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THE AIM AND SCOPE OF THE PdESENT INVESTIGATION. 
The present -day curricula in our schools appear to be the outcome 
of experience, - experience on the part of generations of teachers as to 
the particular subjects, and level of subject, which children at any 
given age have been found capable of tackling. i:íodifications are made 
with changing ideas or ideals, but in the main the curriculum is limited 
by the scholastic ability of the average child. 
If, however, education is to become an undertaking designed to make 
possible the proper development of children, and not merely a technique 
by which to prepare them for future examinations, the standard to be 
expected of the average child must not be based upon an examination 
criterion. For the age at which a child can be induced to absorb and 
reproduce scholastic material is by no means necessarily the age at 
which this same material is fruitful or even healthy for his development 
Even the class -room criterion - the opinion of the teacher as to what 
the average child can do - is not a psychological one. It is based on 
scholastic results; and the question as to whether the production 
of 
these results has been beneficial or otherwise to the child, 
remains 
unanswered. Usually it is not oven asked. 
Some criterion of a psychological kind is therefore 
essential. 
enquiry, however, into the ability of children of different ages to 
tackle the different school subjects, is one much too wide for the 




fruitfully be approached from another and fortunately narrower angle; 
and this is the problem of the method of investigation itself. For 
unless the approach to the child in making an investigation, or to the 
data yielded by one, be without theoretical presupposition, and the 
investigation itself be calculated to bring all the relevant factors 
to light, it is clear that the psychological conclusions arising from 
this will tend to be distorted, with resulting repercussions upon 
educational practice. 
An attempt, therefore, will first be made to arrive at a valid 
me-Ghod of investigation; and thereafter some concrete psychological 
results of this method will be given, which will be focussed back upon 
some of the educational practices at present in use with a view to 
showing how far these can be justified, and to illustrate at the same 
time the illuminating power of the method used. 
Curricula vary from school to school and district to district; but 
a general idea of a certain minimum curriculum can be obtained from that 
recommended for education Authority schools, and the following is an out- 
line of that recommended for Primary Schools by Edinburgh Corporation 
Education uommittee. We shall consider only the more strictly 
scholastic subjects, and the ages at which these are begun. These are: 
Age 5,: Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, Nature- Study. 
Age 7: History, Geography. 
Age 9: Grammar. 
The Arithmetic during the first year involves appreciation and 
understanding of numbers up to 10 with the use of concrete material, 
addition and subtraction up to that number, counting as far as 30, and 
knowledge of value of coins up to 6d. 
Nature -study for the first year involves knowledge of the names of 
birds and other animals, flowers, etc., and observation of the daily 
weather. 
History at age 7 is confined mainly to stories connected with 
historical buildings in the neighbourhood. At age 8 there are stories 
about Egypt and the Pyramids, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Agricola, the 
Goths, Huns and Vandals, Alfred, and so on. At age 9, although still in 
story form, something more in the nature of a period is dealt with, this 
comprising chiefly Scottish history up to 16Q3. 
Geography at age 7 begins with knowledge of north and south poles, 
equator, continents and oceans; knowledge of the origin of certain common 
articles; stories of children in other lands; and the learning of certain 
physical features - island, peninsula, cape, gulf, etc. - by means of a 
sand -tray or other medium. At 8 the child passes to a knowledge of 
certain Scottish rivers, mountains, towns, etc., together with certain 
facts connected with each town, as well as of certain industries such as 
Clyde shipbuilding, Dunfermline linen, Kirkcaldy linoleums, a knowledge of 
railways, etc.. At age 9 he passes to the geography of England and Wales, 
the Irish Free State, and Northern Ireland, with their towns, districts, 
products and industries. 
Grammar, at age 9, begins with simple sentence - building from sub- 
jects and predicates, word -building, and knowledge of some parts of 
.speech. Actual analysis of the sentence does not begin until 10. 




Vulgar and Decimal Fractions; Simple Proportion; 
Bills of Parcels. 
Life -histories of plants and animals; knowledge of 
certain minerals; movements of earth and moon in 
relation to the sun; seasons, tides, etc.. 
History: Period 1714 -1815, treated as before. 
Geography: British Empire. 
Grammar: Sentence analysis; Parsing. 
The above, of course, is a moderate standard of achievement, and 
there are schools in which more is expected. In one Edinburgh school 
visited by the writer, for example, grammar is begun as early as age 7. 
Again, Algebra is not normally begun until after the Primary stage, at 
12; but the writer has before him a well -known elementary arithmetic 
book into the early pages of which simple algebraical exercises are 
introduced along with aritihmetical examples in addition, subtraction, 
etc.. Here it is apparently assumed that a child at this stage can 
handle letters as readily as pure numbers, and the fact that the two 
processes are on different levels of abstraction, is ignored. 
This points to one of the problems with which we shall have to deal. 
Is it a matter of indifference to the child on what level be is asked to 
think, provided that the mental operations are equally simple in degree? 
The educated adult can move freely on all levels; and A + B is as simple 
an expression to him as 1 + 2, and this, in turn, as 1 apple + 2 apples. 
Is the child -mind structurally the same as that of an adult, differing 
only in regard to the complexity of the problems which it can tackle? or 
is it different also in its nature? In other words, is the child a 
little adult, or is he not? 
v 
This question is fundamental for a school curriculum. For if the 
answer is in the affirmative, there is hardly any limit to the age at 
which a subject may be introduced, provided that it is kept sufficiently 
sim 4e. If the answer is negative, it is of great importance for the 
well -being of the child as to whether a subject is given to him before or 
after a given stage in his mental development. 
We are thus brought to the threshold of our first problem - the 
method of investigating the child's mental structure. 
íï 
PART I. 
THE INDIRECT APPROACH. 
Broadly speaking, there are possible to psychology only two ways 
of approach to a study Of the structure of the child's mind. The one 
is the direct method - the method of the mental tests - in which the 
child responds directly to a request for some mental or manual operation. 
The other is the indirect method, that of observing the child's natural 
behaviour toward his environment - physical and social - without the 
obtrusion of the investigator. The only other way of approach - intro- 
spection - is obviously not practicable with young children. 
Jean Piaget, in his "Language and Thought of the Child" (1) and 
"Judgment and Reasoning in the Child" (2) uses both methods. Mrs. Susan 
Isaacs, on the other hand, in her "Intellectual Growth in Young Children" 
(3) 
gives us a long and detailed example purely of the second method of 
approach. 
As a means of investigating the indirect method, we shall deal with 
it in the concrete as it is exemplified by Mrs. Isaacs' experiment; and 
in so doing we shall be able to examine not only the method itself, but 
also how far Mrs. Isaacs has adhered to it. 
Mrs. Isaacs' experiment is at one and the same time an "education 
by environment" of the children concerned and a study of their behaviour 
in the course of that education. But the question of education by 
means of environment, or of a psychological study based upon it, raises 
at once the important problem as to the exact nature of the surroundings 
we are to select for the child. For if education is an affair in which 
the adult takes any part at all, and is not one merely of letting the 
children loose upon the world, to develop unguided like animals, it is 
plain that everyuhing depends upon the environment which we choose for 
them; and the question arises: How is the adult to discover what ought 
to be brought to the child, and in what manner? 
Yrs. Isaacs answers the question by surrounding the children in her 
school with the most varied environment possible, in order "to open the 
facts of the external world to him (the child) in such a way that he can 
seize and understand them." (p. 20) The child is not to be turned 
loose upon the real world, but a kind of filtered edition of it is to be 
brought to him. "The school is, on my view, simply a point of vantage 
for the child in his efforts to understand the real world, and to adapt 
himself to it. It should be a place of shelter for him; but not in the 
sense that it shuts the larger world away from him. Its task is to bring 
the world to him in ways and at a pace fixed by his needs and interests." 
(p. 21) Mrs. Isaacs does not explain how these "needs" are to be discov- 
ered, however; and we are left,apparehtly, to assume that they are 
identical with the child's "interests ". School, teacher, and teaching, 
she adds, "are simply a clarifying medium, through which the facts of 
human life and the physical world are brought within the measure of the 
child's mind at successive stages of growth and understanding." 
Thus, according to the child's manifested interests, the outer 
world is to be brought to him in a suitably simple form, so that he can 
grasp it intellectually and learn to adapt himself to it. In other 
words, Mrs. Isaacs' answer to the question would appear to be: Surround 
the child with a sufficiently varied environment, let him move freely in 
it, and his interests will be your guide as to his further requirements. 
This method of investigation is chosen by Mrs. Issacs in contra- 
distinction to that of Piaget, whom she criticises on the ground that the 
environment in which his children were placed was too restricted, and 
that his "conversational" method does not elicit questions which the 
child would naturally ask when confronted with an environment of objects. 
"Sustained conversations between one child and one adult in one place 
do not provide the circumstances which would prcivoke questions demanding 
causal explanation, or inquiries about inanimate objects." (p.83) 
While the possible importance of this objection is not to be denied, 
attention must be drawn to the exactly opposite error into which Mrs. 
Isaacs herself may fall. While Piaget's conversational method - and in 
general the more restricted environment in which his children found 
themselves - may not elicit all the interests which are present in the 
child's mind, Mrs. Isaacs' "environmental" method may easily yield us 
apparent "interests" which are not naturally present in the child at all. 
These apparent interests may (a) arise through artificial stimulation, 
or (b) be the outcome of a mere misinterpretation of the behaviour of the 
children. As an example of the first, it might be asked: Are children 
of 3, 4, and 5 normally interested in the interior of animals? 
In the data which Mrs. Isaacs has given us, under the heading 
"Interest in Animals" Section 1, and which covers three years of her 
educational experiment, we find the following: During the first 21 months, 
from 1.10.21 to 14.6.26, no single case is reported of a child wishing to 
investigate the inside of an animal, alive or dead. Any dead animal 
found by the children was invariably buried. Then, on 14 .6.26, a pet 
mouse is found killed. "The children looked at it, and spoke of its 
teeth, tail, and fur." Then Mrs. Isaacs says: "Should we look inside 
it ?" The children agree "eagerly ", although the four little children 
concerned, age 3:9, 5:1, 5:9, and 6:10, shudder as the knife cuts the skin. 
On 17.6.26, again at Mrs. Isaacs' suggestion, they dissect three 
crabs. On 18.6.26 a dead toad is found, and "Mfrs. I. asked the older 
children if they would like to look inside it later, and they agreed." 
On 21.6.26 Priscilla, age 6:10, notices that the toad has been opened and 
pinned out, and expresses a desire to dissect it with Mrs. Isaacs; and 
on the same day she wants to "look inside" a cockchafer which appeared to 
be dead. This is the first recorded instance of any of the children 
expressing such a wish on his or her own initiative. Priscilla, however, 
had attended the school since the Spring of 1925. (It is true that on 
3.6.26 Dan, (5:0), after examining the skeleton and anatomical diagrams, 
expresses a wish to see a man walking about with his skin off, so that he 
could "watch what happened and see the blood ". But this may be taken as 
directly suggested by the bones and diagrams which he has been examining). 
The next dissection, on 20.7.26, is again at Mrs. Isaacs' suggestion. 
She had chloroformed some pet rice, and three of the children dissected 
one each. "Priscilla again had some qualms at the beginning, and wanted 
to be assured that they were 'not hurting them'. She also said: "You 
wouldn't do this to us, would you ?" ... "all three showed a little 
excitement about the cutting, but it soon passed ..." 
On 22.7.26 three children dissected snails with Mrs. Isaacs. 
At the beginning of the new session, on 31.10.26, Dan (5 :4) tele- 
phones Mrs. Isaacs (it being Sunday) and tells her that he -and the others 
want to cut up a pet rabbit which has been found dead that morning. Mrs. 
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Isaacs agrees, and the dissection duly takes place after tea. The 
children are all agog to begin, but two new -comers, age 10:5 and 5 :9, 
are"moved emotionally" by the experience and express some "disgust and 
excitement, whereas Dan showed only a steady intellectual interest." 
Dan, however, said once or twice: "You wouldn't do that if it was alive, 
would you? Poor Pamela, (the rabbit), you are sure it doesn't hurt her?" 
On 9.11.26 Dan and Conrad (5:5 and 5:10) write to the Zoo asking 
for dead animals to cut up. 
On 15.11.26 Dan expresses a desire to examine the rabbit further, 
and at Yrs. Isaacs' suggestion they look inside the skull. 
On 22.11.26 one of the teachers brings to school a mouse which has 
died of a tumour. "The children were very eager to cut it up and see 
what was inside the swelling." Seven or eight children sit round and 
watch Yrs. Isaacs open it up. 
The period during which the children, of their own accord, express 
a desire to dissect animals, has covered exactly five months; and now a 
reaction appears to set in. On 24..1.27 a baby rabbit is found dead. 
Jane (10:8) suggests cutting it up, but later the children announce their 
decision to bury it instead. "It is so pretty, we don't want to cut it 
up, we want to keep it ", Priscilla (7:4) expiins. 
On 27.1.27 a mouse is found dead. "The children were grieved, and 
decided, as they had with the young rabbit, that they would bury it, and 
not cut it up." 
On 1.2.27 a pet mouse which had been accidentally killed was brought 
to Mrs. Isaacs by the children. "They said they were not going to cut it 
up, but to bury it - although there was more hesitation about this than on 
the last occasion." 
During the morning the cat brought in two dead sparrows. "Some of 
the children wanted to cut them up, although Dan said 'Let's bury them:' 
The opinion in favour of cutting up prevailed, and Yirs. I. did so." 
Nothing of a similar kind is reported until 23.5.27, When two of the 
young rabbits are found dead. The children were "very troubled about it, 
but no one suggested "looking inside' the dead animals." 
So we have the following facts before us: For the first 21 months of 
the school's existence, i.e. for nearly 6 school terms, no suggestion was 
made by the children that they should 'look inside' any animal. Then 
Mrs. Isaacs makes the suggestion on three occasions within four days, and 
carries out the proposal on each occasion. Three days later, Priscilla 
(6:10) expresses the first spontaneous desire to dissect, an animal. 
The next dissection recorded, a month later, is again at Mrs. Isaacs' 
suggestion; and two days later another dissection takes place, presumably 
again at her suggestion, although it is not stated. Then the session ends. 
At the end of the following October a definite request comes from 
Dan and one or two other children, and 9 days later a request for dead 
animals is sent by them to the Zoo. On 22.11.26 the last unanimous 
desire for dissection is expressed by the children. Then the reaction 
sets in. On 24.1.27, 27.1.27, and 1.2.27, burial is chosen by the 
children in. place of dissection. On the last date there is also a 
non - unanimous return to dissection, but on 23.5.27, when an occasion once 
more arises, the matter is not suggested by anyone. 
There is no question here of throwing doubt upon Mrs. Isaacs' con- 
tention that young children are naturally more interested in animals than 
in plants. It is a readily obsdrvable tendency. But to be interested 
in animals and their ways is one thing; to be interested in their anatomy 
is quite another. The former need not be a scientific interest; the 
latter is necessarily so - or else something morbid. 
From this examination of the records with which Mrs. Isaacs herself 
has furnished us, we can only conclude that the latter interest was not 
normally present in her children, that it had to be deliberately induced, 
at the end of the sixth term, by the repeated efforts of an adult, and 
that the interest so induced in the children lasted, apparently, only for 
one term - from the end of the sixth to the end of the seventh - with the 
exception of one non - unanimous occasion early in the eighth term. 
The fact that the children responded "eagerly" to the first suggestion 
is not a point on which an argument can be based. The curiosity of a 
child can be awakened toward any concrete object in the interior of which, 
it is suggested, there may be something to be discovered. The question 
of psychological importance - from the point of view of the environmental 
method - is not what curiosities can be incited in the child, but what 
curiosities arise in his mind of their own accord. There is no evidence 
in these records that a desire to look inside animals arose of its own 
accord, and there is evidence to show that, in spite of opportunity to 
the contrary, the interest so incited was not maintained. 
This section of the records closes with an incident which is not 
without its humorous side. Anatomical interest seems definitely on the 
wane, and rabbits, mice, and sparrows appear to have lost their appeal. 
But Mrs. Isaacs seems determindd. that the study shall go on, and she 
arrives at school one morning carrying a whole calf's head. It is a 
magnificent coup; the children's curiosity is caught once more; and the 
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curtain rings down upon the merry scene of Mrs. Isaacs and Jane bisecting 
the head with a hack -saw. 
That these children did, within the limits indicated, evince an 
interest in the interior of animals and of their own bodies in consequence, 
is not to be denied. So long as we keep to the concrete, there is no 
reason whatever why we should not be able to stimulate in young children 
an interest in anything which immediately concerns themselves, or in 
which they themselves can take an active part. But the question as to 
the period of development at which this interest should naturally awaken, 
and at which it would be most valuable to the child, still remains to be 
answered. 
Mrs. Isaacs maintains that the experience of 'looking inside' dead 
animals caused these children to be more kind to live ones. Apart from 
the difficulty of distinguishing this as a possible cause, from others 
incidental to the children's activities - such as the daily care of the 
pets themselves - there is a much bigger issue to be considered. The 
question is, at what age is a child's mind ready to be orientated toward 
the environment in that particular relationship which we call "scientific "': 
For this comes even prior to the question as to the age at which anatomy 
is valuable to the child. 
From the earliest age at which children can observe and recognise 
objects, we may speak of a knowledge of the environment. This involves 
the power of ideation in some form. The particular attitude of any given 
human being to his environment will depend therefore upon how he uses 
that knowledge, i.e. how he utilises his ideas, (using the term "idea" 
-9 
at the moment in the broad sense, to include mental imagery. 
Observation of children and adults shows that three ways of using 
ideas appear to occur. The first may be called ''Volitional ", observed 
chiefly in young children when they "act out" in bodily movement the 
events which they see, or have seen, around them. It is the imitative 
stage - a desire to identify themselves with the environment to the 
extent of literal bodily movement corresponding to the movements of the 
objects seen. The second may be called "Imaginative ", again most 
common in children, when the impression made by the observation of one 
object is projected on to another object, thereby transforming the 
latter in the eyes of the subject. The very young,child tends toward 
the Volitional attitude, and when playing at "railway trains" will be the 
train or engine, making movements with arms and legs like those of the 
piston -rods or other parts of the machinery, and emitting appropriate 
noises like that of steam. But the slightly older child will tend to 
seize upon some external objects - such as articles of furniture - 
arrange them in a suitable way, and picture these as the train by project- 
ing his imagery on to them. 
The third attitude to the environment - the Objective attitude - 
is qualitatively different from both of these. It is the reverse of 
imitation which is identification of the self with the object. It seeks, 
on the contrary, to set the object over against the subject as something 
to be intellectually understood. Hence the resultant idea is not used 
for re- projection on to the environment, but is.itself retained as an 
object of further contemplation. 
In other words, the ego of the individual at this third stage 
-lo- 
stands in a quite objective relation to the idea, - confronts it. At 
the second stage the idea is not confronted as such, but is used for 
subjective ends, being confronted only indirectly in the projected 
situation. At the first, or imitative stage the idea is not confronted 
in any sense. The child is totally immersed in the idea. Not only does 
the ego of the child live in the idea, but his bodily movements appear 
to be controlled directly by the idea itself. The movements are literal; 
and this fact is to be distinguished from the play- situation of the older 
child, the movements in which are directed according to his phantasy. 
For even when the child plays the part of "engine- driver" in his own 
"projected" train, his movements are no mere slavish imitation of those 
of an observed engine -driver, but form part of the total dramatic situa- 
tion in which he is an actor, and which is his own creation. Be acts 
the part, and does not merely imitate. In other words, he lives in the 
idea, but he moves freely in it - that is, the bodily movement is not under 
the immediate control of the idea but is mediated by the ego of the child 
operating in terms of phantasy. 
Thus we can distinguish these two situations by saying that, in 
imitation, not only does the ego of the child live in the idea, but that 
the bodily movements are controlled directly by the idea; whereas, at 
the imaginative stage, the ego can either live in an idea or project it, 
but that the bodily movements are free and directed by the child's own 
phantasy. 
The exact significance, therefore, of a child's interest in an 
object or event is discoverable only when one observes how he treats the 
ideas he has so gained, - that is, whether he imitates the impression, 
acts or projects the idea, or objectively confronts it. 
It is plain that the first two types of relation to the environ- 
ment cannot be a basis for scientific thinking. Only the third could 
form such a basis. But scientific thinking is more than a mere ability 
to confront an idea objectively, - to be able, for example, to describe 
objectively some object previously observed. One must add to this the 
ability to think relationally - to see concrete ideas linked together 
into comprehensible wholes, and to grasp the relationship between these 
wholes. When this ability first makes its appearance in the child, we 
may begin to speak of the germs of the scientific outlook in him, but 
clearly not before that time. 
The question now arises: How fax should we expect the presence of 
either of the first two types of relation to ideas to preclude the 
possibility of a scientific attitude being taken on any occasion whatso- 
ever? The child who can so far control his imagery as to be able to 
project it, can reasonable be expected to confront it, when required, 
and to treat it realistically. But how far can we expect this of a 
child in whom the impressions of the outer world seem to act directly 
on his motor system, as at the imitative stage, since the ego at this 
stage does not appear to exercise any mediating control? While the child 
who takes pleasure in living in phantasy and in projecting his imagination 
upon the environment is unlikely to be one who is prepared to consider 
that same environment in terms of classification and of abstract relat- 
ions. For classification involves abstraction from the environment, 
which is the antithesis of projection on to it. 
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Only a reference to concrete data and analysis, of course, can 
settle such questions definitely; but these tentative considerations 
should be a warning lest we tend to read into a child's behaviour factors 
which perhaps cannot possibly be there. Yet it is just characteristic 
of the "little adult" attitude toward the child, that it makes this 
assumption. It assumes that phantasy and other characteristics of the 
child mind can exist side by side with a scientific orientation to the 
environment. Thus Yrs. Isaacs, viewing the children from this "little 
adult" standpoint, appears to see no reason why such tendencies and 
scientific interest should not co -exist in the child as in the adult. 
But the adult uses his phantasy in quite a different way. Adult 
phantasy is not the phantasy of the child. The adult does not identify 
himself with his imagery, nor does he project it on to the environment. 
Be stands outside his own phantasy and is not subjectively tied to it, 
as is the child. For this reason, phantasy and the scientific attitude 
can co -exist in the adult mind without the one interfering with the other. 
When, for example, the adult studies his environment as a stimulus 
to his imagination for the purposes of some creative work - as novelist, 
dramatist, or artist - he does not re- project his imagery upon the real 
environment, but creates for the purpose a quite separate realm, namely, 
the novel, the theatre, or his canvas. Be thus does not intermingle the 
one realm with the other, as does the child; and for this reason the two 
realms can co -exist in his mind in the form of two distinct attitudes to 
reality. 
The difference between adult and child is not lessened by the fact 
that children ask a multitude of questions which appear to require a 
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scientific or even a philosophic answer. For it does not follow that a 
scientific answer is the one that is sought for, or is suitable for the 
child. To assume that the answer must be a scientific one, is simply to 
assume the "little adult" theory at the outset. The alternative mode of 
answering is not fiction or falsehood, as many people appear to think. 
Truth can be expressed in other guises than that of the abstract or 
intellectual. It can be expressed pictorially, for example; and this may 
prove to be a much more f .iitiul way of answering the child than by 
giving him the kind of response which an adult mind finds satisfying. 
For example, when a child asks: "Why don't trains stop and start off 
suddenly express ?" (quoted from Nathan Isaacs' appendix to Mrs. Isaacs' 
book) he is not hecessarily expecting an answer in terms of Dynamics. A 
perfectly adequate reply would be: "Well, neither can you, when you run!" 
This is not a causal, scientific answer; but it nevertheless conveys to 
the child through a "picture" - through a mental picture of himself as 
the train, when he himself tries to start or stop running at top speed - 
the dynamic facts of the situation. Be then feels the need for gathering 
speed, or for slowing down - a much more satisfying and realistic explan- 
ation than any which theory could give him. 
Or again, "Why does. the water spread out flat (in the bath)? Why 
won't it keep up in the middle ?" is a question put by a child of 4;5, 
quoted from the same source. At this age, when his attitude to the 
environment is still largely imitative or volitional, the child should 
readily understand an answer in volitional form; and one could reply: 
"Because it wants to run into all the corners." The child can then feel, 
by virtue of his own imitative tendency, the native tendency of all fluids. 
Such an answer, with its voluntaristic flavour, may shock the 
physicist; but it in no way contradicts the physical theory, which 
depends ultimately upon gravitation - the tendency of solid bodies to 
attract one another. Is that a less voluntaristic expression? 
It can thus be seen that such questions by young children can be 
answered in an imaginative or voluntaristic way, but one which in no way 
conflicts with scientific truth. It is not necessary to invent fairy- 
tales as an alternative. Later it will be shown, in the description of 
an actual teaching experiment carried out by the writer, how an abstract 
subject can be successfully taught by making use of a similar approach. 
The putting of a question does not imply the ability to understand 
an answer. That is true even of adults. And it does not follow, when a 
child uses the word 'UV?" or "How?" - even although the question be 
couched in causal terms - that he is capable of understanding the cause 
of the event which puzzles him, or even that he is interested in that 
type of explanation. It is not so much the question which gives us an 
indication of the child's stage of mental development, as the nature of 
the answer Which he is capable of receiving. 
Thus, neither the deeply philosophical questions of young children, 
not their interest in objects of the environment, has per se much 
significance. One must first ascertain the nature of the answers which 
the child can receive, in the one case, and his general attitude toward 
the environment, in the other. These two problems are mutually dependent, 
since the child's power of comprehension at any stage will be a reflection 
of his attitude to the environment, and his attitude to the environment 
a function of his mental structure, or power of comprehension. Before 
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discussing the manner in which this problem can best be approached, the 
position adopted by Mrs. Isaacs will be more fully considered. 
This position can be seen from the following quotations (pp. 17,18); 
"On the basis of previous direct observations of the behaviour of 
young children ... it was clear to me that children as intelligent 
as those in this group have a very direct and active interest in 
everything that goes on in the general world around them ... 
Active pleasure in looking at these things, and eager curiosity 
about them, is one of the most striking features of the minds of 
intelligent children of two years and more. It has quite as large 
a place in their spontaneous behaviour as their delight in stories 
and "make-believe", in song and dance, and in all forms of "self - 
expression". And yet it has been very largely shut out of the 
tradition of schools for young children, even of progressive schools.. 
It is quite true, and a most significant truth, that the child's 
world is essentially a dramatic world. Undoubtedly, his direct 
interest in things going on around him in the home and the street 
has its roots deep in an intensely personal life. The records in 
this volume show how often and how readily the most active interest 
in these things slips over into the dramatic play of father, mother 
and child; but they also help to show that their deeper sources do 
not prevent these interests from leading on to real experience, and 
from crystallising out into forms of sustained inquiry, and delight 
in the actual process of discovery, which are at least anticipations 
of the genuine scientific spirit." 
And on pp. 21 -23, part of which has already been quoted and is 
restated here for the sake of coherence: 
"The school is, on my view, simply a point of vantage for the child 
in his efforts to understand the real world, and to adapt himself 
to it. It should be a place of shelter for him; but not in the 
sense that it shuts the larger world away from him. Its task is to 
bring the world to him, in ways and at a pace fixed by his needs and 
interests. The school, the teacher, and the teaching alike are 
simply a clarifying medium, through which the facts of human life 
and the physical world are brought within the measure of the child's 
mind at successive stages of growth and understanding. 
And it is the twentieth century world in which most children and 
certainly those in this group, are interested - the world of motor- 
cars, engines, aeroplanes, gramophones, and the wireless. These 
tools of use and pleasure surround them in the street and in the 
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home, in picture books and illustrated papers, and in the talk of 
grown -ups and older children. They have a quite direct appeal to 
the imagination and interest even of the younger children, who love 
to watch trains and trams, to be "the fastest train in the world ", 
as they run round the garden, to draw or model an engine or a motor, 
a "wireless" or a system of roads and water - pipes. They hold 
attention and stir efforts of understanding quite as powerfully as 
dogs and horses, as things seen on a country walk or a visit to a 
farm, as stories of ancient heroes or the people of far lands. They 
are a part of these children's immediate and concrete world, which 
it is the business of the school to illuminate and simplify for their 
understanding. 
Not only so: it is at the point of these concrete interests that 
the intelligent young child touches a characteristic element in the 
spirit of the modern world. When his mind moves out to these 
things and events, first by way of dramatic value, and then by way 
of understanding the "how" and the "how much ", he shows himself 
ready to enter into the scientific way of life. He makes it clear 
that pleasure in the active exploration of the world, and readiness 
to be guided by facts, already have at least an embryonic meaning 
for him. 
As theorists, therefore, we were carried far into the remoter 
provinces of the philosphy of education, by looking at these direct 
and concrete interests of intelligent young children. And one of 
our problems inevitably became that of providing the means and 
devising the methods by which the children could sustain and 
develop these interests, as a part of their living delight in 
e2perience as a whole. Clearly there is no room for "science" or 
any "teaching" of science in a school for little children; but 
there is ample occasion for meeting the actual movements of the 
children's minds towards "finding out" about the world around them. 
Our theoretical aims in this could be stated from either of the 
two opposite ends of the problem. (1) To find suitable ways of 
giving satisfaction to this among all the other educative impulses 
of children; and (2) To discover the beginnings of the scientific 
spirit and scientific method in the thought of young children, with 
a view to making sure of their amplest development." 
In the light of our fore -going analysis, we may agree entirely 
with the facts stated at the beginning of the above quotation, namely that 
children have an active interest in everything that goes on in the 
world around them. But, as we have just seen, such "active pleasure 
in looking at these things" must not be assganed without proof, to be due 
to a natural scientific interest; and it cannot be claimed that 
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"dramatic interests" lead on, in any psychological sense, to experiences 
"crystallising out into forms of sustained inquiry, and delight in the 
actual process of discovery," if by these we mean interests of an objective 
scientific kind. This is the other source of error capable of arising 
through the method employed by Yrs. Isaacs - the possible error of 
misinterpretation of the children's behaviour. 
"Experimentation" and "interest in discovery" are terms applicable 
to scientific activities, but not all experimentation and interest in 
discovery are scientific. Every human being has to discover the brute 
facts of his environment - to learn how things behave in varying situations 
and he has a natural impulse toward discovering this at a very early age. 
Each new discovery - unless it have painful consequences - brings pleasure 
to the discoverer because, apparently, of a fundamental impulse to make 
himself "at home" in the world. This impulse would appear to be a spring 
below which psychology cannot dig. It arises from the very centre of 
human life; and to ask why a child seeks to know his environment is as 
fruitless as to ask why one solid body tends to be drawn toward another. 
This discovery of the natural environment and of human relationship 
to it - what will burn, and what will not; what solid objects can be 
easily modified, and what can not; what will float, and what will not, 
and the like, - have been common human knowledge for many thousands of 
years. Physical science, on the other hand, is of recent birth - a 
matter of four or five centuries. It is plain, then, that concrete 
knowledge of the environment, and physical science are not to be confused. 
Science began when men were no longer content to know merely what the 
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environment contains or does, but asked what are the laws which govern it. 
We thus return to the point already made, that science is not a mere 
knowledge of the environment - however objective and factual - but a 
grouping of objects and events into related wholes, arrived at, in the 
long run, through abstract relational thinking. It is the desire to do 
this which constitutes the genuine scientific spirit; and while of course 
an objective factual knowledge of the environment is first necessary, an 
interest in this can no more be said to be an "anticipation "r >of the 
scientific spirit, than a child's interest in stones can be said to be an 
anticipation of an interest in architecture. It is the manner of the 
grouping together of the stones which constitutes architecture, not a 
knowledge of the stones themselves, or of their behaviour, however 
necessary that knowledge may be to the architect. 
We have already seen how, in the records relating to interest in 
animals, the children's interest in dissection was the outcome of adult 
influence. If we now examine the section of the records entitled: 
"Increase of Knowledge: Problems and Experiment, Observation and 
Discovery" (p.125) we find the following: 
On 27.1.26 a Bunsen burner was introduced into the schoolroom. From 
that date until the end of this section of the records, in October 1927, 
there took place some 42 instances of acts which, on the broadest 
possible basis, might be termed "experiments ", initiated by the children 
themselves. Of these, no fewer than 23 were connected, directly or 
indirectly, with this Bunsen burner, and 6 were connected with other 
apparatus, namely, a U -tube (2), pulley- wheels, a balance, a drilling - 
machine, and a vice. 
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Thus we see, in the first place, that more than two -thirds of all 
the "experiments" recorded during this period (apart from the Biological 
records) were connected with scientific or mechanical apparatus. Now 
there are 20 pages in this section which extends from October 1924 to 
October 1927. The Bunsen burner, therefore, was introduced within two 
months of the middle point of the records in regard to time. Yet the 
records prior to its introduction occupy 4 pages, and after that point 
16 pages, while the ratio of actual "experiments" before and after that 
date is 10 to ¿f2. 
In view of these figures it can hardly be denied that the activities 
of these children were largely orientated by means of this artificial 
environment. For it must be emphasised that an environment of scientific 
apparatus is an artificial one - a secondary environment produced by the 
adult in his desire to investigate the natural, or primary environment. 
The scientific impulse came before laboratories; and if a scientific 
attitude were naturally present in the young child, it should arise 
through his contact with the natural environment, and should not need 
laboratory or mechanical devices in order to stimulate it. In short, 
the presence of scientific apparatus should arise from a scientific 
interest, and not the scientific interest from the presence of the 
apparatus. 
Mrs. Isaacs, however, assumes that the children's "immediate and 
concrete world" is something which "it is the business of the school to 
illuminate and simplify for their understanding ", and that "when his 
(the child's) mind moves out to these things and events, first by way of 
dramatic value, and then by way of understanding the "how" and the 
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"how much ", he shows himself ready to enter into the scientific way of 
life." These assumptions on her part, made without pausing adequately 
to consider what other interpretations might be placed upon the 
children's behaviour, explain the presence of the apparatus. 
In order to see how far this assumption was justified, let us now 
analyse the cases of "experimentation" which occur in this section. 
Experiments may be of two kinds, - haphazard or purposive. The 
first can be characterised simply as play - a more or less idle fiddling 
with objects or apparatus, new trying this, now that, just to see if 
anything interesting or exciting will happen. The second can always be 
identified by the deliberate placing of an object or objects in varying 
situations, or placing various objects in the same situation, with a 
view to discovering how the objects will react. The essence of purposive 
experiment is thus the comparison of events with one another, these 
events having previously been brought by the experimenter into comparable 
relations. The outcome must be at least some elementary classification. 
But this purposive type may be one of two kinds, according to the 
purpose, which maybe to discover either (a) an empirical classification 
of facts, or (b) a law or principle governing that classification. Only 
the latter can be called scientific experiment. 
Wramining now the whole of this section (from October 1924 to October 
1927) there are 52 instances of experimentation. Of these, only 10 can 
be said to be purposive; and if we look among these for evidence of an 
attempt to formulate a principle or law of the simplest kind, we find 
there is only one. 
Those classifiable as purposive are as follows: 
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12.11.24 Melting of wax on hot pipe. 
19.6.25 Seeing what will float. 
do. Seeing how paper will float. 
8.7.25 Seeing if some objects will float. 
9.7.25 Seeing how the window looks between one's fingers. 
16.4.26 Burning wool and cotton. 
21.6.26 Balancing wooden boards over edge of table. 
16.11.26 Experiment with thermometer and boiling water. 
25.2.27 Experiment with Jeyes' fluid in water. 
26.4.27 Experiment with chalk on wheel of mouse cage. 
Only two of these are in any way connected with the available 
scientific apparatus, namely, that on 16.4.26 and on 16.11.26, involving 
the Bunsen in both cases, with some additional apparatus in the second. 
Others, again, which at a casual glance look as if they were not merely 
purposive but actually scientific, - such as the experiments i rith the 
U -tube (22.6.26 and 25.1.27) - cannot be included in this list. The 
children's conclusions in each of these cases are as follows: 
'We found a U that is 
it goes up the other 
when you've done it, 
and: "We've found out that 
you can't pour water 
a bottle, and if you put water down into it, 
side of the U. The water weighs up and down 
like a scale." 
if you keep your finger in one end of the tube, 
down into the other." 
In each case we have nothing more than a simple empirical datum, 
neither connected nor compared with anything. These instances may be 
contrasted with the purposive action of the children in placing various 
objects upon the hot pipe (12.11.24) in order to see which would melt 
and which would not, thus comparing different objects in a given situation 
and making an elementary classification of them into melting and non- 
melting objects. 
Of the above 10 instances, all are empirical in aim or result 
except one - the first of those on 19.6.25. It is recorded as follows: 
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6. 3. 25 Plasticine put under the piano. 
L. 5. 25 Mixing white and yellow plasticine. 
16. 6. 25 Putting ice in water. 
27.11. 25 Trying to make ice. 
do. Trying to melt snow. 
27. 1. 26 Varying air supply to Bunsen. 
29. 1.26 Melting glass. 
1. 2. 26. do. 
5. 3. 26 Unscrewing nuts of table legs. 
17. 6. 26 Melting glass. 
22. 6. 26 U-tube and water. 
14. 7. 26 Playing with hose -pipe. 
411. 26 Pealing heat of steam from kettle. 
20. 1. 27 Discovering adjustments of drilling machine. 
24. 1. 27 Melting glass. 
25. 1. 27 U -tube and water. 
The remaining instances of "experiment" can hardly be taken serious.. 
ly, even as evidence of a pursuit of factual knowledge. We have to bear 
in mind that children are interested not merely in the factual aspect 
of their environment, but are attracted also - and perhaps at this early 
stage very largely so - by the feelings, emotions, and sensations which 
the environment arouses in them. For example, young children are 
especially interested in any object which changes or moves, or in any- 
thing in which their phantasy sees the eerie or mysterious, or simply in 
new sensations of colour, touch, smell, and the like. 
There is definite excitement for the young child in the experience 
of a moving train, a galloping horse, or an aeroplane, apart altogether 
from knowledge of them as objects; there is a thrill for him in peering 
down a well, or into a dark cave; and there is endless pleasure for him 
in playing with fire or flame and in setting objects alight. In the 
last case there is the double attraction of the flame itself and the 
power which it gives to him who uses it, and the element of excitement 
or surprise at the changes in objects which it may bring about; and if, 
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in the process, varying colours of flame are produced, the emotional 
excitement is further increased. But all these are subjective interests 
and have nothing to do with a desire for knowledge, even although 
knowledge may in some cases be acquired through them. 
â child of 5 who rushes repeatedly to a neighbouring railway bridge 
to watch passing trains, evinces an emotional excitement which the mere 
factual or cognitive aspect of the event can hardly justify; children who 
peer down a well or into an open street drain, are attracted probably at 
least as much by feelings of mystery or emotional curiosity, as by an 
interest in water supply or civic sewage; and it is fairly certain that 
children who crowd round a street bonfire are not there because of a 
scientific interest in combustion. Similarly, if we put a Bunsen burner 
into the hands of a child of ii., we must ask ourselves how much of his 
consequent behaviour is mere play - a desire to see something happen 
because of the surprise and excitement of it - before we begin to speak 
of his cognitive interest in discovery. 
Let us follow the behaviour of Phineas (4:0) with the Bunsen. The 
underlined portions of the following quotations should be noted. 
"17.12.27. Phineas spent almost the whole morning with the burner. 
Be gave it the most absorbed and concentrated attention, and showed 
much ingenuity and invention in thinking of fresh things to do with 
it, and the greatest delight and excitement over the different 
happenings. When the burner was first put on it would not light. 
On an earlier occasion some melted lead had fallen down the pipe and 
blocked it. In order to make it burn Miss C. unscrewed the pipe 
and cleaned out the hole with a pin. When it was burning normally 
Phineas presently asked Miss C. to take off the vertical tube again, 
and had it lit without this; then put the tube on again but lit the 
flame at the bottom. Then he managed to get a flame both at the top 
and at the bottom by placing spent matches through the air hole 
horizontally. Then he turned the gas out, and filled the vertical 
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tube with burnt matches, and re -lit it. He found this gave a 
different kind of flame, and watched all the colours with great 
delight. Later on, when he had matches in the tube, he lit the 
burner at the bottom only, and this made the matches smoulder." 
"21.2.27. Phineas asked for the burner again .... He again spent 
the morning with various experiments, sometimes lighting it at the 
top, sometimes at the bottom. Presently he wanted something else to 
burn, and put a stick in the flame; but Miss C. asked him to burn 
sticks on the bonfire, not in the schoolroom. He said, That else 
can we burn ?'" 
"Lena was eating an apple, and suggested cooking this. They put the 
apple, and a brown paper bag, in water in a saucepan, on a tripod 
over the Bunsen. Presently they added some raffia, and they put so 
much in that it hung over the sides .... With a little help it was 
pushed in and flame lit. They saw that the raffia stained the -rater. 
"22.2.27. Phineas again asked for the burner, and held some 
crystals of coloured bath salts in the flame. 'It all goes white, 
doesn't it ?' he said. Miss C. 'What makes it go white ?' 'The 
flame.' Be repeated several times in his characteristic way, 'It 
all goes white, doesn't it ?'" 
He later put a saucepan with raffia on the tripod. 
"24.2.27. Phineas on arrival wanted to cook, and put some water 
into a small kettle and took it to the burner. The saucer containing 
some of the bath crystals which he had used a few days earlier was 
there, and he played the flame of the burner directly on to them. 
When they melted he said, 'Look, it's all juice - isn't it nice ?' 
The burner was partly choked and he cleaned it out with a pin. He 
left the pin in the hole when he lit it, and the flame spread out 
fanwise. He was delighted with this, and later put two pins in. 
Only the points would go in, and the length of the pins standing up 
could be seen to get red hot, and to bend over. Then he turned out 
the flame, and asked Miss C. to fix in three pins, and again watched 
the result of heating them in the flame. Later he heated the raffia 
in the saucepan again, and held a teaspoonful of water in the flame, 
watching the bubbles of steam. When the spoon got too hot to hold 
he got another. Then he held the flame of the Bunsen near the water, 
and presently put it right in. When it went out he asked ';Vhy did it 
go out ?' Miss C. ']thy ?' Phineas: 'Because of the water.' When 
he was intending to relight the burner while holding it near the 
water, the gas ignited after it had passed through the water, several 
inches away. He was excited at this, and asked 'Is the water 
burning ?' Miss C. asked, 'Does water burn ?' 'No' he said, but 
asked the same question in a puzzled way several times. Miss C. 
asked 'What is burning ?' Be replied 'The air'. She said, 'Is it 
air coming from the pipe ?' At this moment Conrad came up and said 
'No, it's gas.' Later Phineas tried to reproduce the distant flame, 
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"3.5.27. Today several of the children asked for the burner .... 
Phineas asked for a saucepan, and they put some water in it, with 
bath salts, soap flakes, and later orange juice and an apple .... 
Their interest today seemed to be much more in the pleasure of their 
own activities, stirring, pouring, etc., than in the results, the 
changes due to heat, etc.." 
The above has been quoted in order to show the behaviour of one of 
these children - a child whose name is cited, in connection with experi- 
ments, at least three times more frequently than that of any other 
individual child, from the time of the introduction of the Bunsen burner 
until the end of the records. It cannot therefore be maintained that he 
does not adequately represent this "interest in discovery" which we are 
discussing. To simplify the investigation further, only those experi- 
ments made by this child in connection with the Bunsen have been quoted. 
We have thus a continuous record of a representative child engaged in 
experimentation of various kinds with the same instrument. 
First he plays with the burner itself, doing all sorts of things 
with it and showing "the greatest delight and excitement over the 
different happenings ". He then manages to light it at both top and 
bottom by means of inserted matches, giving a different kind of flame, 
and he watches "all the different colours with great delight ". Then, on 
the next occasion, when looking for "something else to burn" he passes on 
to "cooking" an apple, brown paper, and raffia. 
Next day he holds some coloured bath salts in the flame, with the 
remark "It all goes white, doesn't it ?" and then water and raffia are 
"cooked "in a saucepan. A few days later he again wants to "cook ", but 
his eye is caught by the bath salts left over from the previous occasion, 
and he plays the flame on these until they melt. "Look, it's all juice. 
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Isn't it nice ?" Next a pin is left accidentally in the burner, which 
causes the flame to spread out fanwise. "He was delighted with this ", 
and he tries two and then three pins; then he cooks some raffia, boils 
water in a teaspoon and watches the bubbles of steam. Later, by accident, 
the gas becomes ignited after passing through the water; he is surprised 
and puzzled, and apparently, in spite of his questions being "returned" to 
him by an adult, and the more practical help of a contemporary, he is 
unable to grasp the situation. Next day he discovers an old and wet 
match box, which he dries and burns, and is puzzled by the differently 
coloured flame emitted by the striking portion. Then he pushes a match 
through the hole of the burner and discovers that the burner makes a 
noise like an aeroplane. "It's m aeroplane. Isn't it a funny noise ?" 
Some weeks later he melts some soda crystals, watching the "juice" 
bubble over and run down the side of the tube. Be does this many times 
over. Then he puts heated objects into water to hear them "sizzle ", and 
is more delighted the more noise they make; and the record ends, some six 
weeks later, with the cooking of bath salts, soap flakes, orange juice, 
and an apple. 
Apart from the frequent resort to cooking, which can be described 
only as imitative play, we must note the reactions of this child to the 
various events, - his "delight and excitement over the different happen- 
ings", the delight with which he watches the different colours of flame, 
and the flame spreading out fanwise, and the bubbling of the juice over 
the edge of the burner - repeated many times; the excitement with which 
he hears the noise like an aeroplane emitted by the burner, and the 
delight afforded by the sizzle of the heated objects when put into water. 
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It is plain that his interests are in colour, sound, movement, and in 
bringing about such changes, all of which seems to give him aesthetic 
pleasure, or excitement. This is quite a different thing from being 
interested in the events themselves as objects of intellectual cognition. 
Mrs. Isaacs does not appear to make this distinction; and it is only when 
the children depart so far from the appearances of a scientific interest 
as to cook bath salts, soap flakes, orange juice, and an apple, that she 
is constrained to remark: "Their interest today seemed to be much more 
in the pleasure of their own activities, stirring, pouring, etc., than 
in the results, the changes due to heat, etc." 
But an interest in change may be either an interest in seeing the 
change take place, or an interest in the results of the change. And an 
interest in seeing the change may be due to the mere pleasure of witness- 
ing change for its own sake - a desire for sense -stimulus, - or an 
interest in the manner, sequence, rapidity, etc., of the process itself, - 
i.e. a cognitive interest. While an interest in the results of the 
change may be due to the excitement of new sensations of colour, sound, 
etc., or an intellectual interest in the new state of the object. Mrs. 
Isaacs seems always to attribute to the children the latter alternative 
of each of these possibilities. 
When adults go to witness a firework display, their interest lies 
in the mere element of surprise and pleasure due to the sudden appearance 
of unexpected arrangements of colours and forms, and in the movement and 
change of these colours. We do not imagine that they have gone there on 
account of a scientific interest in the combustibles and in the chemical 
changes which they are undergoing. Why, then, should Firs. Isaacs assume 
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that children - who are even more susceptible to the pleasures of such 
sense -excitement - should be interested always in the intellectual 
aspect of their "experiments ", instead of in the mere delight of a 
"spectacle "? 
There can hardly be any doubt that the activities of Phineas, 
quoted above, and which occupy so large a portion of the records concern- 
ed, are due to a search for excitement of one kind or another; and, when 
this is found, it will be noted, the experiment is repeated again and 
again:.. But a search for excitement is just the contrary of a search for 
objective knowledge. The interest is not in the object for its own sake, 
or in knowledge for its own sake, but in the subjective effect which the 
discovery produces. To overlook the fact that a child indulges in this 
search for excitement in his environment, slumping all his "explorations" 
under the heading of intellectual interest, is to conceive of him not 
merely as a little adult, but as a little intellectual god. 
The whole explanation would seem to be that Yrs. Isaacs, first of 
all assuming the "little adult" theory, confuses two forms of pleasure, - 
the naive and purely sentient pleasure of the child, afforded by a 
discovery because it is spectacular or unexpected, and the intellectual 
pleasure of the adult, afforded by the discovery of new truth. But unless 
we are prepared, in a psychological study, to begin by making such 
elementary distinctions, we can hardly hope to rise above the level of 
dilettantism. 
The interests and activities of the other children appear to show 
as little cause for intellectualistic interpretation as those of Phineas. 
A few will now be quoted: 
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"7.10.26. Tommy (4;7) experimented with the way that a number of 
draughts would roll when they were stood on edge in a row, and 
started to roll by a push with a pencil." 
We should note here again the factor of movement in the interest. 
"21.10.25. The lights in the schoolroom are on pulleys, and Frank 
(6;0) today pointed out "that white thing above the light" (the 
china weight of the pulley) and asked, "What is that for ?" Mrs. I. 
pulled the light down until it was within his reach, and he made it 
move up and down with great interest, calling the others to "come and 
see ". The children then asked Lrs. I. to pull all the six lights 
down low, and they made "houses" under each of them. They all felt 
the bulbs, 'Feel how warm it is.'" 
Here once again we have a moving object. ;'uld Frank have continued 
his interest if the white object which first attracted him had been a 
fd,xture? Then, it is to be noted that as soon as all six lights are 
pulled down low, the children - instead of continuing to investigate 
the mechanism, as one expects they are going to do - immediately begin to 
play "houses" under each of them, and are attracted by the sensation of 
touching the warm bulbs. The record here could hardly show more plainly 
how evanescent was the children's interest in the pulleys. Nevertheless, 
such incidents prompted hrs. Isaacs to procure a set of aluminium pulleys 
which could be fixed to the walls of the schoolroom or elsewhere, because 
"they were very interested in the mechanism, but the pulleys were far too 
high for the children to see them clearly." (p.36). It is always the 
same intellectualistic assumption, - no allowance being made for the 
pleasure of watching or controlling something which moves. 
Then we find one or two instances of curiosity being aroused by 
"mysterious" noises proceeding from the water - pipes: 
"12.1.25. There was much excited interest in the bubbling sounds 
made by the hot -water pipes this morning. The children kept running 
to listen to them, and wanted to climb up so as to see the cistern." 
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"8.12.25. It had been a severe frost for some days. During the 
morning, the children heard a noise in the lavatory cistern, due to 
its sudden filling on the thaw. They ran to the cloak -room and 
said, "It's the unfreezing of the water," and watched the tap in the 
basin beginning slowly to trickle. They talked at length about the 
frost, frozen water, frozen and burst pipes, the gas not working, and 
so on." 
Unless there were other incidents relating to the water- supply which 
the records do not disclose, such "interests" seem hardly to necessitate 
the introduction of a glass U -tube on 22.6.26: 
"The children having long been very interested in the problems of 
the water- supply, today Mrs. I. gave them a glass U- tube." 
The two incidents above quoted, appear to be quite adequately 
explicable in terms of mere curiosity over something heard but not seen. 
In any case, when the glass t -tube did arrive, the records do not show 
that the children connected it in any way with the water -supply. 
Finally, three further references to Phineas should be noted, in 
which he is engaged in other interests than that of the Bunsen burner: 
"19.1.27. After lunch Jessica (1}; 3) began unscrewing the handle of 
the vice on the carpenter's bench. Phineas (3;11) took the second 
handle, and they took the vice right off twice and screwed it on 
again. After about two turns, Phineas went round to the other side 
of the bench to see how much further in or out the screw was. Every 
time, he called to Miss C., "Come and see how far it is now," and 
was not satisfied until she had looked. He did this perhaps forty 
times and said exactly the same phrase every time, and showed the 
same pleasure and triumph in his achievement." 
Once again we have an interest in movement and change for its own 
sake, accompanied by a delight in the power to control that change. That 
the interest here is not cognitive is seen by the fact that the act was 
repeated about forty times, with the same pleasure each time. 
"27.1.27. Miss C. was mixing some starch paste, and Phineas (3;11) 
said he wanted to do some. Be watched Miss C. do hers, then asked 
12 
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for a pot the same size, and an equal amount of starch. Be mixed 
it first with a little cold water, as Miss C. did, then asked her to 
pour in the boiling water; but finding the steam hot, he would also 
put in cold water. When the jar was full he was very disappointed 
that it had not turned blue as Miss C.'s had done. 'Da didn't it 
turn blue ?' Miss C. told him that it was probably because he had 
put in too much cold water, and asked whether he would like to heat 
it on the gas cooker. He said 'Yes' eagerly; but when it was put 
on the gas, he was so interested in the gas jets that he forgot 
about the paste. He asked perfunctorily, 'Has it turned blue ?' but 
didn't really look at it. He asked Miss C. to light and turn out 
and re-light all the different jets several times over." 
The first part of this record is a perfect example of imitation, and 
is just what one would expect of a normal child of that age. Note how 
he first watches Miss C., then demands the same size of pot and the same 
quantity of starch; then he adds water, first cold, then hot, just as 
she did, and is disappointed when the colour is not just the same as that 
of Miss C.'s starch. But the imitative attitude is just as remote from 
the scientific cognitive attitude as any human activity can possibly be. 
Finally we should note the ease with which the interest is lost and 
turned towards the lighting, turning out, and re- lighting of all the gas 
jets, - once more an interest in movement and change. 
"4.2.27. When Phineas (3;11) had eaten his orange, he went to wash 
his plate, and asked for something else to wash. Be was given a 
mug to wash, and spent twenty minutes slowly pushing the mop in 
and out of the mug, watching the water come up round it, and saying, 
'Look at the bubbles'. The mop fitted fairly tightly, and he 
experimented with the suction as he pulled it, and noticed the way 
that the water came up round it as he pushed it in." 
Again we have an interest in movement and change. Were this a 
cognitive interest, two minutes rather than twenty would have been 
adequate to disclose all the facts of the situation. 
To sum up our examination of this section of the records, we have 
seen that, on analysis, no case is recorded of any child showing a 
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genuine scientific approach to the environment in any experimental act - 
any approach which shows a quest for knowledge beyond the factual. Only 
in one case is any attempt made even at a generalisation of the results 
of the experiment. 
Secondly, of all the instances classifiable as "experiments" only 10 
out of 52 have any appearance of being purposive, 16 show an interest in 
single facts, and the remaining 50% can be adequately explained as the 
outcome of a delight in movement and change, in colour, and in new 
sensations generally, or as the result of the imitative impulse. 
Thirdly, there is strong evidence that the activities of the 
children were artificially orientated in the direction of experimentation, 
by the introduction of scientific and other apparatus not normal to the 
environment of young children, to the extent that the number of experi- 
ments was more than trebled after the introduction of the first piece of 
apparatus. In the first sixteen months there were 10 experiments, and in 
the following twenty months 42 experiments, which is a ratio of 1 to 3.36: 
and of these ¿2 experiments 29 were connected with the apparatus. Only 
2 of the latter, however, are classifiable as purposive. On the other 
hand, of those experimental acts connected with the normal environment, 
10 took place during the first sixteen months and 13 during the 
succeeding twenty months, which is a ratio of 1 to 1.04. 
Mrs. Isaacs maintains, however, that any apparatus of this kind was 
procured only as and when the children themselves gave indications of 
their need for it, 
"It was the behaviour of the children themselves, and their eager 
questions about cooking, about water and snow and ice and the 
garden bonfire, about the drains and the gas -pipes and hot-water 
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pipes and electric light, that led me gradually to give them 
material that would allow of these interests being followed out 
for their own sake." (p. 81) 
But it is just in this sentence that Mrs. Isaacs begs the whole 
question. Enough has been said to show how unjustified is the assumption 
that this interest - when it has not a merely subjective source - is 
anything more than a desire to know the mere facts of the natural environ- 
ment, - facts which, just because they belong to that environment, lose 
their full significance when transferred to a laboratory. (Of the best 
group of experiments, four -fifths are not connected with the apparatus). 
If it be true that a child wants to know his environment, - how he should 
meet it, and how it will react to him, - it is surely of the first 
importance that he should meet the facts of that environment in situ, not 
in a laboratory, where, for the necessary purposes of science, events are 
abstracted from real life. 
In introducing these artificial conditions hrs. Isaacs tends to 
defeat the very object with which she set out, namely, "to open the 
facts of the external world (the real external world, that is, not the 
school "subjects ") to him in such a way that he can seize and understand 
them." (p. 20). Yet she places a Bunsen burner in the hands of Phineas, 
whereby he spends innumerable hours (which might well have been spent in 
learning some of these facts of "the real external world ") in learning 
simply how to play meaningless tricks with a Bunsen burner. 
Of what conceivable educational value is it to a child â four to 
know what happens when you stuff matches into a Bunsen burner, or what 
to expect when you leave a pin inside? Is it important for him to know 
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that gas will ignite after passing through -:rater, or that bath salts will 
melt? 
There is a mental confusion here in Mrs. Isaacs' educational theory. 
She does not observe that it is just in this laboratory atmosphere of 
isolation from the real world - the atmosphere of the student and the 
specialist - that we are in the midst of those conditions out of which 
school "subjects" arise. She is anxious that the children should learn 
directly from the real world, but she is also anxious "to discover the 
beginnings of the scientific spirit and scientific method in the thought 
of young children, with a view to making sure of their am73lest develop- 
ment." (p. 23). Convinced, at the outset, that such a thing as the 
beginnings of "scientific method in the thought of young children" really 
exists, she proceeds to interpret in this light all their factual 
interests, together with as much again that is purely subjective in 
origin. 
Further, this intellectualistic assumption regarding the young child 
cuts continually across another of her main purposes, which is to allow 
the children to come into personal touch with their environment g,nnffected 
by the mediation of an adult mind, (p. 40). For, in avoiding verbal 
mediation and knowledge given purely on adult authority, she forces upon 
them something else - compelling them to adopt, not adult authority, but 
an adult attitude of mind. To her, of course, this is not an interfer- 
ence with the liberty of the child's mode of mental growth, becrntse of 
the "little adult" theory which she presupposes; and therefore she does 
not see that she may be obstructing the children's own view of the 
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natural environment whenever she encourages them to regard the world 
through the medium of scientific apparatus, or to take an adult, ration- 
alistic view of all their little discoveries. 
This is especially in evidence when she or her co- workers insist 
on "returning" a child's questions to him, worrying him for "whats" and 
"whys ", and thus, actually, forcing themselves upon him in a much more 
effective ?tanner than any merely verbal mediation is likely to have done. 
For this is more than a mere giving of adult information to the child; 
it is an attempt to force the very structure of his mind into an adult 
mould. 
Mrs. Isaacs ignores the important psychological fact that a child 
does like to ask questions of an adult, and that he looks up naturally 
to adult authority rather than to his own powers of observation and 
judgment. She does not pause to consider that there may be a reason for 
this, other than that of the child's own ignorance, nor does she ask, 
since the children apparently could reply correctly to questions 
thus "returned" to them, why this tendency was nevertheless there. 
"The general methods of the school" I +irs. Isaacs states (p. 23) 
"aimed at encouraging the children's own active efforts in as many 
directions as possible." Scientific apparatus, however, and the abstract- 
ing attitude which goes with it, is the embodiment of the outlook of 
the adult mind upon the world. It is the medium through which the adult 
likes to study his environment. But if we are genuinely anxious that 
the child should contact his environment freely and in his own way - 
if we really wish to encourage him in 
his "own active efforts" - we 
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contradict our own purposes if we introduce to him instruments which 
distract his attention from the natural world, and a mental attitude which 
forces him to contact his environment in our way. In effect, Mrs. 
Isaacs does not stick to the rules of her own game. 
Of course, she would argue, the introduction of this apparatus was 
merely to serve the purpose of bringing the natural environment to the 
Child in a nearer and clearer way. It was always a simplification of the 
outer environment which these instruments brought to him. But again 
this is to beg the question. For the adult wishes to have the environment 
thus simplified by his instruments for his own scientific purposes. He 
wishes to abstract from the complex world outside in order that he may 
discover the laws of that world. To introduce these instruments to the 
child is therefore to assume that he is more interested in the laws of 
his environment than in the concrete facts of that environment, in all 
their rich complexity. We tear the child away from his search after the 
concrete world as soon as we try to "simplify" it for him; and Mrs. 
Isaacs' own records show that the child is interested in the concrete, - 
not in laws and principles. 
(An examination even of the section of the records entitled: 
"Reasoning: 'Whys', 'Becauses', and other Logical Interests" reveals 
none but concrete interests. The nearest approach to an interest in a 
"rule" or "principle" is the remark made by Frank (5 ;7) (p. 11+6) 
when, 
having dropped a pair of scissors from the gallery, he says: "They didn't 
break - they're metal. ") 
But Mrs. Isaacs has not taken the trouble to analyse 
her own records 
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into these various levels of approach to the environment which we have 
tried to define here; and ao all her geese are swans. Even the cry of 
delight of little Phineas (2;11) when, distracted from his tears by the 
sight of the lighted Bunsen, he exclaims: "I can see it burning. Oh, 
it's out now" (p.129) is listed under this section of "Increase of 
Knowledge: Problems and Experiment, Observation and Discovery ". But 
there must be a distinguishing mark somewhere - a point at which we can 
say: "This pleasure is apparently due to the satisfaction of discovering 
new truth, - that is not." Otherwise, we shall find ourselves led to 
recording, as evidence of the scientific spirit, the gurgle of joy 
emitted by an infant at the sight of a brightly -coloured rattle. 
By all means let us give young children the opportunity of 
"discovering" their environment, but do not let us call this a scientific 
pursuit - however embryonic - unless we can show that there is evidence 
of thinking in terms of related wholes. Until this can be shown, it is 
an absurdity to introduce young children to laboratory apparatus, 
anatomical diagrams, and the like; for such apparatus is an artificial 
construction - not part of the natural environment - and designed for 
the discovery not of the environment, but of the laws which govern it. 
And as for anatomy, this is a subject comprehensible only to an intell- 
igence which can think in terms of organic relations. Mere factual 
knowledge of such matters is therefore not only futile but misleading. 
But if we begin by making the assumption that a child's curiosities 
are evidence of a scientific spirit, and we thereupon present to him 
an environment which is itself "scientific" - in the shape of apparatus, 
anatomical diagrams, a human skeleton, and the like, -we need not be 
surprised if he begins to develop activities which superficially reflect 
that environment. He may make "experiments" with U- tubes, take the 
temperature of boiling water, or develop a curiosity as to the appearance 
of his awn bodily interior; and the mere attitude of the adults around 
him is sufficient to lead him to adopt a self- conscious attitude towards 
all his own little discoveries, which otherwise he would not necessarily 
have taken up. 
Children, one need hardly point out, very quickly take their cue 
from the surrounding adults. As Mrs. Isaacs herself remarks in a diff- 
erent connection (p.82) : "Little children are profoundly at the mercy of 
grown -ups and of the environment which grown -ups determine . . . "; and 
if these adults make a habit of regarding all the children's discoveries 
from a scientific angle, and of answering their questions - whenever 
possible - by reference to observation and experiment, or by returning 
the problem upon the questioner, - the children will very soon begin to 
adopt a similar attitude to the world of physical facts; and we may 
produce even the phenomenon of children of infant- school age pedantically 
requesting that their little discoveries be duly chronicled in a note- 
book. (p.136) All this, however, does not prove that the young child 
is an embryonic scientist. It merely goes to show that we can influence 
his mind if we try, - a fact surely too well known, however, to need such 
experimental proof. 
other desire than simply to enjoy his environment as a child, - that is, 
in the particular manner appropriate to his uáental structure at the time. 
If he imitates a moving object, it need be no more than because he 
enjoys imitating, because the volitional element predominates in hire. 
But imitation does not help towards understanding. It prevents it. For 
in understanding we must confront our idea of the object, in order to 
think about it; whereas in imitation, the idea, instead of being object- 
ively confronted by the ego, is let loose upon the motor system where 
it works itself out in action. Thus, although at a later stage the 
child does begin to take an objective interest in engines and motor -cars, 
this cannot be said to be on account of the fact that at an earlier age 
he had imitated them. Imitation is fundamentally a motor activity with 
certain attendant pleasurable feelings, and has no necessary connection 
with an interest in engineering. 
It is only when we regard the child superficially from the point 
of view of the adult, and do not enter into his point of view, that we 
are led into thinking of all his activities as leading toward an under- 
standing of the world - toward our attitude to the world. This error 
can be avoided by analysing the psychological situation of the child 
when he imitates, projects his imagery, etc., as we have tried to do here. 
In regard to imitation, however, the present writer can vouch for the 
following: 
When at the age of 7 or 8 he remembers playing "trains" with a 
friend of the same age. They were racing up and down on some grassy 
ground, each trying to be the "fastest express in the world" - exactly 
like Mrs. Isaacs' children. "I'm the 'Flying Scotsman'." exclaimed one. 
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"Oh, but I'm the 'Flying Dutchman:" retorted the other. "That's much 
faster!" 
The writer remembers his own thoughts and feelings very distinctly. 
There was not the slightest interest in the mechanical side of the matter 
- in any "how" or "why" or "how much ". The pleasure involved was first 
one of free movement, and secondly a delight in identifying oneself with 
something big and powerful, in feeling this "ower" in one's limbs, and 
in the pride of "being" that thing and of demonstrating that fact to 
others. The whole situation could be summed un as a love of movement, 
together with an enhanced self-feeling brought about by the identific- 
ation of oneself with a powerful object. 
In regard to questions about such objects, the writer can also 
quote the case of a boy about the same age who, watching trains pass 
through a country station, asked some adults present 'haw many ri] es 
per hour that was'. He asked the question about each train after it had 
passed. Had Lars. Isaacs been present, she might have seen evidence not 
only of an objective interest in mechanical objects, but in the relative 
speeds at which they were travelling. 
Is that boy, however, happens to have been the writer himself, he 
is able to vouch for the fact that the boy had no such interests. Fe 
was not at that time in the least interested in the mechanics (although 
a few years later he was very fond of playing with model steam engines 
and understood their working); nor was he interested in relative speeds. 
He was thrilled, however, to see this enordously poérful object 
hurtling past him at high speed, and, having been told that 'GO miles 
an hour' was very fast (that was some 35 years ago), he hoped on ePeh 
occasion that the train would be tra.vellin:: Isi-,ved and he 
on the platform to see it. . . . Thus it is 
questions at their face-value, to read into their tridurgds 
are not there at all. 
The same may be said of chili:: u.ser. their idea.s of rs.edheardeal 
objects in their projected As has alrea.dy been. pointed out, 
the child is interested in these objects as zs-+eriall for Ms phantasy. 
It is not necessary to mulerstan d. the zecinaniL.-, this gar;.,....e.t. 
After all, the c. e for the purpose a infitation or 
only those objects araund ink; and of these, - 
will tend to use se wL e t coramonl:,:r seen and. which lend, then- 
selves best to imitation i to ell-matí c sithio 1t be either 
sorzeVring lenich moves, or soneiL: Ish-fic:111. actiaa can taike 1.11,.vee, 
Hence it is not in the leas-: _ that modern eidillialten luise ideas of 
mechanical objects in their pi Tra the made= wrgorliAL-Ndlact else t there 
for the= to use? t they are litarterestedlu itlitese inv 
indication whatever that the rftiit themi the apaid t of 
modern science. It is merely an indleattztaaa law far -vet 
modern science has influenced their enoriztzumeat.. 
It can thus be seen that, as far as a. start?' of -the elidaid, eau- 
cerned, the ''',,.-:,-....ronnent.a1120 nett:boll depends ilavotar 1.filoo agur. lotelstrzetattsiga 
of the olbs,2:,r57.. ,act.f.vities of the inuist goiveyaored to so 
.-.r41)-illma. the mere external behaviorxr an 13,atealpret Jim terms of the 
situation *nrii,t4, the fan= of the behaviour iiveLdicgdieg 
the form rattler tittam ta) tie rraditt&r - lizAw 
laSe noterlail tilnetr lixtortvetfis 3rattiihex dam thome 
interests themselves. 
Thus, imitation indicates one mental situation, projected phantasy 
another; but we are no nearer to solving the problem as to how far one 
stage overlaps another, nor how far the higher intellectual processes 
are compatible with these psychological situations. We have seen so far 
only that higher intellectual processes need not be assumed to be present; 
and that no trace of the genuine scientific attitude is to be found in 
Mrs. Isaacs' records. But this is merely negative evidence; and the 
method is not exact enough to yield us a way of discovering what are the 
best ages at which to introduce certain school subjects to the child. 
For that is our ultimate goal. 
As an educational medium, the "environmental" method is still less 
satisfactory. For it is based upon a quite untenable assumption. The 
guiding principle of this method might be said to be: "Let the child's 
interests be your guide as to what his mind needs." But, apart altogethe 
from the fact that a mere study of the material of his interests is no 
indication as to how these interests are to be presented, - it is also 
to assume that a child's interests, curiosities and desires are always 
wise and healthy, always coincident with his needs. 
It will be noted that Yrs. Isaacs takes it for granted that, since 
mechanical objects surround the young child on every hand today, and 
since the child is attracted towards these things, this particular form 
of interest should be fostered. But it must be borne in mind first, that 
the child has little choice in the matter in a largely mechanised world, 
and secondly, that these objects, being an artificial production of man, 
and of recent origin, do not belong to the natural environment in which 
 
the human race has evolved. Surely a prior i restig -..-i- into the -:.'.::l 
structure of the young child is required, before we c. :r. 
merits of this innovation in the environment as a factor in 
of the young child. 
We are convinced that a child's physical i 1 es are ï -s 
healthy or wise, and that to turn him lo, in a role fil01 of all types 
of food would be disastrous. Yet y "rs. Isaacs would apparently have it 
that young children should be allowed to moose out of the :: .- ...'. 
any form of mental food which happens to a``'.r'act them, that t:- 
then be assisted in these pursuits, an t. ::mss is the a - of the 
educator. 
The physical diet of a child is s_ upon a prior knowledge of -*bat 
is nourishing, not merely upon the child's impulses; anal it is surely not 
too much to expect that the mental nou= s: =Lent of the child should be based 
upon a prior psychological know le T. sycholo - %,wledge of this 
kind is just what we cannot obta__ p _ _ _ aa ne enviromental zethod of study, 
since we have no means of distingu= in,.. .7.etween. the ch41d's needs and his 
desires, and it is a fallacy to assume `v they are coincident, 
Further, the child is influenced by 2 environment - not only by 
artificial factors such as were introduce . :. :rs. Isaacs, but by theme Isery 
mechanical contrivances of the modern world which he Can hardly avoid seeing 
and contacting. Therefore it is not a question merely of noting that the 
modern child is attracted by these things, aavA of trying to deepen that 
interest, but of pausing for a lament to consider' whether it is fortunate 
or otherwise for his that he should be so in` % nave such interests, 
and whether it would not be better for Mn bafi r: ,.: ..ffere:.% :.:ateria1 for 
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imitation or for phantasy. This is an elementary educational question, - 
one which Mrs. Isaacs does not reach the point of asking. 
If this activity of imitation, for example, is good for the child at 
all, would it not be better that he should imitate the free aesthetic 
movements of an animal rather than the rigid, restricted annd mechanical 
movements of a steam engine? And if this be so, must we not rather con- 
sider how we may draw the child's attention as far as possible to objects 
which lend themselves to more aesthetic movement, and protect him as far 
as possible from those which do not? 
Thus the brief consideration even of a simple question such as this, 
leads us in quite the opposite direction to that of the "environmental" 
method. Here the needs of the child would be in exact opposition to his 
desires, these desires having been conditioned by the modern environment, 
and not by the needs themselves. 
The whole fallacy upon which this method of educational study is 
based, is just this identification of desires with needs. As soon as this 
distinction is taken into consideration it can at once be seen that this 
method can yield us nothing reliable. 
If we now turn to the method which Jean Piaget has developed in his 
"Language and Thought of the Child ", we find thAt here the aim is to study 
the quality or structure of the child's mind, not by laying emphasis upon 
his impulses and interests, but by an analysis of his language and the 
quality of thought which it implies. We can thus discover What is the 
child's attitude toward his environment, as distinct from a mere knowledge 
1 of the things in it which attract him, since the latter has meaning only 
when the former has been already ascertained. 
This method is partly direct, partly indirect. It may be classified 
as "environmental" in so far as it is a study of the spontaneous language 
of the child moving freely in his environment; while it partakes of the 
direct or mental test method in so far as the child is asked to perform 
certain tasks, - e.g. to explain to another child the working of an 
instrument previously shown and explained to him by an adult (p.83) 
By such means Piaget arrives at certain conclusions regarding the 
quality of the child's mind at this or that chronological age, - a quality 
belonging to that age and differing from that of the adult mind. With 
these conclusions we shall not deal at present. Mrs. Isaacs, however, 
claims that the material given in her records "shows many disparate types 
of behaviour co- existing in the same children, and ranging freely between 
the phenomena characterised by Piaget to clear logical statement and 
reasonable action," and she therefore contends that the child is not 
dominated by one particular type of thinking at a given chronological age, 
but that the various types or levels are co- existent, given a suitable 
environment. 
So far we have not dealt with the logical aspect of the records 
given by Mrs. Isaacs, a matter which will be considered later. Allowing, 
however, for the possible validity of the criticism made by her, that the 
environment in which Piaget's children were placed was too narrow, and 
that one less restricted would have evoked interests in causality and 
brought to expression other logical forms which Piaget did not find in 
his children's conversation, - we are led once more into the vicious 
circle of the "environmental" approach to the child. The environment 
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affects the mental habits of the child, and from our enquiry into the 
mental habits of the child we are to gather what kind of environment is 
suitable for him. We travel in a circle, and can never arrive at any 
reliable criterion. 
We must conclude, then, that while Piaget is right in wishing to 
examine the form of the child's thought rather than his interests, we 
still do not know how far these forms are the results of maturation or 
a mere product of his particular environment. We are thrust back, there- 
fore, upon the investigation of the child's mental structure by means of 
some direct examination. 
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PART 2 
T H E D I R E C T A P P R O A C H 
It is the aim of those who construct mental tests to include in the 
test various types of question, sufficient to yield examples of the 
child's ability in a number of different directions. Samples, as it 
were, are taken of a variety of his mental activities, and from the sum 
total of these his "intelligence" is ascertained and expressed in terms 
of a mental ratio. 
But this result is an abstraction. It gives us no information 
about the structure of the child's mind, nor tells us anything about its 
present needs. To the genuine educator, who is concerned with the needs 
of the child and not with examination results, the intelligence quotient 
of a child should therefore be of comparatively little interest. It is 
of interest only to those who want to divide the "bright" from the "dull", 
so that they can "push on" the one and hold back the other. 
These do not stop to ask whether it is good for the "bright" to be 
pushed on. Some act in this way because it is convenient for the exist- 
ing school system to herd together children of one degree of brightness 
so that they can all be brought to the examination roam at the same time, 
and because it involves far less thought on the part of the teacher to 
teach Children who are all of the same level of cleverness. Others do 
so in the genuine belief that only in this way can the education of the 
dull be adequately attended to, and the bright given sufficient outlet 
for their mental energies. But this is a facile assumption. 
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If a child of eight is restless in class, a trouble to everyone, and 
"bored" with his schoolwork, and if it is subsequently found that he has 
a "mental age" of ten, it is very easy to say that the child's mental 
powers are not being fully occupied, and it is much the most convenient 
way out of the difficulty to push him up a class and give his mind so 
much more to do that he becomes docile. 
There may be individual cases where this may be found the right thing 
to do, for the child's sake, after a very careful examination of his case; 
but it can by no means be assumed as a general rule. The question at 
issue is rather more complex. It depends upon in what respect the child 
is intellectually superior, - whether, for example, it is a question of 
greater mental agility, or whether it is a case of more mature mental 
structure. For these are not the same thing; and to give a child the 
work of a higher class merely on the strength of the former, would not be 
beneficial, but, in fact, almost certainly harmful. Further, there is 
the question as to whether the superior energies of such a child are 
really most fruitfully occupied in an increase of intellectual work, and 
whether it would not be better for his mental health to deflect them into 
some other channel, aesthetic or manual. Of all this the I.Q. tells us 
nothing. 
There is one sense, however, in which mental test results can be 
psychologically valuable, and this lies in the raw data which they afford. 
When it is found that, at a certain chronological age, 60% or 70'"/ of 
children can perform a certain mental task, while those a year or two 
younger can scarcely do it at all, we can begin to learn something of the 
manner in which the child m ops, as well as something of its 
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structure at any given age. 
The terra "mental structure" as it will be used in this thesis is now 
in need of some fuller definition. It has already been pointed out that 
the relation of the ego to its imagery and ideational system, and the 
relation of these to the motor system, may take several forms. In the 
young child, when he imitates, impressions of the outer world appear to 
act directly upon his motor system and to be not under the direction of 
the ego. In the older child, impressions in the form of imagery are 
used and projected by him to the extent that we can conclude that the ego 
had here some influence, although it tends to live very much in the ideas 
which it entertains. 
The adult, on the other hand, does not live in his phantasy as the 
child does. Be treats his phantasy objectively, and does not normally 
become an actor in it. He tends to turn to the life of imagination, or 
of philosophic and scientific enquiry, as his mood or interests lead him. 
He is not subjectively tied to any of his mental impressions as the young 
child is in imitation, or the older child in phantasy. This freedom of 
the ego to move among its thoughts, and, at will, to control them, - 
whether they be abstract or pictorial, theory or phantasy, - is what is 
specially characteristic of the developed adult. Mrs. Isaacs argues 
that this tendency to change from one mode of thinking to another is also 
largely characteristic of the child. The important differences between 
phantasy in the child and in the adult, however, have already been 
pointed out; and what remains of this question has still to be discussed. 
By the term "mental structure" is meant just the characteristic 
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relationship which exists, at any given age, between the ego, the 
ideational system, and the motor system. That this relationship is, will 
determine very largely what is the actual attitude of the individual 
toward the environment, and what are the mental needs upon which a true 
education for him can be based. What, in detail, this conception of 
mental structure involves, is best seen in a simple analysis of the 
different cognitive levels of the adult mind. 
Defining cognition as a situation in which a subject finds himself 
face to face with an object which he recognises as something distinct 
from himself, and which therefore he can study and observe, we find that 
human cognition is not confined to that of objects of the outer world. 
A man is cognisant of his mental images, memories, and the like, of his 
feelings and emotions, of his ideas, concepts, and even of the principles 
governing his mental processes - so that even thinking itself is studied 
and a science of logic made possible. 
But it is common experience that to be cognisant of one's mental 
imagery is easier than to be awake to one's more abstract ideas or con- 
ceptions. For to be fully cognisant of an object - to be completely 
aware of it - one must be able so far to dissociate it from oneself as to 
be able to judge it. We are all in the habit of judging the mental 
images which arise, as to whether they are clear or indistinct, whether 
they belong to reality or phantasy, whether they are healthy or unhealthy, 
and so on. An adult who did not continually make such judgments would no 
be normal. But fewer people are in the habit of thus judging their ideas 
and conceptions - of really objectifying their own views of the world or 
of life, for example. This is a rather more difficult act. It involves 
the subject taking a pace further back, as it were, and of focussing 
his attention upon something usually much closer to him, and which he is 
accustomed to take for granted. While a cognitive awareness of the 
logical and ethical principles in accordance with which we daily think 
and act is found almost exclusively among those who have made a special 
study of the matter. 
It must now be noted that when an individual has trained himself to 
objectify and examine the various phenomena of his mental life - even 
those logical and ethical principles which stand behind the manipulation 
of the thoughts themselves - when, in other words, he has differentiated 
himself from all these, - there remains over the subject himself; and 
that, in such moments, although he has thus stripped himself of all his 
mental belongings, he is nevertheless still acutely aware of himself 
as an individual. If fact, no one experiences this sense of individuality 
more keenly than he who can thus stand as judge over against his own 
thoughts. 
On the other hand, it is to be noted that the individual who is less 
accustomed to practise such mental objectivity, is of the type who tends 
to seek his feeling of individuality more in terms of a group or "herd" 
to which he attaches himself and with whose outlook he finds himself in 
sympathy. He clings, in other words, to groups of ideas or prejudices 
with which he closely associates - if not identifies - his own ego. In 
short, his real individuality is weak and seeks support from groups of 
more or less fixed ideas or beliefs. 
Yet we must admit that a man may argue quite logically without 
being in the least aware of the principles which he is following, and be 
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quite consistent in his moral judgments without knowing anything of the 
ethical theory in terms of Which he is really making these judgments. 
Again, a man can possess ideas and conceptions - political or religious 
views, for example - and act in accordance with them, without ever so far 
objectifying these ideas as to judge them as he judges those of other 
people. 
Descending still farther in the scale of mental objectivity, we come 
to the man who, as we say, "lives in his feelings ", and tends to act more 
out of these than out of definite ideas. While he who is found to be 
living in his mental imagery is either a dreamer or a person bordering on 
insanity. 
What, then, is the difference between our being aware of our ideas to 
the extent of judging the world in terms of them, and our judging these 
ideas themselves? In the latter case we make these ideas into objects of 
observation and judgment. We adopt a truly cognitive attitude towards 
them. In the former case we are also aware of them, but in a different 
sense. In what sense is this? 
A useful indication is already given us in the expression "living in 
one's feelings ". A man who lives in his feelings does so in that he does 
not objectify his feelings. For while it is true that a man who object- 
ifies his feelings does not therefore cease to feel, - to feel is neverthe- 
less one thing, and to know what one feels is quite another. For example, 
a person may be jealous without being aware that he is jealous. In order 
to know what one's feelings are, one must objectify them and pass judgment 
upon them. It is only by this latter process that we learn to inhibit 
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certain acts which might result from our feelings. Conscious inhibition 
presupposes objective cognition of what is inhibited. But a man who 
"lives in his feelings" and acts accordingly, does not inhibit them. Be 
is not suffieiently aware of them in the objective sense to do so. 
This state of "living in" feelings is, of course, a form of cognition, 
if we use the term in a certain loose sense. Such a person is not 
unaware of his feelings. On the contrary, he experiences them acutely. 
But he does not pause to judge them from either a moral or a psychological 
standpoint. In order to do this, the ego must enter into a quite diff- 
erent relationship to the feelings concerned. It is preferable here to 
reserve the term "cognition" for this latter relationship; for it is of 
very great importance that we should clearly distinguish the one mental 
condition from the other. 
Most of us, of course, fluctuate between the two states. We live in 
an intense emotion at one mor_-_ent, and only afterwards contemplate it iii 
retrospect, passing judgment upon it. This, of course, is not objectific- 
ation of the emotion itself, but only of a memory of it. But in the 
case of lesser emotions and many forms of feeling, it is possible for us 
to turn our cognitive attention to them while they are still present, and 
to judge them quite objectively. For example, when a person says to 
himself: "Why am I feeling so depressed today? Is it due to my 
digestion ?" he is not living in the feeling of depression at the moment, 
but is observing it from a quite objective point of view. Another person, 
on the other hand, might give himself up entirely to such a mood, never 
bestirring himself to reflect upon it, but allowing it to influence all 
his acts and thoughts. 
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Similarly we can - and do - speak of a man who lives in his ideas. 
This type may range from persons who tend to interpret reality in terms 
of preconceived ideas or opinions, to the fanatical type and pathological 
cases. The trouble in all such instances is, that the subject cannot 
get away from his ideas. He cannot live outside them and view them 
objectively. (This is to be distinguished, of course, from living for 
an idea or ideal. This too may produce fanaticism, although the idea in 
such a case is an objectified one.) 
The difference between the experience of living in feelings or ideas, 
and of objectifying them, is thus a difference in relationship of the 
ego to these feelings or ideas. In the one case the ego experiences 
the idea or feeling entirely, as it were, "from the inside ". In the 
other case, the ego is able also to experience it "from outside ", i.e. 
objectively. Neither is a situation which can be "explained ". It is 
sufficient to point to it and characterise it. In both cases the 
feelings or ideas are experienced, but in the latter case they are both 
experienced and judged. One might say that in the former case they are 
"lived" but not cognised. 
It will be observed that the only thing which can never become an 
object - which can never be cognised but only "lived" - is the judging 
subject himself. We can experience our egohood only in this other sense - 
from "inside ". Hence direct observation of the ego is impossible. We 
can observe in an objective sense only its overt acts. There is nothing 
"metaphysical" in thus characterising the ego. It is a perfectly legit- 
imate psychological characterisation. The ego is an experience, not a 
postulate. Only, it is not a cognitive experience in the meaning of the 
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term here outlined. 
It is just because of the quite unnecessary assumption that the ego 
must be objectifiable in order to be considered a legitimate datum of 
psychology, that characterisations of it have been sought in groups of 
ideas and sentiments, in the stream of consciousness, and the like. Groups 
of ideas and sentiments are not the ego, but what the ego has gathered 
round itself in the course of its experiences, and which, as already indicated, 
it may objectify and judge; while the stream of consciousness is that which 
passes in review before the ego. It is the stream in which the ego stands, 
as observer. How else could we imovï that there is such a stream at all? 
We can know that the river is flowing only if we stand still beside it or 
within it, and observe its movement in relation to ourselves. If we are 
one with the stream, we float down with it, and then we cannot observe the 
current. In short, if anyone speaks of a stream of consciousness, he 
admits that it is something he has cognised, - something which appears, as 
object, to him as subject; and in speaking of it as a cognisable object 
he already admits that it is not the subject. Such characterisations of 
the ego are merely the outcome of mental confusion. 
The ideas, sentiments, and so on, with which the ego faces the ,world, 
may be regarded as the psychical "clothing" of the ego; and the ego is 
constantly changing its psychical clothes. So long as the ego wears these 
clothes, they may be considered as a part of the total self. They are 
accepted by the ego as representative of itself for the time being. But 
they must not thereby be confused with the individuality. For the ego can - 
and does - treat then as objects, and may even repudiate them after a time 
and cast them off. 
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The ego stands in this unique position that, because it can be aware 
of its own existence and_ identify only as a "lived" experience, it is 
dependent for self- knowledge upon the thoughts, memories, and so on, 
which surround it. It can learn to know itself, - i.e. what kind of 
being it is, - only by contemplating what it has done, both physically 
and mentally, together with the manner of thoughts, feelings, and emotions 
which it entertains. The more, then, that the ego can objectify those 
psychical elements which surround it and cling to it, the more self - 
knowledge it will acquire. It is for this reason that loss of memory 
brings loss of self -knowledge, but not the loss of any sense of personal 
identity. My memories are the mirror in which I see myself reflected; 
they are not me. I need a mirror in order to know the nature of my face, 
but my face does not cease to exist when the mirror is broken. 
To sum up, our analysis has led us to distinElEsh between the human 
ego, and the mind in which it lives and through which it acts. It is 
not a group of thoughts and sentiments, nor the stream of consciousness, 
nor even, as James would have it, a single complex thought which is the 
final receptacle, owner and knower of all the previous thoughts. (4). To 
begin with, such a "thought" has no existence in psychological experience. 
A thought is something of which we are conscious. We are never conscious 
at any moment of all that we are, have been, feel, wish, will, and know. 
We could become aware of all this only in a series of many thoughts. 
Secondly, no thought "knows" another thought. We have no such experience. 
We have experience of a thought only as something that is known, or as 
something in terms of which some other object is known. And if it be 
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argued (although it is begging the question) that each of us is, after all, 
just this final all- inclusive thought, there is no reason why this last 
thought should always be the knower, while, as soon as it is displaced 
by the one immediately following, it should thenceforth completely change 
its function, cease to be the knower,. and become only the known. 
Because the experience of egohood is a unique one, and because we 
do not know what the "I" is, are no reasons why it should not be a datum 
of psychology. A genuinely scientific attitude is prepared to recognise 
any datum, however unique or mysterious; and it does not help in the 
least to evade the issue by giving it the name of some other datum to 
which it bears no resemblance. We know what we mean by a thought, and we 
recognise one when we meet it in our psychical life. It is something 
which in itself is passive, and something which we can contemplate. But 
the ego is experienced as a centre of activity, and as something which we 
cannot contemplate. To call such an experience a "thought" is not only 
a mère postulate, but one for which there appears to be no foundation 
either in experience or in reason. 
The fact is, that fames does not avoid the fallacy of the "stream 
of consciousness" theory when he assumes that the last part of that stream 
is that which cognises the remainder. For the part - however ultimate 
in time - nevertheless flows with the whole; and he has still to face 
the question: What is that, which, in virtue of its not flowing, is 
able to recognize that a stream exists at all? The ego, in short, is 
not to be denied. 
This analysis which we have made is not one of mere academic 
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interest. It is, as will be shown, of the most fundamental practical 
importance, without which we can make no advance towards the solution 
of problems of education. For the educator must know at least two 
things, - first, where to point to the individuality, how to distinguish 
it from the merely ephemeral; and secondly, in what successive aspects 
it shows itself during the physical growth of the child. 
We must now consider the relationship of the ego to its ideas at 
the various levels of cognition. We have seen that, for ordinary life, 
it is not necessary that the ego should become objectively aware of the 
principles according to which it thinks or acts, nor even of the ideas 
or concepts in terms of which it judges things and affairs. In other 
words, on such occasions, the ego need only "live in" such principles or 
concepts. It uses them, but need not objectify them. 
For example, in the simple judgment: "That is a horse ", we must 
possess the concrete idea of horse, but it is not necessary that one 
should be objectively aware of the idea and say to oneself: "I know 
that that is a horse, because I have already a concrete idea of horse ". 
On the other hand, if one is asked to give an account of this or that 
kind of animal, one is obliged to bring under objective review a concrete 
idea of that animal. We should not, however, need to objectify the 
class -concept "animal ". But if we are studying some low form of 
organism and are faced with the problem: Is this an animal or a plant? 
we must bring into objective review the concept "animal" and the concept 
"plant" and compare the two in relation to the object before us. 
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At each of these stages we must take a step back, as it were, and 
bring under objective review and judgment concepts or ideas which, at 
the more elementary levels of cognitive activity, we use more-or less 
unconsciously. Thus the relationship of the ego to its concepts, ideas, 
and the like, is different at each level. It stands in an objective 
relation to some and inaa "subjective" relation to others. At the lower 
levels the ego must at least possess the requisite concepts or ideas, 
but it need not objectify them. The higher the level of thought or 
cognition, the more it must stand in an objective relation to its 
concepts. Thus at each level we have an example of a different kind 
of mental relationship or "structure ". 
Now every normal adult can, potentially, operate on any of these 
levels. Even a principle of conduct or of reasoning, or a scientific 
law, is within his grasp if his attention be drawn to it and if he exert 
himself to understand it. But how does this matter stand with the child? 
AT,dAT.,YSIS OF STANFORD REVISION OF THE 
BINET SCATF 
Let us examine first of all the Stanford Revision of the Binet 
Sclae, in which we shall find what the average primary school child is 
able to do at the various ages when not subjected to class -room pressure. 
At 5 he is expected:to: (l) Compare two weights, (2) Recognise 
a 
colour, (3) Distinguish between prettiness and -ugliness in a picture, 
(4) Define an object in terms of use, (5) Recognise the similarity 
between two simple geometrical forms, and (6) Carry out a series 
of 
simple instructions. He is also expected to know his age. 
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In (1) we have an act of judgment of the most elementary kind, 
involving the ptiwer to compare two muscular sensations. 
(2) is an act of naming. 
(3) is a comparison of an aspect of two things. 
(¿i.) involves a statement derived from past experience. "A fork is 
for eating with" is hardly a judgment based on thinking. It involves 
memory rather than thought. The child has seen forks, horses, pencils, 
etc., being used, or he has used them himself and already knows what he 
does with them, or what other people do with them. His task is here to 
objectify a memory -image of a total situation, and not to allow himself 
to be led from the point by the power of association, - not to reply, for 
example, by naming an associated image in the situation and say "A knife" 
in reply to the question about the fork, nor succumb to the imitative 
tendency and simply reply "A horse" to the question "That is a horse ?" 
In (5) - "Divided Card" - the child tries various positions of the 
two pieces until he is satisfied that their combined shape is now like 
that of the other card. The test is therefore one of comparison of an 
aspect of two things in the visual sphere, together with a certain test 
of the power of "'persistence. 
(6) is a test of attention to words, the power to transform them 
into imagery, and to retain this series of images in order. 
Thus three of these tests involve comparisons between qualities in 
observed objects, or the ability to objectify muscular sensations, visual 
sensations of form, and elementary aesthetic feelings. 
The colour test is of a different order. It too involves the 
objectification of a visual sensation, but it also belongs to the "naming" 
type of test (as at age 3), with this difference, that the child is asked 
to name, not objects, but abstracted aspects of objects. Colours belong 
to the objects of his experiences, and to place before him four colours in 
juxtaposition and to ask him to name them, is to present him with a 
slightly unusual situation. Apart from this element of naming, however, 
this test is substantially of the same type as the three already mentioned, 
involving comparisons between qualities of a sensory or affective kind. 
The remaining two tests (Definition in terms of use, and Three 
commands) point to a consciousness of imagery, to a certain objective 
relationship to it. But there are three kinds of relation to imagery, - 
that of merely observing it, that of abstracting from it or controlling 
it, and that of manipulating it, - all of which may be said to involve an 
"objective" relationship to it. In the first we merely attend to an 
image, reading -off what is there, as in the description of the function of 
a horse, etc.. In the second we abstract from it, and in the third we 
transform it. It is only the first stage which is here in evidence. 
It is to be noted that at this age the child is not asked to cognise 
objects, as such, but certain aspects, qualities, or functions of the 
objects; and in the two tests involving memory he is expected to cognise 
only an image of a total situation of which the object named is only a 
function. He is not yet expected to select an object from that situation 
and cognise it in abstraction from other objects. In test 4_ he has to 
cognise an image, not of a horse in abstraction, but of the total 
situation of "horse-pulling-cart", or "man- riding -on- horse "; a fork is 
"a- fork -in -my- hand - while- eating -my- dinner; a table is "table- in -the- 
- 65 - 
room-at-home-with-things-on-it", and so on. Likewise in test 6 he has a 
series of three situations: "Key-to-be-put-on-seat-over-there", "Open- 
door-to-be-shut", and "Ink- bottle -over -there- to -be- brought- here ". The 
cognising of an object in abstraction from its natural context, whether 
physical or in imagery, involves an act of thought which is not expected 
of the child until he is 6. 
The alternative test - giving age - has little significance beyond 
evidence of memory for verbal statements which the child has heard made 
about himself. It points to a certain control over memory as in test 6. 
Coming now to the tests at year 6, the first is that of a knowledge 
of the terms "Right" and "Left ". Of the four reasons given by Terman (5) 
as to why Right and Left are discriminated by the child later than up 
and down, and before and behind, the most cogent appears to be that of 
the frequency with which the two latter are used by the child in compar- 
ison with Right and Left. Right and Left are not vital distinctions for 
him, and they are not forced upon him as the others are. Further, those 
other distinctions are concerned with dimensions in space, while Right 
and Left are, primarily, distinctions in the child's own body. It is 
easier for the child to cognise a distinction which is outside him, than 
one which is more closely bound up with his own person. Cognition of 
self comes later than cognition of the environment. 
But, when awareness of this difference does arise, it is apparently 
a matter of a certain feeling of difference - almost an organic sensation - 
between the one si:e of the body and the other. It is in terms of this 
feeling of difference that the more abstract relation of right and left 
in outer objects is later judged. This bodily experience appears to be 
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a unique one, and cannot be compared with any other type of apprehension. 
Test 2. (Omissions from pictures). To recognise an object and 
name it, involves the use of an idea in the light of which the object is 
recognised. But if a child fails to see that parts of the object are 
missing, even when it has been suggested to him that there is something 
wrong, this can only mean that he is projecting his preconceived idea 
upon the object and so filling in the missing parts. This means, in 
other words, that he is not free of the idea, but is living in it to the 
extent that it dominates his visual perception. This fact comes to 
light only in such a case as this, where the object has to be not 
merely recognised but criticised. 
In this test, as Terman points out, (p. 179) "the parts of the 
picture must be perceived as constituting a whole ", and thus we have 
the use of the category of "whole and part" in connection with an object. 
But a much more important factor is the ability on the part of the 
child to free himself from the idea. This test primarily involves, 
therefore, the use - but not necessarily the conscious objectification - 
of a free idea in terms of which the judgment is made, together with 
the ability to distinguish this idea from what is actually seen. To 
name or recognise an object need be no more than an immediate associative 
reaction. Here, however, such spontaneous association must be inhibited 
and judgment take its place. We have here a sign that the child's 
ideational system is passing under the control of the ego. 
Of younger children Terman says (p. 180): "The writer has found 
that normal children of three years often see nothing wrong in a 
picture which shows a cat with two legs or a hen with four legs. 
Such children would, of course, never mistake a cat for a hen. 
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Their trouble lies in the inability to call up in a clear form a 
"free idea" of a cat or a hen for comparison with the perceptual 
presentation offered by the picture." 
But in the present case there can be no question of there not being 
adequate ideas. Every child knows the appearance of a human face; and 
the child who fails in this test does so - not because the idea is not 
called up, - but because of the relationship which the ego has to that 
idea. 
At six, apparently, this relationship has changed for the average 
child; and we have in consequence the first appearance of the ability 
to apprehend an object as something which can be examined and judged, - 
which is the ability to apprehend an object in abstraction from the 
environment. 
Test 3, - the counting of 13 pennies, - does not appear to be one of 
great psychological interest. If a child can cognise an object, and if 
he has learned the use of numbers, there appears to be no reason why he 
should not count 13 pennies. But the test does not show decisively 
whether or not the child has grasped the meaning of number. 
Test 4, "What is the thing to do if it is raining when you start 
for school ? ", etc., - is a test of comprehension. The child is asked to 
call up a concrete situation and to describe what his acts should be in 
regard to it. But it need involve no more than the awakening of a 
memory image of such an incident and the retailing of what was actually 
done on that occasion, or of what he has been told is the right thing 
to do. There need therefore be no question of any form of reasoned 
judgment in the response to this test; but there is certainly involved 
in it the ability to attend to the image of a concrete situation, and to 
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give an account of that image. 
Test 5, - the naming of four coins, - involves the recognition of 
an object with a certain degree of accuracy; and test 6, - repetition 
of 16 syllables, - is again a test of imagery- fixation. 
The alternative test, - "Morning and afternoon ", - involves the 
retention - or calling up - in memory of the events of the day, and the 
recognition of the immediate events in the light of an idea of time. 
We have here again the use of a free idea, for there is no environmental 
stimulus which could evoke an automatic response. Attention to imagery 
is also involved. 
To sum up this series, the only tests which indicate anything new 
in the mental powers of the child at this age are, "Distinguishing 
right and left ", "Omissions from pictures ", and "Morning and afternoon ". 
The first, as was pointed out, stands by itself. The remaining two 
indicate the use of free ideas, and the emergence of the ego from a 
"subjective" relationship to ideas. The third alsó shows the beginning 
of an idea of time. The other tests show merely an increase in 
abilities already possessed. 
Although the question of the pre- school child is outside the 
bounds of the present inquiry, it is necessary at this point to consider 
briefly the tests for 3- and 4-year -old children in order to distinguish 
the fundamental characteristics of these tests from those with which we 
have just dealt. 
At age 3, in tests 1, 2, and 3 the child is asked to point to an 
object, (nose, eyes, etc.,), name an object (key, penny, etc.), and 
name objects in a picture. This recognition of objects to which he 
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can attach names is not to be confused with "cognition" of an object 
by the child in the sense already discussed. It is the recognition of 
parts of his environment in the light of previously acquired ideas; but 
it in no way demands the use of a free idea, together with its implic- 
ations. 
Tests 4 and 5, - giving sex and family name, - have to do with a 
recognition of self. The former involves the use of an idea - however 
vague or incomplete, and the latter the use of a name which he has 
learned belongs to him. The principal factor required here is a certain 
ego -consciousness. The remaining two tests (6 and the alternative) 
involve repetition of words or digits. Thus the mental level at this 
age would appear to be a sense of self -hood, and the recognition and 
naming of objects. 
At age 14. we have three tests which are concerned apparently with 
visual discrimination of spatial relationships, namely, comparison of 
two lines, discrimination of forms, and copying a square. From the 
point of view of adult cognition these tests are of the same order as 
that of the dividedrectangle or any other test involving recognition 
of a geometrical form. But there is a factor in the presentation of 
the second test which is of importance to the child - that of the 
examiner running his finger round the outline of the forms. This does 
not merely draw the child's attention to the outline; it presents the 
form to him in the aspect of movement. The child is still in the 
imitative stage when movement makes the strongest appeal, and the com- 
prehension of a form in terms of movement is probably much easier for 
him than comprehending it as something static. 
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Copying a square involves the actual dynamic representation of a 
figure on the part, of the child, but here the instructions are not to 
run the finger round the four tides. This is further complicated by 
the element of motor co- ordination in the use of the pencil. The 
scoring here, Terman says, (P. 155) "should be rather liberal ". The 
comparison of the lengths of the two lines is a very simple act, and, 
as Terman points out (p. 151) is more a matter of understanding the 
verbal directions and of degree of attention than of discrimination of 
length. 
According to Terman (p. 158) the purpose of test 5 (Comprehension) 
is "to ascertain whether the child can comprehend the situations 
suggested and give a reasonably pertinent reply." But it is surely of 
importance to consider also what is the source of a reply, however 
pertinent it may appear verbally. A reply may be based on (1) Verbal 
association, (2) Comprehension of the situation in imagery but where 
the conduct referred to is based simply upon past experience, (3) Compre- 
hension based upon reasoned insight. Verbally, all three responses might 
be alike, or equally pertinent. For example, of two correct replies 
quoted by Terman in answer to the question; "What must you do when you 
are sleepy ? ", one - "Have my mother get me ready for bed ", - suggests 
comprehension of the situation; whereas the other - "Lie still, not 
talk, and I'll soon be asleep ", rather suggests the more or less verbal 
repetition of a maternal injunction; for if the child were really sleepy 
he would not need to think about lying still and not talking. 
Thus two replies which may be verbally adequate may nevertheless 
represent two qualitatively different psychological situations. The 
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first involves the subject seeing the suggested situation in imagery 
and taking up an objective attitude toward it, selecting therefrom the 
essential factors. The second appears to be the outcome merely of 
association, the response not being selected, but "selecting" itself. 
Such tests tell us nothing of the mental structure of the child unless 
the questions are such that they plainly exclude the possibility of 
responses at the lower levels. But in the present case any of these 
levels might be operative, and so the significance of the test is 
doubtful. 
Tests such as test 6 - repeating of four digits - appear at first 
sight to be in contrast to the foregoing, as a type which merely increases 
in degree of difficulty. But there are two ways of repeating digits or 
words which have just been heard. A number, for example, can be 
repeated mechanically, by mere echoing; but if it is desired to retain 
it in memory for even a short period, it is necessary to form an actual 
mental image of the number. It is a common experience, for instance, 
that, when told a telephone number, we repeat it mechanically without 
forming an image of it, and immediately afterwards we are unable to 
recall it. Unless we pause deliberately to form a mental image of the 
number, or keep repeating it to ourselves, we shall have forgotten it 
by the time we reach the telephone. 
The echoing tendency of the Young child is adgquate for the repet- 
ition of numbers or words in this first way; but there must come a 
point at which the numbers or words become too long or numerous to be 
repeated mechanically, and the deliberate formation and retention of a 
mental image becomes necessary. Apparently the limit of this mechanical 
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method for the young child is reached with four digits; for while three 
digits can be repeated at 3 years, and four digits at 4 years, five 
digits are not introduced into the scale until 7 years - three years 
later. We have already seen that at 6 the system of ideation and 
imagery is beginning to pass under the control of the ego, which is a 
factor necessary to the deliberate formation of mental images. The 
repeating of digits, therefore, does not always represent the same type 
of mental structure. At ages 3 and 4 it would appear to be still a 
mechanical process, otherwise there seems no reason why the repetition 
of five digits should have to be postponed until age 7. 
The remaining test - counting four pennies - is also psychologically 
unsatisfactory. Terman (p. 151) points out that success "does not pre- 
suppose any power of calculation or a mastery of the number concepts 
from one to four." But when these are excluded, what is left? It is a 
bare reference of a number (not understood) to an object (not yet grasped 
as such). 
To sum up this ¿i. -year -old group of tests, we have evidence for some 
form -discrimination and motor co- ordination, but evidence of ability 
to objectify imagery is doubtful. 
Returning to our analysis of the tests for children of school age, 
we come to year 7. At this stage of the analysis we must begin to 
distinguish two types of test, - one type in which the mental structure 
required is the same as that seen in a previous year, the test being 
more difficult only in degree, - the other type consisting of tests for 
which an entirely new mental structure is required. This latter type 
of test we shall call a "significant" test. 
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Taking the abilities of the 5 -year -old child as a basis, at which 
stage he can objectify and compare certain sensory and affective elements, 
and objectify an image of a total situation, we find at age 6 two new 
functions appearing, - the cognition of the feeling of "right" and "left" 
in his own body, and the cognition (through the use of a free idea) of 
an object as such. All the remaining tests involve functions already 
at the command of the child and are not "significant ". For example, 
when a child of 6 is asked tó visualise a situation in which it is 
raining when he starts for school, he is merely carrying through a 
slightly more complicated variant of what he already did at the age of 5 
when asked to describe a horse. In the case of the latter question his 
problem is, in effect: "What does a horse do ?" In the case of the 
former it is: "What do I do when it is raining and I am starting for 
school ?" The mental structure is the same, - that of the ego confront- 
ing the image of a total situation and expressing what it observes. 
All the tests at 7, on the other hand, appear to be significant 
with the exception of "Picture description ". This test, of course, 
involves a different function from that of mere enumeration. It involves, 
however, the perception of ottects in a meaningful relation - which the 
child of 6 already does when he pictures himself in a concrete situation, 
and even the child of 5 when he describes the functions of things. 
Hence there is no reason why such a test should not be passed at 5 or 6, 
if the pictures are simple or obvious enough. Terman (P. 193) remarks 
that with pictures used by Kuhlmann "even 5- or 6 -year intelligence 
seldom fails with them." And he adds: "No better proof than the above 
could be found to show how ability of a given kind does not make its 
appearance suddenly. There is no one time in the life of even a single 
child when the power to describe pictures suddenly develops. On the 
contrary, pictures of a certain type will ordinarily provoke description, 
rather than enumeration, as early as 5 or 6 years; others not before 7 
or 8 years, or even later." This proves nothing, however, beyond the 
fact that this type of test is not a very significant one. It could 
also be said that there is no time in the life of a child when he cannot 
repeat digits. 
Coming now to the significant tests at 7 years (1) - Number of 
fingers - shows a grasp of the use of number which was not clearly seen 
in the counting of 13 pennies. It is a conception of number, however, 
still attached to the concrete. 
(3) - Repeating five digits - as we have already seen, appears to 
depend upon the development of control over imagery, and so represents 
a new factor. 
(l+) - Tying a bow -knot - chiefly involves, according to Tensan, 
(p. 199) "Interest in common objective things" and "Ability to perform 
permanent associative connections between successive motor co- ordinat- 
ions (memory for a series of acts)" The significant element in this 
test appears to be, however, not interest in objective things, for that 
is already present at 6 in the ability to cognise an object, but in the 
fact that we have here a series of acts too complex to be performed by 
mere imitation, but only through conscious direction by the ego in the 
light of an objectively grasped series of images. At 6 we saw that 
ideas were beginning to pass over to the control of the ego. Here we 
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see that the ego is beginning to control, through such images, the motor 
system in a conscious way. 
In test 5 - Concrete differences - we have the calling up of two 
concrete ideas and an act of comparison between them. In "Omissions 
from pictures" a comparison is made between an idea and an object. Here 
it is between two ideas. In this respect it is a different quality of 
test. The child must be aware of his ideas; whereas, in the 6- year -old 
test, the image- pattern of the human face to which the child must refer 
in making his judgment is not consciously apprehended as such. Even as 
adults we are not consciously aware of the ideas in terms of which we 
make such comparisons. In short, in the 6- year -bld test we have the 
objective cognition of an object. In this test we have the objective 
cognition of concrete ideas in its first beginnings - apprehension of an 
aspect of two ideas; for the child compares only a quality common to 
the two ideas, as he compares qualities common to two objects at 5. 
Test 6 - Copying a diamond - would appear to be a further stage of 
the test of copying a square; but, like the digits test, a new factor 
is involved other than one of degree. The shape is abstract, and one 
outside the child's normal experience. Square or rectangular forms 
surround him on all sides, but here is a shape upon which he must fix 
his attention and note the unusual direction of the lines. Be must, 
in fact, treat it as an object - see it as it really is - and not yield 
to the associative tendency by drawing a linear figure he already knows. 
This he should be able to do at 6; but the factor of control over the 
motor system which appears at 7 in the bow -knot test, is probably an 
important one here. To be awake to the form of the figure is not enough. 
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He must have sufficient motor control to reproduce it. Hence there is 
an interval of three years between the square and the diamond test. 
Of the two alternative tests, the second, - Three digits backwards, - 
is especially interesting. Here the child must not only observe an 
image, but he must mentally re -read it in the reverse direction to that 
in which it was built up. Terman calls this "manipulation" of imagery; 
but it is hardly that. The image is not moved or changed. It is mere- 
ly "held" or controlled. The first alternative - Naming the days of the 
week,- including the answering of the "check" questions, involves also 
this ability to read backwards and forwards from some form of image or 
series of images, as well as a certain conception of time. 
These significant 7- year -old tests show that the child has now the 
ability to objectify concrete ideas and to control mental images which 
do not form part of a total situation, and that he has a grasp of the 
use of number in the concrete. It is a most important stage in his 
mental development. 
We have now observed three stages of development in the relation of 
the ego of the child to its imagery and to concrete ideas. At 5, con- 
crete memory images in a context - a total situation - can be objectified 
and observed. At 6 an image can be abstracted from its context - in 
the form of a concrete idea - and used for the purpose of comparison with 
an object. At 7, these ideas can themselves be objectified and compared 
with each other, while abstracted mental images can be fixated. 
In the 8- year -old tests there are three which appear to show a new 
mental structure, involving the objectification of complex ideas, or 
concrete ideas in relation. These are, "Ball and field ", "Similarities" 
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there already supplied for him, and he had nothing to do but "read off" 
the answer. Here, however, he must either grasp the related ideas as 
such, or fail to answer correctly. The questions are concerned with 
what ought to be done, and so cannot be answered merely de facto. 
But although the child objectifies these ideas in relation, it does 
not mean that he objectifies the abstract relations themselves, such 
conceptions as ownership, etc., in the abstract, belonging to a class of 
concepts which are not found to be objectified by the child until the 
age of 12. We may therefore say that at the age of 8 he uses or "lives 
in" such concepts, but does not objectify them. 
The middle question, about being late for school, seems quite out 
of place here. Psychologically, it is of the same quality as the ques- 
tion at 6, about what to do when it is raining. It is a purely practical 
matter, and can probably in nearly every case be answered from memory. 
Its main difficulty appears to the writer to lie in the fact that the 
child might well think the expected answer too obvious to be the right 
one. It is noteworthy that Burt (6) inserts the question about "missing 
a train" in its place, which, according to Terman, is a 6- year -old test. 
In regard now to the non -insignificant tests at this age, "Defini- 
tions superior to use" - in so far as these are merely descriptive - are 
evidence of a slight advance in the ability, shown at 7, to objectify a 
concrete idea. Here the idea is cognised more as a whole; and, as the 
idea is described in terms of parts related to a whole, we have the use 
of the category of 'Whole and part" in connection with a concrete 
idea. 
In so far, however, as the answer is a "class" 
definition, we have 
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the use of such a concept in connection with a concrete idea. But this 
stage belongs probably to a year later. Bobertag (7) shows in his table 
of answers to these questions that true class definition does not appear 
until 9, while Burt (6) obtained only 63.8¡o passes at 9, even when 
including description. In Burt's table of age -assignments given to the 
Binet tests by the different investigators, it is noteworthy that out of 
17 of these, 15 place this test at either 9 or 10 years, the only ex- 
ceptions being Terman at 8, and Rogers and Maclntyre at 12. 
Counting backwards, from 20 to 0, is a rather more difficult form 
of the 7 -year test of repeating digits backwards. It is, however, the 
same psychological process, involving a firm grip of imagery and sústained 
attention. Terman (p.210 says that the quantitative relationships of 
the numbers must be apprehended. It seems rather, however, to need 
primarily some imagery of the number series, and, given this, the appre- 
hension of the quantitative relationships becomes a secondary matter. 
At the very least, it involves the "holding" of one number in imagery 
until the next lowest is found. 
What exactly the "vocabulary" test signifies could be known only 
through an examination of individual responses. The words are so 
heterogeneous, and the accepted levels of definition so various, that it 
is impossible to generalise from it. Further, the range of words with 
which a child is acquainted is so much a reflection of his environment, 
that we have no means of knowing how far we are really testing the 
child's native intelligence. 
Of the two alternative tests, naming six coins is a 
more difficult 
form of the similar test at 6, and so involves nothing new in structure; 
while "Dictation" is too involved in the scholastic element to allow of 
our making any psychological deductions from it. 
To sum up, this year shows a complete cognition of concrete ideas 
and of concrete ideas in relation, the relational concepts themselves, 
however, not being objectified but only used. Similarly we can say 
that the child now uses what may be called "general ideas" or "rules of 
conduct" in connection with concrete ideas, - that governing the "Ball 
and field" test being of a practical nature, and thosd governing the 
two "comprehension" cjuestions being of an ethical nature. But, like 
the relational concepts, they are not yet objectified. 
In the 9 -year tests we find this use of relational concepts 
further extended. In giving the day, date, and year the child must 
bring three separate temporal ideas into relationship with one another; 
and in the "Five weights" test he must bring into a serial relationship 
the weights of the five objects, - i.e. he must be able to use the 
concept of a series. The third test, - "Giving change ", - again 
involves ideas in relation, this time the relationship being one of 
reciprocity. 
Thus these three tests represent the use of a temporal, a serial, 
and a reciprocal relation, and we have to do with the same mental 
structure as at 8, the difference being, presumably, one of difficulty 
in degree. 
The repetition of four digits backwards is of course a further 
stage of the same test at 7, and involves nothing new in structure; 
while naming the months involves the same mental process as that of 
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naming the days of the week. Knowing the value of stamps has its basis 
in a knowledge of coins, already possessed at 8, and simple arithmetic. 
"Finding rhymes" - as Teiman points out (p. 249) - "means that one 
must hunt out verbal associations under the direction of a guiding 
idea ". This involves the child "holding" an auditory image, and 
searching among his memory images for the appropriate association. It 
involves attention, and the power to move freely among his images; but 
this demands nothing new in structure. 
The only remaining test, "Sentence - building ", - needs some 
discussion. The task of building up a sentence including three given 
words involves bringing these three concrete ideas into a relationship. 
It is the unity of the resulting complex idea rather than the grammatical 
unity of the sentence which is required here; for sentences consisting 
of two independent clauses are accepted. The menta -1 level of the test, 
however, will depend largely upon the nature of the idea required, and 
which will of course vary with the words given. 
At its si:::plest it involves the cognition of related concrete ideas, 
e.g. "The boy lost his ball in the river" (quoted by Ternan). But 
"The river is a source of much money to London" (Burt) from the words 
"London, River, Money", is obviously a combination of a much more 
abstract kind. This is largely because these three words do not lend 
themselves so readily to such a concrete linking, although the words 
themselves are concrete. Thus the difficulty of this test will depend 
not only upon the concreteness or otherwise of the words themselves, 
but upon their intellectual "distance" from one another. Yet Burt (6) 
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is also willing to accept: "London is a big place. It has a river in it. 
And many people come there to make money." Taking Terman's conditions, 
however, it involves at least the cognition of a complex idea consisting 
of concrete ideas in relation. 
This test, however, differs from the other relational tests in 
one particular. In the previous tests, - even in the "ethical" 
comprehension questions, - the relationship already existed and had 
only to be apprehended. Here, however, the relationship has to be 
invented. This involves manipulation of the concrete ideas and would 
appear to beaqualitative advance on the 8 -year level. But while this 
might safely be said in regard to the "London, River, Money" test when 
a single sentence is demanded, it can hardly be affirmed of "Boy, Ball, 
River" or of 'Work, Men, Money ", since. mere association of ideas may 
here be operative. Such sentences as "The boy threw his ball into the 
river" or Men work for money" may fall into place almost automatically 
in the child's mind, and in which case it is scarcely a test of anything. 
Like the vocabulary tests it is vitiated by the factor of environment, - 
by what the child is in the habit of doing or hearing. 
There is therefore no clear evidence here of any mental structure 
in advance of the 8 -year level; and we have to conclude that the 
difference between the 8- and the 9-year intelligence is not a difference 
in structure but only of greater ability in the use of the structure 
already possessed. In other words, there are no significant tests at 
this age. 
Of the six tests and three alternatives at 10, sim prove to be 
non -significant. The vocabulary test provides no general information, 
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as already pointed out. The naming of 60 words in three minutes is 
again a test whose results can be judged only in individual cases. Its 
psychological significance depends entirely on whether the child 
proceeds in an orderly way to enumerate words belonging to a class of 
object, and, having exhausted these, passes to another group; or, 
whether he passes, through quite illogical association, from object to 
object indiscriminately. A scatter -brain might well succeed by the 
second method. 
Reading for eight memories involves no new factor, as does neither 
the repetition of six digits nor twenty -two syllables. The third 
alternative test, - that of the Healy and Fernald. form- board, - involves 
space discrimination and some elementary reasoning, neither of which is 
a new element at this stage. 
In the tests of "Absurdities ", "Memory drawing ", and in one of the 
"comprehension" questions, we have, however, a new factor appearing. 
Absurdity usually involves some form of contradiction. To 
recognise a contradiction one must be conscious of some universal rule 
which is hereby broken. For example, roads cannot run both uphill and 
downhill at once, weight cannot add to the speed of a train, etc.. The 
child who passes this absurdity test must be able to objectify such 
general ideas. 
A complex idea is the term we have applied to an idea of a related 
group of objects. A general idea, on the other ha a, is the idea of 
a rule or law relating to such a group of objects and in terms 
of which 
(and of others) the group may be sild to form a rational whole. 
If, 
therefore, we introduce into our idea of such a related group, another 
idea or related group of ideas which does not conform to this rule or 
law, an "absurdity" arises. 
The "intruding" ideas are not necessarily absurd in themselves. 
In their proper context they may be perfectly rational. The absurdity 
arises through the clash of incompatible rules, or the juxtaposition of 
two incompatible wholes of ideas. 
Thus we can say: To fail to see a contradiction or absurdity is 
to fail to grasp the fact that two factors in the situation are said to 
belong to a whole in which, however, they cannot co- exist. The 
absurdity lies in the affirmation that they belong to one whole, when 
actually they can belong only to quite separate wholes or situations. 
A girl may kill herself. A girl may be found cut into eighteen pieces. 
But the two facts cannot co -exist as parts of the same situation. 
The ability to pass this test, therefore, involves not only the 
objectification of general ideas or rules, but the ability to distinguish 
separate groups of related ideas within a given context. This means 
the objectification of complex ideas in relation - in its simplest form - 
in which the relation is one of incompatibility, or exclusion. 
It is interesting to note that the test of "Memory draving" 
involves the same factor, - the apprehension of related wholes. Tennan 
says (p. 261): "Success is possible only by grouping the lines according 
to their relationships, so that several of them are given a unitary 
value and renembered as one." and "Ability to pass the test indicates 
the presence, in a certain definite fount, of the tendency of the 
contents of consciousness to fuse into a meaningful whole." 
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This, however, is to grasp such a relationship only on the visual 
level, and it is on that account a simpler task than on the level of 
related ideas - as is the case in the absurdity test. The fact that 
this memory test is placed at the same age -level must therefore be due 
to other factors. It is thus not a wholly significant test for this 
age, but it is nevertheless the first appearance of such a type of test 
in this scale. 
Coming now to the Comprehension test, we shall deal first with 
question 3, - 'Thy should we judge a person more by his actions than by 
his words ?" In two of the comprehension questions at 8 the child was 
asked to make a judgment. Here he is asked to make a judgment about a 
judgment. 
A simple judgment is made in the light of a general idea or rule 
which is used but not objectified. But here the rule must be object- 
ified in order to answer the question: "Iihz do you make such and such a 
judgment ?" The child must examine, not the judgment, but the rule in 
terms of which he makes the judgment. Hence we have again the 
objectification of a general idea or rule. 
But questions 1 and 2 of this series do not demand this. They ask 
'`That ought you to do ?" - not "lay?". They are therefore of the same 
type as questions 1 and 3 at age 8. They are placed here, apparently, 
not because of any higher mental level which they involve, but on 
account of some greater difficulty in degree. "What 
ought you to say 
when someone asks your opinion about a person you don't know very 
well ?" 
and "What ought you to do before undertaking something 
very important ?" 
are questions in no way different in the mental structure which they 
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demand, from "That's the thing to do when you have broken something 
which belongs to someone else ?" and ''What's the thing for you to do 
if a playmate hits you without meaning to do it ?" All four demand an 
answer in relation to a concrete situation. They do not demand the 
statement of a rule. The fact that the w ord "ought" is substituted 
for "the thing to do" does not alter this fact. But the answer to the 
question? "Why should we judge a person more by his action than by his 
words:" must be the statement of a rule; e.g. "Actions speak louder 
than words" or "It's not what you say but what you do, that counts." 
(quoted by Tennan, p. 270). 
It is to be noted, however, that the rules or general ideas 
objectified at this age are of a factual nature, not ethical. 
Summing up our analysis of the 10 -year level, we have the objectif- 
ication of simple factual rules, or general ideas, and the cognition 
likewise of complex ideas in relation. In connection with the latter, 
also, we may note the use of the category of "whole and part" in 
relation to complex ideas. 
While this age shows this important step in mental development, the 
ability to objectify abstract ideas has not yet appeared, still less the 
objectification of "principles" or categories. Here, however, in the 
absurdities test, we see a principle in use, - the principle of "law" 
or "coherence" in connection with ideas of a concrete kind. It is at 
this stage, therefore, that we might begin reasonably to speak of the 
"germs" of the scientific spirit appearing in the child. 
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In the tests at age 12 we have four which are plainly a continuation 
of those given in previous years, namely, "Vocabulary ", "Ball and field ", 
"Five digits backward4 and "Similarities ", and which therefore show us 
nothing new on the side of structural development. The significant 
tests appear to be: "Definition of abstract ideas ", "Dissected 
sentences ", and "Fable interpretation ". 
In the first, we have now the objectification of abstract ideas. 
In order to define a thought we must first be able to objectify it 
mentally. 
In "Dissected sentences" we seem to have evidence for the ability 
to manipulate concrete ideas, since success in this test involves 
bringing the "broken" parts of the sentence into various relationships 
until the correct "whole" is found. But, as in the case of "sentence 
building ", it is not easy to separate this from the association factor, 
and its real value therefore depends upon the degree of unusualness of 
the sentence. At the least, it involves the cognition of concrete 
ideas in relation; but how far the element of manipulation enters in, 
will depend on the sentence and the manner in which it is broken up. 
This test, in fact, is merely a more difficult form of sentence- 
building, where, instead of a free choice of the intermediary words, 
all the words are given and have to be fitted into the sentence, without 
deduction or addition. 
It is significant that of 13 investigators quoted by Burt (6) (P.212 
10 place the sentence-building test (two sentences) at either age 10 or 
11 (7 at 10 and 3 at 11), only 1 placing it below 10. As this applies 
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to Binet's original test ( "Paris, River,loney ") or its local equivalent, 
and which are not normally "associable" words for a child, we may not 
be far wrong in placing the beginnings of idea -manipulation at age 10, 
regarding the "dissected sentences" test as merely a further development 
of it. 
In "Fable interpretation" we have now the objectification of 
ethical rules, or general ideas of a non -factual type. The "moral" of 
the story has to be objectively cognised by the child. 
In regard to "Picture interpretation" there wôuld appear to be some 
doubt. Terman (p. 305) strongly reasserts that everything depends upon 
the nature of the pictures used, and that Kuhlmann's pictures are as 
easy to interpret at 10 as the Stanford pictures at 12. But while 
this is undoubtedly a level of thought which we have not yet met in 
connection with these pictures, the process is little different from 
what we have already assumed to be operative at 10, namely, the mani- 
pulation of concrete ideas. For, instead of the child being confronted 
with three concrete ideas such as "London, River, Money ", which he has 
to manipulate into a rational relationship, he is here given a picture 
depicting certain persons and objects which he has to manipulate in 
the same way into a meaningful relationship. Like the sentence- 
building test, the difficulty or otherwise will depend u;on the readiness 
with which these data are naturally associable for the child. It is a 
test which has comparatively little meaning; and one can imagine a 
picture being successfully "interpreted" by quite a young child if it 
happened to call up in his mind a story or event which he:had recently 
heard or seen. We have no means of knowing whether the result is the 
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outcome of deliberate idea - manipulation, or of mere automatic association. 
The 12 -year level can therefore be summarised as that at which the 
child can objectify abstract ideas and ethical rules. These are the 
only new mental abilities shown by the tests. 
We may now make a summary of our analysis of the years 5 to 12. 
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Before drawing any final conclusion from these results, however, 
we must take account of the Revised Stanford -Binet Scales (Forms L. and M 
recently published (8). In these scales some of the former tests have 
been moved to other years, while some appear in other years in a modi- 
fied form. Others, again, have been omitted and tests of a quite 
different type make their appearance. 
We shall deal first of all with those tests which are the same as, 
or similar in type to, those of the 1916 revision. 
As the ages below 5 are now divided into half years, it is to be 
expected that some of the 5 -year tests, for example, should now be found 
at 4;6, since, in the old scale, the passing of all the 4 -year tests and 
half of the 5 -year tests gave a mental age of 4;6. Thus we have at 4;6 
"Aesthetic comparison ", "Three commissions" in Form L., and a kind of 
"definition" test expressing "use" - or an "identifying" description 
rather inferior to use, in Form M.. 
On the other hand, there appear in the 5-year tests, Form L., three 
which belonged formerly to the 4 -year level, namely, "Copying square ", 
"Repeating 12 syllables ", and "Counting four objects ". The first is 
scored as before, the second has a slightly higher standard (1 out of 2 
as compared with 1 out of 3), while the third has a lower standard (2 out 
of 3 as against 1 out of 1). At the same level are now found two tests 
which were formerly at a later age, - tying a knot (Forms L. and M.) 
being a simpler form of the bow -knot at 7, and, (Form M.) a new form 
of the "Mutilated pictures" test at 6. In the latter the standard of 
scoring is lower (3 out of 5 as against 3 out of 2+). There is also a 
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"Concept of number" test (Form M.) going as far as the concept of "three ". 
At year 6 (Form M.) we find a "Concrete differences" test which was 
formerly placed at 7, and a concept of number test (L. and M.) reaching 
to 10, in addition to the former "Fingers" test which remains at 7. 
At 7 we find "Similarities" and the former "Comprehension" test (L.), 
both previously 8 -year tests, "16 Syllables" (M.) formerly year 6, and 
a simpler form of "Sentence -building" than the one found previously at 9. 
We have therefore a few changes to note. Although the "Fingers" 
test and a concept of number test appear at 7, the presence of the latter 
type of test also at 6 now indicates that the beginning of the use of 
number in the concrete is to be found at this age. Previous to this, 
there is only the "Counting four objects" test at 5 (L.) and a number 
concept test for "three" at 5 (H.). The gulf between these and the 
test at 6 is marked, and indicates that a big step forward in the concep- 
tion of number is taken during this year interval. Any conception of 
number indicated by the 5 -year tests is negligible. 
Since "Concrete differences" is now placed a year earlier, the 
ability to objectify an aspect of two concrete ideas must now be con- 
sidered to be present at 6. In the same way, as the "Comprehension " 
and "Similarities" tests are now placed at 7, we must place full objecti- 
fication of concrete ideas at this age instead of at 8, as well as the 
beginning of the cognition of ideas in relation. The test of "Definition 
superior to use" has been dropped, but the ability to cognise concrete 
ideas wholly, and not merely in part, is involved in these two other 
tests. 
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These two alterations appear to be reasonable, since, if control 
of free imagery is possible at 7, there seems no reason why concrete 
ideas - which are very. closely allied to the free image - should not be 
fully objectified at the sane age, with partial objectification a year 
earlier. It is a more logical arrangement than that derived in Table 1. 
Mutilated Pictures, also, involving the use (not objectification) of a 
concrete idea - which now appears at 5 - suggests that cognition of 
an object should be placed at this age instead of at 6. 
But this question of placing a test earlier by reducing the 
standard of scoring, is one which must be carefully considered from 
our point of view. The structural changes with which we are dealing 
do not take place over night. There must be a period of transition 
during which a certain task, involving a new structure, can sometimes 
be performed successfully and sometimes not. That we are concerned 
with, however, is the point at which we can say that the new structure 
is clearly there - not merely half there. Unless, therefore, the 
presence of other tests in the same year affirms the existence of the 
particular structure, the mental act must be performed by the child 
in, say, two out of three attempts at the very least, before we can say 
that the particular structure is now part of the normal mental life 
of the child. Three out of four would be a more reasonable proportion. 
For unless the child can perform a given task easily, allowing only for 
a possible slip, - (provided always that the difficulty of the test is 
not one merely of degree and that it represents the simplest of its 
kind requiring such a structure) - it would be wrong to base educational 
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assumptions upon the fact, and to give the child scholastic tasks which 
involve such a structure. 
The score in the "Mutilated pictures" test at 5, therefore, being 
only 3 out of 5, is too low for us to assume that cognition of objects 
is yet fully present at this age, although its beginnings may be noted. 
It will be noted also that this line of demarcation affects the 
two significant tests at 12 in the 19l6' Revision, namely, "Abstract 
definition" (3 out of 5) and "Fable interpretation" (i out of 10), there 
being no other tests at this age.to confirm this new structure. These 
are, however, the only examples of their kind in that scale, and we 
must wait for their confirmation, or otherwise, in our analysis of the 
new scales. 
Tying a simple knot shows the first beginnings of the passing of 
the motor system over to the control of the ego, which reaches a certain 
completion at 7 through the ego's control over imagery. This test is 
very different from the bow -knot test (formerly at 7 and now discarded); 
for it requires actually only the same simple movement repeated twice 
in order to form a simple knot. This hardly shows the control over a 
series of images indicated by the bow -knot test. 
On the other hand, the "Days of the week" test is now postponed 
until 8. As this test involves control over imagery such as is shown 
by other tests at year 7, both in the new and in the former scale, it 
is difficult to see any psychological justification for this change. 
fact, however, does not affect our analysis, since this structure is 
1 
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already represented at 7. 
The introduction of the "Sentence -building" test at 7, and which 
involves, as we have already seen, the cognition of concrete ideas in 
relation, is in keeping with the presence of the "Comprehension" and 
"Similarities" tests now found at this age. As already noted, the 
difficulty of this test depends upon the intellectual distance of the 
given words from each other, and the closer these words are to each other, 
the less does the need for conscious manipulation of them arise. In 
this each set of three words is simple and suggestive, and the standard 
of sentence is lenient. 
At 8 we find a "Verbal absurdities" test, a type belonging formerly 
to year 10. This type we have already described as involving the objecti- 
fication of general rules governing groups of concrete ideas (concrete 
ideas in relation), and of recognising the incompatibility of the two 
resulting wholes. In such a test as "I know a road from my house to 
the city which is downhill all the way to the city and downhill all the 
way back home ", we have two groups of concrete ideas - that of house, 
city, and a road leading downhill from the first to the second, and that 
of city, house, and a road leading downhill in the opposite direction. 
The incompatibility is between these two groups of ideas. Either might 
be true, but they cannot both be true at the same time. 
On the other hand, the statement: "A man had influenza twice. The 
first time it killed him, but the second time he got well quickly ", 
involves the following ideas: A sick man dying, and later the same man 
recovering from an illness. These are the incompatible elements. But 
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here we have to do only with two concrete ideas, not two groups of related 
ideas, as in the former case. We have to do with states or acts of the 
same subject, not with relations between one subject or object and 
another. The incompatibility is between two states or acts. 
Again, in the test: "Walter now has to write with his left hand 
because two years ago he lost both his arms in an accident ", we have: 
A person writing with his left hand: A person without any arms. These 
are once more two concrete ideas, with the incompatibility lying between 
an act and a state. 
Lastly, in the test: "An old gentleman complained that he could 
no longer walk round the park as he used to; he said he could now go 
only halfway round and back again ", we can have either the idea of two 
halves being equal to the whole, or, less abstractly, we can form a 
mental image of the park and compare the two distances. It need thus 
involve no more than a comparison of concrete ideas, the incompatibility 
here being one of dimensions and not of states. 
Three of these four tests in Form M., therefore, are on a lower 
level, and involve the recognition of the incompatibility of two concrete 
ideas, that is, the cognition of concrete ideas in relation. 
In Form L., age 8, we have the following: 
(a) "They found a young man locked in his room with his hands tied 
behind hLa and his feet bound together. They think he locked 
himself in." 
Here we have a variant of the test where an armless man writes. A 
bound man locks a door, or he ties his own hands. 
(b) "A wheel came off Frank's motor car. As he could not get the 
wheel back on by himself, he drove his motor car to the garage 
for repairs." 
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This is another case of two concrete ideas, a car being driven, 
and a car without a wheel. Incompatibility of act and state. 
(o) "I read in the papers that the police fired two shots at a man. 
The first shot killed him, but the second did not hurt him much." 
This is a similar situation to that in which the man died from 
influenza, but recovered from the second attack. Here a man is killed, 
and then only slightly wounded. Two concrete ideas. Incompatibility 
of two states. 
(d) "An engine -driver said that the more carriages he had on his train 
the faster he could go." 
Here we have the idea of an engine pulling a train of a certain 
size and travelling at a certain speed, together with that of a length- 
ened train travelling at a greater speed. But in this case the incom- 
patible elements consist of complex ideas, for one must think of size of 
train in relation to speed in both cases. (Of course this test may be 
vitiated by the child possessing a toy railway. He will then know 
this fact by experience, without having to think relationally.) 
In this set of tests also three out of the four are on the lower 
level. 
As the pass is three correct out of four in each case, 
it can 
hardly be said from this evidence that children of 8 are able to cognise 
complex ideas in relation, which, in the original Terman scale, belongs 
to year 10. 
A verbal absurdities test appears also at year 
9 in the new scale. 
In Form L. we have: 
(a) "Bill Jones's feet are so big that 
he has to pull his trousers on 
over his head." 
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This absurdity is based simply on a physical impossibility, and all 
that is needed is a clear mental picture of the garment concerned, to- 
gether with that of the shape of the human body. There is no logical 
contradiction. It involves the incompatibility of two mental images. 
(b) "A man called one day at the post- office and asked if there was a 
letter waiting for him. 'What is your name ?' asked the postmaster. 
"Why', said the man, 'you will find my name on the envelope.'" 
If the name is known, the envelope need not be known. If the 
envelope is known, the name need not be known. But if anything is to 
result, they must not be both unknown at once. So we have here two 
complex ideas, each involving a relation between a knower, an object, 
and a name. 
(c) "The fireman hurried to the burning house, got his fire hose ready, 
and after smoking a cigar, put out the fire." 
The contradiction here is practical, not logical. The fireman 
first hurried to the fire, then he delayed action when he got there. 
We have here two concrete ideas - that of the fireman hurrying, and that 
of the fireman wasting time. Or, the idea of the house rapidly burning, 
and that of the fireman calmly looking on. Incompatibility of acts. 
(a) "In an old graveyard in Spain they have discovered a small skull 
which they believe to be that of Christopher Columbus when he 
was about ten years old." 
The skull of a ten -year -old boy. The skull of Christopher 
Columbus. Either might be found, but the two are incompatible. The 
incompatibility is between the attributes of two concrete ideas. 
(e) "One day we saw several icebergs that had been entirely melted 
by the warmth of the Gulf Stream." 
Once more - the incompatibility of states of two concrete ideas. 
The score is 3 out of 5. Only one (b) is on the level of complex ideas. 
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In Form Iii. we have: 
(a) 
" 
I saw a well- dressed young man who was walking down the street with 
his hands in his pockets and twirling a brand -new cane." 
Here is simply a physical impossibility, involving the incompat- 
ibility of the two mental pictures - of state and act. 
(b) "A father wrote to his son, 'I enclose ten pounds. If you do not 
receive this letter, please send me a telegram". 
Knowing to send a telegram depends upon receipt of the letter. 
The need to send it depends upon not receiving the letter. Hence we 
have to deal here with two incompatible complex ideas. 
(c) "A soldier on the march complained that every man in the regiment 
was out of step except himself._" 
This is not exactly a contradiction, but a matter of opposing 
values. There are two concrete ideas which, however, cannot both be 
right, and the soldier places corl'ectness -value upon the wrong one. 
The absurdity lies really in his ego -centrism. Incompatibility of 
values of two concrete ideas. 
(d) "A kind - hearted man who was taking a heavy bag of grain to town on 
his horse, sat on his horse and lifted the bag to his own shoulder 
in order to make the load easier for the horse." 
This involves two complex ideas - the relation of the weight of 
the bag to the man, and the relation of the weight of the man plus bag 
to the horse. The two relations must be seen to bear ultimately on the 
horse. Here we have an inseparable relationship which the kind- 
hearted man believed to be separable, and the child has to see the 
impossibility of the separation of the two sets of ideas. 
But a pictorial short -cut can be made 
to this conclusion by the 
simple picturing of the man with the bag seated 
on the horse. The child 
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can then see at once that the horse bears all the weight, without his 
having to think the matter out. This imagery short -cut is possible in 
this particular case, because the absurdity lies not in the incompatibility 
of two falsely united complex ideas, which cannot be pictured together, 
but in the failure to unite two complex ideas which really belong to one 
another. Thus the situation can be pictured directly as a whole. 
(e) "A man said to his friend: 'I hope you live to eat the chickens 
that scratch the earth on your grave.'" 
Here are two complex ideas - living long enough to eat certain 
chickens, and the chickens that scratch the earth on his own grave. 
In this series we have two (b and e) involving complex ideas, and 
three at the lower level. The score is 3 out of 5. 
Thus,in neither of these two series at age 9 is the child expected 
to think in terms higher than that of concrete ideas in relation, in 
order to pass the tests, which is the same level as that found at 8. 
It is not surprising to find "Memory drawing" moved from year 10 to 
year 9, since, as was pointed out in our previous analysis, this test 
is not qualitatively on the level of the other significant 10 -year 
tests in the 1916 revision. There is nothing in this test which is not 
found at the 7- or 8 -year level in regard to structure, although there 
is no actual example of such a test. It involves the grasping of 
wholes in terms of imagery and their relation to one another. The 
category of whole and part in reference to an object is already in use 
at 6, and in reference to a concrete idea at 8. 
At Y ear 9 (Form Iii.) a "Dissected 
sentences" test is placed. Like 
the new sentence - building test at 7, these sentences 
are much simpler 
than those of the former scale; and there is no evidence in Tei-man's 1! 
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quoted cases of failure that the general meaning of the sentences has 
ever been misunderstood. For the crux of the matter is, that in 
solving these little problems, the eye tends to look first for "key" 
words which may suggest the general meaning or trend of the sentence. 
If these principal ideas are capable of arrangement in two or more 
different ways, they may have to be manipulated by the subject into the 
various possible arrangements until the arrangement is found in which the 
intermediary words are seen to fit. 
This may be evidence for the presence of idea - manipulation in the 
case of those who pass; and evidence for the need of such manipulation 
can be seen if some of the failures show an alternative or wrong meaning. 
If, on the other hand, there is only one possible arrangement of the key 
words which could make a sentence at all, there can be no question of 
idea - manipulation, but only of the grasping of a complex idea. 
In the sentences given at this age: 
"A have dog I fine" 
"Cool the was coat of made" 
"Child the playing garden in the is" 
there can be no doubt that they deal with "I" having a dog, a coat made 
of wool, and a child playing in a garden; and it is merely a question 
of being accurate in regard to the placing of the intermediary words and 
to the grammatical arrangement. 
On the other had d, in such a sentence as: 
"A defends dog good his bravely taster" (age 13, Form L. and :K.) 
one can have "A good dog defends his master bravely ", or "A good master 
bravely defends his dog" - showing that these key ideas "Defends ", "Dog ", 
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and "Master" are here capable of manipulation and that the correct meaning 
is not directly suggested to the child, as in the former case. (See 
terman (8) p. 277. 
In view of the fact that concrete ideas in relation can be object- 
ified at 7, and the function involved in this test is simply to see the 
dismembered parts of the sentence in relation to one another, there is 
nothing here qualitatively different from year 7. 
In regard to all the above new tests at 9, there is no evidence of 
any qualitative level, or structure, appearing at this age higher than 
that already seen at 7 and 8, namely, the cognition of concrete ideas in 
relation. 
The "Comprehension" questions found at 8 in Forms L. and 11., are in 
some respects different from those of the original scale, which are now 
placed at 7. In two out of each of the three questions the child is 
asked either to place himself in an unusual situation and state his 
reactions, or state how a man should act in such and such a situation. 
These questions are of a purely practical kind, such as: 
"What should you say when you are in a strange town and someone 
asks you the way?" 
and 'What should a man do if he comes home and finds that a burglar 
has robbed his house ?" 
The remaining tests (one in each scale) are concerned with mech- 
anical matters: 
"What makes a sailing -boat move ?" 
and "Why is a train harder to stop than a motor -car?" 
In the first type of test the child has to imagine an unusual 
situation and view it objectively, In the second type he must have some 
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expected of the child at 8 or 9. 
This higher level at 10 is also demanded by the "Absurdities" test 
in the 1916 scale. We have already seen that the question "I know a 
road from my house to the city . . . . " and "An engine -driver said that 
the more carriages he had on his train . . . . " are of this kind. 
The same applies to the question regarding the body of the girl found 
cut into eighteen pieces, and who was believed to have killed herself. 
Here we have a complex idea - a body cut into eighteen pieces - related 
to an incompatible complex idea - a girl who had killed herself. It 
is to be noted that the latter is not equivalent to the concrete idea 
"a dead girl ". It involves the relationship between the girl and the 
various possible methods of killing herself, which is then seen to be 
incompatible with the body in eighteen pieces. 
In regard to the "Railway accident" absurdity, we have the 
incompatible relation between the complex idea of a slight accident 
with its implied lack of injury to passengers, and that of a large 
number of people killed with the implied seriousness of the accident. 
In the last question of the series, - that of the cyclist who was 
killed and then taken to hospital, - we have the concrete idea of a 
dead person on the one hand, and that of a person seriously injured 
but not dead. In spite of the apparent complexity of this test, it is 
similar to that of the man who took influenza twice, and to that of 
the man whom the police shot at twice, and involves simply two concrete 
ideas. 
Thus four out of the five questions at year le in 
the 1916 scale 
involve complex ideas; and the score 
is L. out of 5. The two scales 
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are therefore in agree__:.ent that this level of thinking, and the mental 
structure which it involves, belongs to year 10. 
A change in the new scale at 10, however, is the introduction of 
an "Abstract definition" test, formerly ;placed at year 12. In the 1916 
scale the words are: "Pity ", "Revenge ", "Charity ", "Envy", "Justice". 
Here (Form M.) they are "Pity ", "Curiosity ", "Grief ", "Surprise ". 
It may safely be said that the younger child's outlook on the 
world is affective before it is intellectual, and therefore it is natural 
to expect tht a term which describes a feeling is more likely to be 
grasped earlier than a purely intellectual concept. It will be noted 
that all four words at age 10 are the names of feelings; but of the five 
words formerly given at 12, only two represent feelings, namely, Pity 
and Envy. Charity and Revenge may be the outcome of feelings, but are 
not themselves feelings; while Justice, of course, is a purely intellect- 
ual concept. It is noteworthy that in the new scales Revenge does not 
appear until year 11 (L. and M.), Charity not until 12 (L.), and 
Justice not until 14 OK.). On the evidence before us, therefore, we 
may conclude that the intellectual- abstract type of concept is not 
cognisable by the child until 11 or 12 years, although some of an 
affective significance are cognisable at 10. The score at 10, however, 
is only 2 out of 4 - too low a percentage to be significant. 
At year 11 of the new scale (Form L.) we have another series of 
verbal absurdities, abstract words, a test for "similarities" (three 
things) which was formerly at 12, besides two memory tests and a word - 
naming test which are non -significant for this age. The "Absurdities" 
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test is as follows: 
(a) "A judge said to the prisoner 'You are to be hanged, and I hope it 
will be a warning to you.'" 
Here the child must cogn_se the word 'warning" as implying a future 
for the person addressed, which involves a complex idea (That happens 
to you now should have a bearing upon your future conduct "). This must 
be brought into relation with the incompatible complex idea of the man 
who is to be hanged and have therefore no future. 
(b) "A well-known railway had its last accident five years ago and since 
that time only one person has been killed on it in an accident." 
Here the child has to deal with two complex ideas - an accident, 
five years ago, which was the last; and a person killed in an accident 
since that time. 
(c) "When there is an accident the last carriage in the train is 
usually damaged most. So they have decided that it will he best 
if the last carriage is always taken off before the train starts." 
Once more we have two complex ideas - the last carriage which is 
usually damaged most; and the solution of the difficulty by removing 
the last carriage. The relation here, however, is not one of incompat- 
ibility, but of logical non -coherence. 
The score for this test is 2 out of 3; and we have here the 
higher level of thinking, as at 10. 
In Form Li. at 11, however, there are repeated the same absurdities 
as at year 9, with the difference only of a higher score - L. out of 5. 
xs in that series two of the five questions were of the higher level, 
at least one of these must now be answered correctly in order to pass 
at this age. 
The abstract words given for definition at 11 (L. and I,_.) are: 
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"Connection ", "Compare ", "Conquer ", "Obedience ", "Revenge ", the score 
being 3 out of 5. In these five :tords nothing of the feeling element 
is represented. The score, however, is still low. 
The "Similarities" test "L. and is a continuation of that now 
found at 7, and has therefore no special significance at this age. 
At year 12 the "Ball and field" and "Dissected sentences" tests 
are omitted in the new scales and plamOted to year 13; but abstract 
definitions appear once more in both scales, besides "Memory for designs" 
at a more difficult stage (M), "Five digits reversed" (L. and M.) as 
before, and a verbal absurdities test (L). 
The abstract words in Form L. are: "Constant ", "Courage ", "Charity ", 
"Defend ", the score being 2 out of 4; while in Form M. they are the 
same as at year 10 (Pity, Curiosity, Grief, Surprise), with a score of 
3 out of 4. The latter is the first occasion in any of the three scales 
in which we are given a significantly high score in abstract definitions. 
hitherto, 3 out of 5 has been the highest we have met. These words, 
however, are all of the affective type of concept. The series of non - 
affective terms used at 11 (Form ii.) are not passed with a significantly 
high score until year 13 (II) where the score is 4 out of 5. 
It would seem, therefore, that the objectification of purely 
abstract (intellectual) ideas is barely normal at year 12. When the 
terms are non -affective, a score of only 2 out of 4 is required; and 
a significantly high score is achieved only through using terms of an 
affective kind. This would seem to be borne out by the 1916 scale, 
where, of the five words used, two are of the affective type with a 
3 out of 5 score. 
The verbal absurdities test at 12 is a repetition 
of that at year 
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9, with a score of 4 out of 5. It has therefore no significance here. 
There is no level of thinking shown in t__ese 12 -year tests higher 
than that seen at year 11, except possibly in regard to the objectific- 
ation of abstract ideas. But since the terms used at 11 are of the 
intellectual type in both scales, we cannot tell how the child of this 
age ,Jould respond to the affective type of concept. Certainly, as far 
as the intellectual type is concerned, there would appear to be no 
difference between the two years; for the score demanded at 11 is 3 
out of 5, and that at 12 is 2 out of 4. 
Before drawing up a modified form of Table 1, in the light of these 
new findings, we must now examine the remaining tests, which are different 
in type from those used in the original Stanford Revision of the scale. 
At 5 (Form L.) we have "Picture completion" (Ian) and "Paper -folding" 
(Triangle); and (Form M.) "Picture vocabulary" and "Pictorial similar- 
ities and differences ". 
The first is a form of "missing feature" test in which one missing 
feature (the leg) is pointed out to the child and which he has to fill in 
as well as to discover and fill in a second missing feature (arm, mouth, 
or nose). This represents a 1 out of 3 score, or, if we count the leg, 
2 out of 4; arid, as in the case of the other test of this kind, where 
the score is only 3 out of 5 at this age, this serves to show that full 
cognition of objects is not yet present at 5. 
The paper -folding test is largely a matter 6f imitation, and is 
therefore not significant at this age. Likewise the "picture vocabulary" 
test is not significant, being concerned merely with the naming of 
objects, already present in the former scale at age 3. "Pictorial 
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similarities and differences" involves the cognition of aspects of 
objects at the perceptual level, and which belongs to this age also 
in the old scale. 
At 6 the new tests are "Copying a bead chain from memory" (L. and M.) 
"lfiaze tracing" (L.), and "Opposite analogies) (M) . 
The first is a simple memory test, there being no "whole and part" 
element in the pattern, as in "memory drawing ", and is therefore not 
significant at this age. The "haze tracing test" involves the grasping 
of the situation as a whole and of seeing how the starting -point is 
related to the goal in respect of distance. It requires the use of the 
category of whole and apart in reference to a perceived object, and is 
a factor which we have already seen to be present at this age. 
The "Opposite analogies" test involves a relationship - of opposition 
on the one hand, and of either class -inclusion or attribution on the 
other. But these relationships are not brought to conscious expression. 
Conscious class -inclusion or attribution (definition superior to use) 
appears only at a later age. Here it is brought about by means of 
suggestion, i.e. by means of the -preceding statement. The definition, 
in other words, is "suggested out "' of the child. The same applies to 
the relation of opposition. The child is not asked ' "rJhat is the 
opposite of . . . ?" The relation is suggested, not demanded. We 
cannot say, therefore, that we have as yet any evidence for relational 
thinking in terms of concrete ideas. This, apparently, still lies below 
the surface of conscious thought, and at this age has to be "dug out" 
of the child by means of suggestion. 
At 7 we have a new type of test in the form of "Picture absurdities" 
-109- 
(L. and M. ). Here the situations do not need to be ment lly pictured, 
i.e. the ideas do not need to be objectified, but only used. All the 
ideas involved are concrete, and we have therefore cognition of the 
incompatibility of the acts or states of depicted objects in the light 
of non - objectified concrete ideas in relation. This represents a lower 
mental structure than the new 7 -year level of objectified related ideas. 
"Counting taps" (Form M.Yconsists in the child counting tapping 
sounds (score 3 out of 3). There appears to be nothing in this test 
other than the factor of attention, Lnd it is therefore not significant. 
A further "opposite analogies" test appears here (Form L.) with 
a higher level of scoring. This, of course, has no significance. 
At 8 (Fo_m L.) there is a new form of "Reading for memories" test, 
a "Similarities and difference" test, and a "Problem situations" test 
(Form M.). The first, of course, is not significant at this age, the 
second is a combination of the tests already found at 6 and 7 
separately, and is therefore non -significant. 
The third, - "Problem situations" - involves two or three concrete 
ideas being presented together in a situation and the child ling asked 
to discover the relationship between them. This involves the grasping 
of concrete ideas in relation, the missing relation being supplied out 
of experience of similar observed situations. This structure belongs 
to year 7 in the new scales, and this test is therefore not signi ficant. 
A further "opposite analogies" test is also given at this age. 
At 9 (Form L.) there is a 'Taper-cutting" test. This involves the 
manipulation of imagery, for the paper must be unfolded in imagination 
by the child. He must picture a process. This is the first evidence we 
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have found of this particular function - as distinct from mere imagery - 
control; and as this function is closely akin to the manipulation of 
concrete ideas, this seems to confirm our -placing the latter at year 10. 
The new form of Rhyme test given at this age (L.) involves the 
search for a rhyming.word within a given class of words - a colour, a 
number, an animal, and a flower. Ms was also a 9 -year test in the 
original scale, and. the modification now introduced does not alter the 
quality of the test. In Form M. there is a "Similarities anal differ- 
ences" test with a higer level of scoring the -.n at 8 (L). 
At 10 (Form L.) - apart from a further "Picture absurdities" test 
which is not significant for this year, - the only new type of test is 
one of "Finding reasons ". Nearly all the "minus" answers quoted by 
Terman for this test show that failure was due to giving only one reason 
instead of the required two, and not to a failure in reasoning. The 
point here is, that, in most cases in practical life the giving of more 
than one reason is superfluous, and to be asked to give two specific 
reasons for the same thing involves the child thinking of reasons as such. 
He must consider his reasons objectively, giving one and then deliber- 
ately seeking another to place beside it, avoiding at the same time the 
tendency to become "lost in his oy.:n description ", as Terman expresses 
it. This test, then, involves the deliberate placing of one group of 
related concrete ideas beside another given group, in the particular 
relation demanded by the .,uestion. This is the objectification of 
complex ideas in relation, which, as we have seen, is characteristic of 
year 10. 
In Form Iii., at 10, we have a new test - "Block counting" - in which 
the child must calculate the number in a series of piles of cubes depicted 
on a card, taking into account those cubes which are not seen. As the 
child is previously given three trials, and the method of counting is 
explained to him if he fails in any of these, the test would appear to 
be nothing more than a matter of arithmetic and involves no structure 
that is not already present at this age. 
At year 11 (Form L.) there is no new type of test, and in Form M. 
there are continuations of two already dealt with. These are a 
"Finding reasons" test, and "Copying a bead chain from memory ". The 
latter now involves a pattern, and therefore the same factors are 
involved as in the case of "Memory drawing" - cognition of whole and 
part in terms of imagery - already found at year 9. 
At 12 (Forms L. and Tai.) the only new test is the niinkus Com- 
pletion" test. Here we have very clearly an example of complex ideas 
in relation, and since the actual relating concept is omitted and has 
to be supplied by the child, we have for the first time the object- 
ification of a relational concept. This cognition of a pure concept 
of relation is to be expected with the appearance of the cognition of 
certain abstract ideas at 11 and 12; but as the score is only 2 out of 
4 we have some confirmation of our assumption that objectification of 
the purely abstract is only beginning at this age. 
A marked characteristic of these new scales is the appearance at 
lower year -levels of certain significant types of test which, by being 
watered down, have been made suitable for these earlier years. The 
appearance of such simplified forms of these tests is the sort of thing 
which is used as a basis of argument by those who prefer to think that 
all mental development is smooth, and that there are no marked periods 
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of change. But by watering down a test in this way (either by simpli- 
fying it or by reducing the standard of scoring) we show nothing but the 
fact that the test can be performed earlier if we water it dawn. For if 
we simplify the test beyond a certain point, we alter its significance, 
and it drops to a lower structural level; and if we reduce the scoring 
standard to 50J or 6Oó we merely show very clearly that the child cannot 
yet normally perform the act. In the latter case, we show the beginnings 
of the change; but a change is none the less a change because it has a 
beginning. What is important from the educational point of view, however, 
is to know when it is completed. 
We are now in a position to draw up a modified form of Table 1, 
showing the mental structure of the child at each of these ages in the 
light of the new scales (Table 2). Unfortunately, the "Fable interpret- 
ation" test is not included in either of the new scales, "Proverb" tests 
with a higher score taking its place at the "average adult" level. The 
ability to objectify ethical rules, therefore, like cognition of purely 
abstract ideas, must be assumed to be only beginning at 12, in view of 
the lack of any evidence to the contrary. 
Table 2 is based on Table 1, change s being made only in so far as 
the new scales contradict the old, and in the introduction of the 11- 
year level. 
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The fore -going table shows a certain regularity in development. 
There appear go be three phases: (1) From 5 to 7, during which control 
over imagery and the objectification of concrete ideas is developed. 
(2) From 7 to 9, during which the objectification of concrete ideas in 
relation develops. (3) From 10 to 12, during which complex ideas in 
relation are objectified, together with general ideas or rules, and the 
beginning of the objectification of abstract ideas makes an appearance. 
During this development there can also be seen a progress from the 
"use" to the objectification of the various grades of ideas. Elements 
appearing at the sub -cognitive level ( "use ") during one phase, tend to 
appear on the cognitive level during the next. Thus, concrete ideas 
which the child has used during his early years in naming and recognis- 
ing objects, become free and objectified only during the 5 - 7 period. 
General ideas, used at 7, become objectified at 10; and abstract ideas 
used at 7 do not begin to be objectified until 11 or 12. 
The "use" of ideas has, of course, various levels, depending upon 
the manner in which the ideas are expressed and the sphere in which they 
are applied. For example, the concept of "Justice" is implied in the 
behaviour of the youngest child who weeps because he feels he has been 
treated unfairly, although he may not be old enough to express the fact 
in the simplest terms. Here the concept is probably quite below con- 
sciousness. Later, when he learns to use the word "fair ", the idea lies 
less deeply below the surface, but it is not yet objectively cognised. 
The new scale does not expect him to do this with any degree of certainty 
until he is an adult. 
We are not concerned here, however, with the beginnings of the use 
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of ideas, but with the sphere of their use and the period of their 
objectification during the elementary school years. And while it may be 
said with truth that children possess these ideas and act upon them from 
the earliest years, that is nothing to the point. The point is not what 
they possess, but what they are able to do with what they possess. 
There is also a certain orderliness of progress in respect of the 
functional aspect of development. Objectification of "total" imagery 
appears at 5, control of free images at 7, and manipulation of imagery at 
9. Similarly, objectification of free concrete ideas appears at 7 with 
manipulation at 10. Manipulation seems always to lag behind the other 
processes, so that objectification of concrete ideas in relation (period 
7 - 9) lies within the period in which manipulation of imagery appears 
(at 9); objectification of complex ideas in relation at 10 is accompanied 
by manipulation of concrete ideas; while manipulation of abstract ideas 
is not -shown in the tests until the level of "Superior Adult 1 ", where 
there is a test for sentence -building out of abstract ideas. 
We are now in the position to give an exact definition of the term 
"thinking" as it will be understood in our further discussion. For our 
present purpose, since this inquiry has to do with the teaching of school 
subjects, genuine thinking may be said to begin when the process is under 
the control of the ego of the child, i.e. when that which is thought about 
can be apprehended objectively by him, whether it be an object, an image, 
or an idea. The child can cognise individual objects at 6 and free images 
and concrete ideas at 7. An object can be thought about only when it can 
be apprehended as such, i.e. in abstraction from the total environment, for 
only then can one see it in relation to the rest of the environment, 
or its own parts in relation to itself as a whole. 
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Anything seen only as belonging to a general context cannot be thought 
about; it can only be observed. The same applies to imagery. 
Previous to that point a child may have thoughts, and he may 
express them. He may give vent to quite wise remarks or ask apparently 
profound questions. But to have thoughts is not the same as to think. 
To think is a deliberate act, the selection at will of an object, image, 
or idea with a view to discovering its relations with other of its kind. 
This is possible only when an object can be cognised as such, or when 
images and ideas can be brought under control. The wise sayings or 
deep questions which arise spontaneously in the young child are of little 
avail when he is faced with a task in arithmetic. Here, even at its 
simplest, it is necessary for the child to call up a free image, relate 
it to another free image, and discover the result. Thus the type of 
thinking which will be required of him in much of his school work can be 
said to begin only when this mental structure is found. All forms of 
thinking found previous to this must be placed in a different category. 
In so far, then, as thinking involves some purely "mental" activity, 
dissociated from physical objects, this can be said to be found first at 
the 7 -year stage, when not only free images and ideas can be brought under 
control but when concrete ideas can be apprehended together in relation. 
Any attempt to deduce from the apparent epistemic nature of 
children's questions (as in the Appendix, by Nathan Isaacs, to "Intellect- 
ual Growth in Young Children ") that the structures of the child and the 
adult mind are alike, fails to take account of the relationship in 
which the questioner stands to his thoughts. The fact that such questions 
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are alike in form in the case of both adult and child tells us only that 
both adult and child possess ideas of the environment, and that they are 
both disturbed when the environment does not correspond to these precon- 
ceived ideas. But that does not constitute identity of structure in the 
sense in which we have used the term. That young children possess 
ideas of the environment, is obvious, and that they should feel disturbed 
when the two do not correspond, is natural. But ideas and feelings are 
part of the contents of the mind; structure has to do with its form. 
It depends upon the relationship existing between the individual and his 
ideas. Can he objectify them, or not? Can he control them, abstract 
from them, manipulate them? Not one of these mental acts is necessary 
in order to see that the environment is not behaving as we expected. 
The fact, therefore, that both adult and child ask epistemic questions 
about the environment, is not only no proof that their mental structures 
are alike; it does not even begin to indicate what these structures are. 
We have now some indication of the general tendencies of develop- 
ment in the child mind, as shown by these scales, and some idea of the 
mental structure at each age. The difference between the child and the 
adult apparently is, that while the adult can adopt, at will, any 
relation to his ideas, the child's mental structure is limited by his 
age. This, of course, has reference to the average child, and we omit 
in the meantime the question of mental backwardness or precocity; for 
this aspect of the matter can be satisfactorily dealt with only when we 
have considered to which factor backwardness or precocity is due, - that is, 
whether to mental structure or to the development of the ego; or both. 
-117- 
In the meantime it can be seen that there is little room for the 
assumption, made by Mrs. Isaacs, that scientific and imaginative 
interests develop side by side in the child. Objectification of 
imagery precedes even the most concrete relational thinking by two 
years; while the necessary mental structure for any thinking which 
could be termed "scientific ", relating to wholes of concrete ideas, 
is not found until 10. 
Development, apparently, has two aspects. There is the structural 
development, which appears to take place at intervals and more or less 
abruptly; and there is the ego -development which appears to be 
continually in progress in the shape of the more skilful use of those 
structures which have already appeared. This is seen, for example, 
in the gradually increasing control over imagery throughout the years 
7 to 12, or in the ability to perform, with a higher score, any test 
previously introduced. This aspect of development, in fact, is seen 
in the presence of all non -significant tests, where the difference from 
similar tests in earlier years is merely one of degree of difficulty, 
and not of mental structure. These two factors in development appear, 
therefore, to be in some respects independent of one another. 
It can already be seen at this stage that mental development - 
even average mental development - cannot be expressed in terms of some 
simple or regular curve. For we are dealing here not with an 
abstraction, such as the Intelligence Quotient, but with the actual 
year to year mental changes in the growth of the average child. 
We shall now examine the problem from another angle. 
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PART 3. 
DEVELOPMENTAL CURVES. 
Having made a qualitative analysis of the child's intellectual 
development, as expressed by the Terman -Binet scales, the question now 
arises: How does the matter stand from the quantitative point of view? 
Does a quantitative analysis of test data show any evidence for these 
changes in structure? For it is clear that, with the appearance of a 
new structure at a given age, the ability to perform certain tests should 
show a sudden improvement; while, after the change has been established, 
one would expect a gradual decline in the rate of progress. 
In the following investigation data only from Binet tests will be 
used, since these have been universally standardised and correspond 
to the tests we have been considering. The method employed is as 
follows: 
The percentages of passes, as found by any given investigator for 
the separate tests at each chronological age, are first translated into 
terms of the standard deviation of the normal curve of distribution. 
The difference between any two such figures representing consecutive 
chronological ages will therefore represent the progress rude in develop- 
ment between these two ages, as far as any given test is concerhed. 
Thus if we take for example the percentages for the test of 
counting from 20 to 0, quoted by Burt (6), we arrive at the following 
figures: 
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Age:- 6 7 8 9 10 11 
28.0 73.6 76,0 86.1 96.0 98.3 
S.D. -- .58 4 .09 +.71 +1.09 11.76 4-2.12 
Differences: .67 .62 .38 .67 .36 
These standard deviation "intervals" can now be considered along 
with those of other tests covering the same ages, and an average S. D. 
interval for any given year- interval can be arrived at, and which will 
indicate the rate of development during that year. This can then be 
compared with similar results derived from the data of other investig- 
ators. 
In order to make such an average S. D. interval comparable with 
that derived from the data of any other investigator, the average yearly 
S. D. interval for all the age intervals - i.e. the complete age series - 
is found, and each particular year -interval is expressed in of 
this general average interval. In this way the average rate of progress 
between one given age and the next is expressed as a ratio of the 
average annual rate of progress throughout the whole age -series; and 
geographical or racial differences between the groups of children are 
thus eliminated. For it is then not the actual rate of progress in a 
given year, say, of London children, which is being c anpared with that 
of a group of children in Germany, but the relative rate. 
To take a concrete example, the average S. D. interval for certain 
tests in Burt's data for the age -interval 6 - 7 is .68, while that of 
Bobertag's data for the same type of tests is .87; but the average S.D. 
interval for all such tests over the years 5 - 12 in Burt's data is .53, 
while that of Bobertag is .68, and the resulting ratio (.68 : .53 and 
.87 : .68) is in both cases 1.28. 
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Since, in this way, the ratio for any one year -interval will be 1 
when the average S. D. interval for that particular year coincides with 
the average interval for the whole age- series, these figures can 
conveniently be expressed in terms of their difference from that 
average, or from unity. Thus, 1.33 can be expressed as +.33, while 
a ratio of .80 would be -.20. The amount and direction of developmental 
fluctuation can then be seen at a glance. Such ratios we shall term 
"Progress Ratios ". 
It is not possible, however, to slump together in this way all the 
tests to be found at any one age, if we wish to arrive at an accurate 
estimate of the rate of development from year to year. For one type 
of mental process (representing some given structure) may be just 
reaching the highest point of its development in the same year in which 
another type is only beginning to develop. For example, control of 
imagery has been seen to reach a certain completion at 7, while at that 
age relational thinking is only beginning. Obviously, to mix the 
results of tests involving such different mental functions would be 
only to blur the issue. 
Our analysis of the Terman scales has shown three lines of 
structural development, - that of cognition of objects, arising at 6, 
that of the objectification and control of imagery and concrete ideas, 
culminating at 7, and that of relational thinking, beginning at that 
year. The tests now to be analysed quantitatively are divided there- 
fore into three groups: (1) Tests involving simple (non -relational) 
mental processes connected with something immediately present in the 
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physical environment (such as Divided Card, Diamond, Right and Left 
Hand, Counting 13 Pennies, Missing Features, Pence and Halfpence, Coins, 
Picture Description, etc.). (2) Tests involving simple mental pro- 
cesses not connected with the immediately present physical environment 
(such as Repeating 5 Digits, Concrete Differences, Days of Week, Months, 
16 Syllables, Morning and Afternoon, Counting 20 to 0, Reading for 
Memory, Definition, etc.). (3) Tests involving thinking of a relational 
kind, whether connected with the immediately present environment or not 
(such as Arranging 5 Weights, Date, Giving Change, Comprehension (3 and 
4), Similarities, Sentence -Building, Picture Interpretation, Memory 
Drawing, Mixed Sentences, Absurdities, etc.). 
In regard to group 2 it should be explained that even although in 
some cases - such as in 5 Digits, 16 Syllables, and Reading for Memory, - 
the digits, syllables, and reading- matter are actually presented to the 
child there and then and thus form part of his environment for the 
moment, the fact remains that they are not present when he gives his 
answer, which has to be based on a purely mental process, namely, that 
of memory and its control. The child has nothing in his immediate 
environment to lean upon. That is the criterion used here. 
In addition to dividing the tests into these three types, certain 
statistical precautions have been taken. 
(1) In order to ensure that the tests in any one year -interval are 
reasonably suited to these ages, being neither excessively easy nor 
impossibly difficult, intervals which lie wholly below 2% or wholly 
above 74% have been ignored. 
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(2) In order to eliminate chance factors among those which remain, 
all S. D. intervals in any one year -group which exceed by more than two - 
thirds, or are more than two- thirds below, the average interval for 
that group, are discarded, (i.e. intervals more than 5/3 or less than 
1/3 of the average). We are thus left with a group of figures for each 
year -interval, which, in a normal curve of distribution, would represent 
a range of approximately -1 to-F-1 S. D. 
(3) With the comparatively small numbers of children with which 
we have to deal, it would be unjustifiable to credit percentage 
intervals reaching into the "nineties ", or originating in a very low 
percentage, with all the significance given to them by the Probability 
Integral table. Burt (6) (p. 138) in determining the intervals of 
difficulty between one Binet test and another, translates the percentage 
intervals into terms of S. D., but disregards percentages above 90 and 
below 10 on account of the large influence exerted by a small error in 
these very high or low percentages. Rather, however, than make such 
an arbitrary barrier, a modified solution of this difficulty has been 
adopted. 
All intervals between -1 and-1-1 S. D. - that is, intervals between 
15.9% and 84..l% - have been treated as "significant ", and a distinction 
is made between such intervals and those which extend beyond these 
bounaaries. Since, for our purpose, the nearer a percentage beyond 
these figures approaches 0 or 100, the less do we wish to treat seriously 
the rapidly increasing deviation, the value for us of an interval which 
extends beyond 15.9$ or 84..1% is in proportion to that part of the total 
interval which lies within the two boundaries. 
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For example, an interval which extends from 65 to 9% (difference, 
1.26 S. D.) is regarded as fully significant from 65% to 84.1;ó - an 
interval of .61 S. D.; but the remainder of the total interval, frown 
84.l;ä to 95jó, is less significant. The latter portion, representing 
.65 S.D., is therefore modified by multiplying it by the ratio of the 
former, or significant, part to the whole. 
Thus: Total interval 1.26 S.D. 
Portion above 84.1% . . . . . .65 S.D. 
Portion below 84.1% . . . .61 S.D. 
Ratio of lower portion to whole . .48 
Upper interval modified by this 
ratio (.65 X .48) . . . . . .31 
Thus the upper portion of the interval is reduced to .31, which, 
added to the lower portion (.61) makes a total interval of .92. 
The justice of such a method of modification can be seen from the 
following examples. If an increase of, say, 26% in the number of 
passes in a test is found between one age and the next, the figures 
being 744 in the one year and 100% in the next, while another test shows 
an increase of the same amount, - from 70% to 96 %, we can hardly claim 
that from a psychological point of view there is any very significant 
difference between these two intervals. Yet,in terms of S.D. the first 
interval is 2.35 (taking 100% as equal to 3.00 S.D.), while the second 
is 1.23, suggesting that the first is nearly double the value of the 
second. Calculated by the method here employed, however, the first is 
.66 and the second is .77. The fact that, in this case, the first turns 
out to be slightly less than the second, is due to the progressive 
lessening of the value of the higher percentages, so that here the 
difference between 96% and 100% becomes automatically ignored. In this 
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way exaggeration of an interval is avoided, without at the same time 
ignoring altogether the meaning of high or low percentages, when these 
form part of a significant interval. 
(4) The more purely scholastic tests, such as Dictation and 
Transcription, are omitted, as also are the Ball and Field, and Bow -knot 
tests, which are neither universally used nor similar to any of the 
other Binet tests. Likewise the Healy -Fernald Form -board test is 
dmitted, and the Vocabulary tests are discarded for the reasons 
previously given. 
The sources of our data must necessarily be confined to records of 
the actual numbers or percentages of passes for each individual test 
over a range of consecutive ages, and the following have been found by 
the writer to be available:- 
x Decroly et Degand: Archives de Psychologie: 1910. (9) 
Alfred Binet: L'Année Psychologique: 1910. (10) 
x Alice Descoudres: Archives de Psychologie: 1911. (11) 
Otto Bobertag: Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie: 1911. (7) 
H. H. Goddard: Pedagogical Seminary: 1911 (13) 
F. Chotzen: Zeitschrift fair angewandte Psychologie: 1912. (14) 
Terman and Childs: Journal of Educational Psychology: 1912. (15) 
Terman, Trost, & Waddle: "Stanford Revision of B. -S Scale" 1912. (16) 
x Bloch und Lippa: Zeitschrift fair angewandte Psychologie: 1913. (17) 
Mary L. Dougherty: Journal of Educational Psychology: 1913. (18) 
E. C. Rowe: Pedagogical Seminary: 1914. (19) 
x Clara Schmitt: Psychological Review: 1915. (20) 
x Alice Descoudres: Archives de Psychologie: 1915. (21) 
x Nina G. Taylor: Journal of Experimental Pedagogy: 1916. (22) 
Terman, Lyman, Ordahl: "Stanford Revision of B. -S. Scale ": 1916.(16) 
Cyril Burt: "Mental and Scholastic Tests ": 1921. (6) 
Some of the above series of figures, however, represent very few 
children, and those which represent less than 20 children for each age 
(marked x) have not been used. Binet, however, gives two tables of 
figures, one being an investigation by Lévistre and Morlé; and Burt 
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gives us not only percentages for normal children but also for children 
from special (M.D.) schools. The Lévistre and Morlé series has only 
10 children at age 7, while that of Tennan, Trost and Waddle has only 
10 at age 5. These, however, have been retained, as the remainder in 
both series represents throughout more than 20 children for each age. 
The results at these particular ages in these two tables may be treated 
with reserve. 
Goddard, on the other hand, although dealing with over 1500 
children, gives figures of passes and failures oiily for those "at age ", 
and consequently some of these tests represent fewer than 20 children. 
As, however, all these children are considered to be "at age ", it is 
possible to place more reliance upon the results of snaller numbers in 
this case, and a few of these instances have been admitted into our 
calculations. None below 15 in number, however, have been considered. 
In the case of F. Chotzen, while the numbers are adequate, there 
is nevertheless a fluctuation in the percentages from age to age in 
many of the tests - the percentage of passes sometimes decreasing 
instead of increasing with age. It has therefore not been possible 
to utilise this series. 
The ages quoted by the authors are numerically the mean age, age 8, 
for example, including children from 7 to 82, with the exception of 
Burt's figures where "age 8" represents a range c1£'6 to 8;11, or mean 815-. 
We are thus left with 11 series of percentages, comprising 10 of 
the performance of normal children, and 1 of mentally defective 
children, and representing children in England, France, Germany and 
America. 
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In this part of our inquiry we are making no attempt to differenti- 
ate between "significant" and "non- significant" tests in the qualitative 
sense already indicated. That we are seeking here is a series of year - 
intervals with a view to ascertaining whether or not the qualitative 
changes already noted have a quantitative effect; and, as a test which 
is significant for one year becomes on that account non -significant for 
the next, it is obviously impossible to introduce these distinctions 
here. Since, however, any qualitative change brings with it new powers 
to the child, it is to be expected that this will show itself in an 
improved performance of the non -significant tests also, provided that 
the tests concerned all represent the same type of mental process. 
For example, although the ability to cognise complex ideas in 
relation is not necessary for passing such tests as "sentence building" 
or "giving date ", the increased ability to handle relations, brought by 
this new structure, should render the performance of these other tests 
much more easy, giving greater ability in this respect to those children 
who have hitherto failed in the simpler forms of relational test. The 
same applies to the acquisition of control of imagery, in regard to tests 
involving simple memory and the like. 
We shall consider first of all the development of relational think- 
ing. Table 3 shows Burt's data for normal children, treated in the 
manner described, and involving those tests which require some form of 
relational thinking. Burt's actual percentages are given, with the S.D. 
interval (modified when necessary) shown between. Tables 4, 5, 6, and 
7 give similar figures for Bobertag, Goddard, Rowe, and Dougherty. 
TABLE 3. 






7 8 9 5 6 
Comprehension (3) 9.6 .70 31.2 .53 51.7 .68 76.5 -- 89.3 
Giving Date 1.3 9.6 .89 36.4. .92 71.1 .4.2 83.9 
Giving Change 0.0 -- 10.9 .89 39.1 .75 68.2 .35 79.3 
Five Weights 2.6 -- 14..3 -- 21.0 .1 +5 36.1 .45 53.5 
Sentence- build. (2) 0.0 -- 5.3 -- 14.7 .65 34.1+ .31 46.3 
Memory Drawing 0.0 -- 2.1+ -- 9.8 .61 28.9 .45 4.5.7 
Comprehension (4) 0.0 -- 1.9 -- 6.3 -- 13.1 .51 28.2 
Absurdities 0.0 0.6 -- 5.2 --- 24.4. .14 29.3 
Sentence- build.(1) 0.0 -- 0.6 -- 3.1 -- 16.5 -- 20.4. 
Picture Interp. 1.3 2.5 -- 4.6 -- 11.2 -- 16.6 
Mixed Sentences 0.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.9 -- 15.3 -- 21.4. 
Problems 0.0 -- 0.6 -- 0.9 -- 2.2 -- 6.7 
Abstract Defin. 0.0 -- 0.0 - - 0.0 1.1 -- 2.6 
Average Interval: .7o .77 .676 .375 
Progress Ratio: +.L2 +. +.31 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Comprehension (3) 89.3 -- 95.4 -- 99.3 -- 100 
Giving Date 83.9 -- 93.5 -- 97.6 -- 99.2 
Giving Change 79.3 -- 95.4 -- 97.3 -- 98.4 
Five Weights 53.5 .49 71.9 .31 81.4 -- 87.4 
Sentence -build. (2) 4-6.3 .6o 69.3 .5o 84.3 -- 91.3 
Memory Drawing 4.5.7 .42 62.0 .43 76.9 -- 81.1 
Comprehension (4) 28.2 .54 48.6 .1+1 64.6 .35 76. 5 
Absurdities 29.3 .53 4.9.2 .55 70.3 .28 79.2 
Sentence- build.(1) 20.4 .65 4-3.0 .39 58.1 .28 68.7 
Picture Interp. 16.6 .63 36.7 .28 4.7.5 .63 71.7 
Mixed Sentences 21.4- .54 4.0.1 .38 55.1 .38 69.5 
Problems 6.7 -- 19.6 .28 28.o .40 42.8 
Abstract Defin. 2.6 -- 8.7 -- 19.6 .35 30.5 
Average Interval: .55 .39 .38 
Progress Ratio: +.10 -.22 -.24 
T A B L E 4. 
B O B E R T A G- 
(300 Volkschulkinder (6-12), 35 Spielschulkinder (5-6), 20 Hochschul- 
kinder (6-12), 80 Hilfschulkinder (8-15). ) 
RELATIONAL THINKING 
Age: 5 6 7 8 
Comprehension (3) 30 1.08 71 
Giving Date -- 47 
Giving Change -- 61 
Five Weights -- 34. 
Sentence -build. (2) -- -- 
Average Interval: 1.08 
Progress Ratio: + .93 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Five Weights 60 .52 78 
Sentence- build.(2) 32 1.15 75 
Comprehension (4) -- 4-2 .56 64 .41 78 
Sentence- build.(1) -- 39 .36 53 .23 62 
Abstract Defin. -- 31 .65 56 .53 75 
Absurdities -- 59 .54- 78 
Mixed Sentences -- 56 .62 78 
Average Interval: .835 .52 .466 









X There were, in addition, some 400 " Volkschulkinder" age 6 
to 9 upon whom a few of the tests belonging to these years 
were tried. 
The percentages used are those given by the author. 
TABLE 5. 
G O D D A R D 
( "at age" subjects out of 1,54.7 children, New Jersey, U.S.A. ) 
RELATIONAL THINKING. 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
Giving Date 4.8 1.68 59.7 .87 87.2 
Giving Change -- 22.4 .99 58.9 
Five Weights -- 40.0 1.09 80.0 
Definition (genus) -- 41.3 .54. 62.5 
Average Interval: 1.68 .87 
Progress Ratio: + .58 -.18 
Age: 







Comprehension (3) 61.7 .97 92.4 
Absurdities 41.1 .65 66.3 .83 92.3 
Sentence- build.(1) -- 44.5 .77 72.6 
Mixed Sentences -- 24.3 1.52 79.5 
Abstract Defin. -- 21.9 1.30 69.8 
Average Interval: 1.06 1.105 
Progress Ratio: .00 + .20 
NOTE:- Owing to the small number of children shown in the relational 
tests at age 12, there are no data available for the i1 -12 
interval. 
TABLE 6. 
R O W E 
(312 Children, Michigan, U.S.A.) 
RELATIONAL THINKING 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
Giving Change 24 .66 48 .93 81 82 -- 82 
Giving Date 36 .51 56 (.lo) 60 
Five Weights 30 .65 55 .23 64 
Memory Drawing 40 .50 60 .59 8o 
Comprehension (4) 17 .34 27 .46 44 
Sentence -build. (2) 8 .51 25 .36 38 
Absurdities 10 .55 27 .58 4-9 
Sentence -build. (1) 5 -- 20 (.76) 4-7 
Mixed Sentences 25 .34 37 .48 56 
Average Interval: 00 .93 .4.85 .4-5 
Progress Ratio: +.30 +.82 -.05 -.12 
Age: 9 10 11 
Giving Change 82 97 -- 86 
Giving Date 60 1.07 94 -- 90 
Five Weights 64 .94 94 -- 90 
Memory Drawing 80 100 -- 100 
Comprehension (4) 44 .43 61 .13 66 
Sentence -build. (2) 38 .75 67 .14 72 
Absurdities 49 .84 79 -- 86 
Sentence - build. (1) 47 .44 64 .22 72 
Mixed Sentences 56 .37 70 .29 79 
Average Interval: .69 .195 
Progress Ratio: +.35 -.62 
NOTE: - The deviation intervals shown 
more than two -thirds above or 
and are not included in the ca 
shown is that of the remaining 
succeeding tables of this kind 
Year 12 has been omitted as it 
in brackets are those which are 
below the average for the year, 
lculations. The average 
figures. This applies to all 
represents only 9 children. 
TABLE 7 
D O U G H E R T Y 
( 483 Children, Kansas, U.S.A.) 
Age: 5 
RELATIONAL TIiCNKING. 
8 9 6 7 
Comprehension 3.0 .68 27.4 .64 51.7 
Giving Change 4.5 .65 27.4 .54- 48.3 
Sentence -build. (2) 1.5 -- 22.6 .53 4-1.4 
Giving Date 10.4. -- 14.5 1.10 51.7 
Memory Drawing 6.5 .64. 27.6 
Average Interval: .665 .69 
Progress Ratio: +.15 +.19 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Comprehension 51.7 .47 69.4- .24 77.3 - -- 89.1 
Giving Change 48.3 .80 77.6 -- 77.3 
Sentence -build. (2) 41.4 .73 69.4 .16 75.0 -- 84..8 
Giving Date 51.7 .86 81.6 -- 79.5 
Memory Drawing 27.6 .51 46.9 .19 54.5 .67 78.3 
Absurdities 20.7 1.05 59.2 .18 65.9 .37 78.3 
Sentence - build. (1) 34..5 .85 67.3 .59 84.9 -- 91.3 
Mixed Sentences 3.4- -- 16.3 (.81) 4.3.2 .39 58.7 
Definition (Abstr) 15.2 .64 34-.8 
Problems 18.2 .4.0 30.4 
Average Interval: .75 .27 .4-9 
Progress Ratio: +.29 -.53 -.16 
NOTE: Actual percentages are not given by the author, and these have 
been calculated by the present writer on the same statistical 
assumptions as those of the Binet data, described below. 
The percentages for the "Five Weights" test show a decrease 
instead of an increase at age 9, and this series has there- 
fore been omitted. 
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Burt's series of percentages is a complete one and will serve in 
some respects as a guide to our evaluation of the other less complete 
series of data. As intervals lying wholly below 25% are not considered, 
the number of tests which appear in any one year -interval is in itself 
significant in a complete series such as this. The high progress ratios 
at 5 -6 and 6 -7 must therefore be considered in conjunction with the small 
number of tests which have reached the 25% level by that time. On the 
other hand, the decline in progress noticeable at 8 -9, with the subsequent 
increase at 9 =10, can have little to do with this factor. There are 
already six tests. 7 -8, seven at 8 -9, and eight at 9 -10. Previous to 
that there are only three at 6 -7, and one at 5 -6. Relational thinking can 
therefore be said to begin seriously only at 7 - a fact which is in agree- 
ment with our qualitative analysis in Table 2. In the year 7 -8 the pro- 
gress ratio is +.35, or 35i above the average; in the following year it 
falls to -.25, or 25% below average, rising again to +.10 in year 9-10. 
Thereafter it falls to -.22 and -.24 in the two remaining years. 
The other four tables suffer from a scantiness of data in various 
year -intervals, such that it would not be possible to treat any one of 
them as authoritative if taken by itself. But it is interesting to note 
that the same decrease from 7 -8 to 8 -9 appears in two of them, and the 
increase from 8 -9 to 9 -10 is found in them all. In addition to this, 
three out of the four (Goddard being the exception) agree with Burt in 
showing a decline once more after year 10. In these tables also it is 
clear from the actual percentages at year 7 that relational thinking has 
no appreciable presence before that age. The one exception is to be 
found in Rowe's "Giving Change ", where the percentage at 6 is 48 as 
against Burt's 10.9. 
TABLE 8 
BURT 
(729 mentally defective children) 
TON :IELATIOT'AL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
1+ Pennies 71.9 .40 83.6 -- 94.2 -- 95.1 
2 Lines 65.6 .65 85.2 -- 94.2 -- 96.3 
Copying Square 56.2 .50 74.5 .52 91.3 -- 92.6 
Chooses prettier 46.9 .86 78.2 -- 88.4 -- 88.9 
4. Colours 37.5 .77 67.3 .24. 75.4 -- 86.4 
Fingers 25.0 .79 4-5.5 .49 72.5 .34 82.7 
13 Pennies 21.9 .53 40.0 .76 69.6 .4.8 83.9 
Picture Description 18.7 .82 4.7.3 .38 62.3 (.09) 65.4 
2 Weights 15.6 .56 32.7 .69 59.4 .44- 75.3 
4 Coins 12.5 .444 25.5 .75 53.6 .4-5 70.4 
Right and Left 9.5 .92 38.2 .46 56.5 (.08) 59.3 
Copying Diamond 3.1 1.07 36.4 .29 47.8 .36 61.7 
Divided Card 6.2 -- 21.8 .65 44.9 .33 57.9 
Pence & Halfpence -- 1.8 -- 24.6 .26 33.3 
Missing Features 5.5 .64 27.5 .25 36.2 
9 Coins 3.6 -- 8.7 -- 23.2 
Average Interval: .69 .53 .36 
Progress Ratio: +.26 -.21 -.34 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
4. Pennies 95.1 -- 97.4 -- 99.2 -- 100.0 
2 Lines 96.3 -- 96.5 -- 99.2 -- 100.0 
Copying Square 92.6 -- 97.4- -- 98.3 -- 99.1 
Chooses prettier 88.9 -- 91.3 -- 98.3 -- 97.1 
4 Colours 86.4. -- 93.0 -- 98.3 -- 97.1 
Fingers 82.7 -- 90.3 -- 97.2 -- 98.1 
13 Pennies 83.9 -- 90.3 -- 98.3 -- 98.1 
Picture Descrpt. 65.4 .69 86.7 -- 90.8 -- 90.5 
2 Weights 75.3 -- 87.7 -- 91.7 -- 93.3 
4 Coins 70.4 .42 83.2 -- 93.5 -- 98.1 
Right and Left 59.3 .56 78.8 -- 85.2 -- 94.3 
Copying Diamond 61.7 .35 74.3 .48 88.9 -- 96.2 
Divided Card 57.9 .29 69.0 .48 83.3 -- 88.6 
Pence & He (pence 33.3 .60 56.6 .63 78.7 -- 89.5 
Hissing Features 36.2 .72 64.6 .40 77.8 -- 80.0 
9 Coins 23.2 (.08) 25.7 .84 57.4 .52 76.2 




TABLE 8 (Continued) 













Comprehension (3) 3.1 -- 9.1 -- 24.8 .60 4.6.9 
Giving Date 4.3 -- 18.5 
Giving Change 1.4 -- 8.6 
Five Weights 0.9 -- 6.2 
Sentence- build.(2) -- 3.4 
Picture Interp. 
etc. 
1.4 -- 4.9 
Average Interval: .6o 
Progress Ratio: +.58 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Comprehension (3) 4.6.9 .34 60.2 .36 73.2 .29 81.9 
Giving Date 18.5 .4.5 32.7 .40 48.1 .18 55.2 
Giving Change 8.6 .83 34.5 .26 44.5 (.4-9) 63.8 
Five Weights 6.2 -- 17.7 .26 25.0 .16 30.5 
Sentence- build.(2) 3.4 -- 9.7 -- 13.9 -- 17.1 
Picture Interp. 4.9 -- 15.0 -- 15.7 -- 20.0 
Memory Drawing 1.2 -- 6.2 -- 13.0 -- 23.8 
Absurdities 
etc. 
2.5 -- 3.5 -- 7.4- -- 11.4 
Average Interval: .54 .32 .21 





FIGURE 1. (Cont.) 























Table 8 gives Burt's data for mentally defective children, in res- 
pect of non -relational thinking connected with the immediate environment. 
It will be seen that we have here again a zero -point at age 9, with an 
increase in the rate of progress at 10. 
Table 9 gives the figures for relational thinking for the same chil- 
dren. As far as relational thinking goes with these children, it appears 
to begin at 10; but it will be noted that the tests concerned involve 
only concrete ideas in relation. The cognition of complex ideas in 
relation is apparently beyond the powers of the mentally defective. 
(The "Absurdities" test reaches only 19.6 at age 11., in Burt's table.) 
At 10 they have reached the same stage as the normal child at 7. There 
is an increase of progress with them, as with normal children, at 10, but 
"structurally" they are exactly one "phase" behind. 
Figure 1 shows all these results in graphic form, the horizontal axis 
representing the average interval for the series, and the vertical axis 
the rate of progress above or below that average. 
Turning now to Binet's figures, we find (pp. 150 -151) two tables, 
one consisting of data obtained from Binet's own experiments, the other 
representing data obtained by Lévistre and Morlé on behalf of Binet. 
Binet describes the latter table as a "norm "; but the other is in a raw 
state, and he points out that the actual number of passes and failures for 
any given test below or above the normal age for that test, must not be 
accepted as it stands. In the case of tests below the normal for any 
given year, allowance must be made for the fact that only doubtful cases 
would be given such tests, and that the other children to whom the test 
was not given must be credited with a pass. Similarly, in the case of 
-130- 
between the years 10 and 12 have been halved. On this account we 
cannot be certain of the behaviour of the graphs after year 10. 
As in some previous cases, the number of tests represented is meagre; 
but the two graphs, derived from independent sources, seem to agree. 
FIGURE 2. 
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Age: 9 10 11, 12 
Five Weights 53 .12 58 
Sentence - build. (2) 24 (.56) 44 .595 - .595 85 
Absurdities 27 .11 31 .525 - .525 71 
Comprehension (1+) 20 .29 29 .595 - .595 74 
Abstract Defin. 8 .51 25 .18 - .18 38 
Sentence-build.(1) 16 -- 21 .81 - .81 79 
Mixed Sentences 6 -- 21 .64 - .64. 68 
Picture Interp. -- 6 .29 - .29 26 
Problems -- 4 .37 - .37 29 
Average Interval: .257 .50 .50 
Progress Ratio: -.51 -.04 -.04 
NOTE: The figures for "Giving Date" could not be used owing to a 
fluctuation in the resulting percentages, these being, for 
years 7, 8, and 9, 66;, 30kó, and 100$, respectively. 
"Comprehension (3)" is already 782. at 9, and no figures are 
given below that year. 
TABLE 11. 
LEVIS THE AND MORLÉ 






Giving Date 40 1.09 80 
Giving Change -- 140 2.01 100 
Comprehension (3) -- 20 2.06 90 
Five Weights -- 10 1.22 50 
Average Interval: 1.09 1.76 
Progress Ratio: +.70 +1.75 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Five Weights 50 .25 60 
Absurdities 40 .25 50 .42 - .42 80 
Memory Drawing 140 .25 50 
Sentence build.(2) 30 .52 50 .42 - .42 80 
Comprehension (4) 30 (.00) 30 .52 - .52 70 
Sentence- build.(1) 20 .59 40 .51+5 - .545 80 
Mixed Sentences 10 (.85) 40 .385 - .385 70 
Definition (Abstr.) 10 20 .295 - .295 40 
Average Interval: .37 .43 .43 
Progress Ratio: -.42 -.» -.33 
'0 " 
'0 
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TERMAN, LYMAN, ORDAHL, etc. 
8 
( 725 Children, California and Nevada, 
RELATIONAL THINKING 
U.S.A.) 
7 Age: 5 6 
Comprehension (3) 47 .31 59 .35 72 
Similarities 30 .55 51 .30 63 
Giving Date -- 20 .84. 50 
Giving Change -- 3 1.08 38 
Five Weights -- 7 .88 35 
Sentence -build. (1) -- 44+ 
Absurdities -- 16 
Memory Drawing -- 27 
Average Interval: .4.3 .69 
Progress Ratio: -.02 +.57 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Comprehension (3) 85 -- 92 
Similarities 78 -- 90 -- 92 
Giving Date 67 .51 83 -- 91 
Giving Change 60 .70 83 -- 92 
Five Weights 58 .30 69 .17 75 -- 79 
Sentence- build.(1) 68 .4-1 81 -- 90 -- 95 
Absurdities 47 .41;- 64 (.08) 67 .23 75 
Memory Drawing 4.6 .35 60 .33 72 .3o 81 
Comprehension (4.) 44 .4.0 6o .39 74 .31 83 
Fable Interp. 37 .4.1 53 .23 62 
Mixed Sentences 25 (.64) 4.9 .34 62 
Abstract Defin. 27 .56 4.8 .23 57 











Average Interval: .444 .34-5 .263 













TERMAN, TR 0 S T, and WADDLE. 
(265 Children, California, U.S.A.) 
Age: 
RELATIONAL THINKING 
7 8 9 5 6 
Comprehension (3) 20 .87 51 .28 62 .27 72 
Giving Date -- 14 1.02 48 .60 71 
Giving Change 0 .81 29 .86 62 
Five Weights 50 .55 71 
Sentence - build. (1) -- 38 .52 68 
Absurdities -- -- 29 .55 50 
Memory Drawing -- -- 36 .36 5o 
Average Interval: .87 .70 .53 
Progress Ratio: +.81 +.46 +.10 
Age: 9 l0 11 12 
Comprehension (3) 72 .3o 81 
Giving Date 71 .52 86 -- 94 
Giving Change 62 .46 78 -- 91 
Five Weights 71 (.06) 73 .31 82 
Sentence build.(1) 68 .60 86 -- 91 -- 90 
Absurdities 50 .55 71 .29 80 -- 85 
Memory Drawing 50 .28 61 .30 72 .54 90 
Comprehension (4) 45 .44 62 (.08) 65 .38 78 
Mixed Sentences -- 37 .33 50 .18 57 
Picture Interp. -- 3o .44 47 .47 65 
Problems __ -- 38 .31 50 
Average Interval: .45 .33 .376 
Progress Ratio: -.ó6 -.3o -.23 
TABLE 114 







































+.17 Progress Ratio: 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Comprehension (3) 78 -- 85 
Giving Date 81 -- 77 -- 87 -- 93 
Giving Change 42 .33 55 .31 67 
Five Weights 55 -- 54 -- 77 
Sentence build. (1) 60 .74- 84. -- 36 -- 93 
Absurdities 40 .30 52 (.08) 55 .4-8 73 
Comprehension (4) 37 .56 59 .29 70 .32 80 
Nixed Sentences -- 24 .24 32 (.78) 62 
Fable Interp. -- 44 .35 58 .24 67 
Definition (Abstr.) -- 20 (.53) 38 .34- 51 
Problems -- -- 40 (.02) 41 
Average Interval: .48 .297 .345 










NOTE: As the percentage for "Five Weights" is lower at age 10 than 
at 9, the figures have not been used after age 9. 
The percentages used are taken from "Stanford Revision of the 
Binet -Simon Scale:' 
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Considering now the three series of data associated with Terman, the 
results of which are seen in tables 12, 13, and 14, and in graphic form in 
figure 3, we find that only the Terman and Childs data show evidence of a 
slower rate of progress at 8 -9 than at 9 -10. The high point at 7 -8, how- 
ever, is again evident; and although figures are not given for any test 
below age 7 - with the exception of "Comprehension" and "Similarities" - it 
is evident from the other percentages at 7 that there is no appreciable 
relational thinking before that age. 
If we now examine the data for tests involving non -relational thinking 
of th4 type not connected with the immediate environment, we find rather 
different tendencies. Results of Burt's children - both normal and M.D. - 
and those of Rowe are seen in tables 15, 16, and 17, and in graphic form in 
figure 4. In the case of the normal children, the highest point of develop- 
ment of this type of mental process is year 5 -6. There are no figures for 
the mentally defective children at 5, but it is clear that a very substantial 
step forward is made by these children at 6 -7. All three graphs show a 
descent to the year 8 -9 after which there is a change in direction, Rowe 
increasing rapidly once more to year 10 (as in relational thinking), while 
Burt's graphs maintain the 8 -9 rate of development with a tendency to 
descrease once ,-_ore toward year 12. The similarity of the development of 
Burt's normal and M.D. children is again noteworthy. 
The results för this type of thinking derived from Terman's three 
series are given in tables 18, 19, and 20, and graphically in figure 5. 
The peak of development is here at 5 -6, 6 -7, or both years together, with a 
descent in all three to year 7-8, and a rise at 8 -9. 
Dougherty's figures commence only at 7 -8, but as far as year 10 
(table 21) they approximate to those of Terman. (See figure 5.) 
FIGURE 4, 












7 8 9 
with environment) 
5 6 
1+ Digits 72.3 .66 94.8 -- 96.1 -- 98.9 -- 100.0 
Days of Week 11+.2 1.01+ 81.3 -- 93.9 -- 95.6 -- 97.6 
Definition (use) 46.2 .69 72.3 .52 87.2 -- 94.2 -- 97.1 
5 Digits 37.3 1.02 75.7 -- 94.0 -- 95.6 -- 98.8 
16 Syllables 17.8 .66 72.7 .1 +1, 85.3 -- 95.2 -- 98.6 
Concrete Differ. 28.3 .62 52.0 .49 70.6 .30 80.0 -- 92.9 
Counting 20 -0 5.7 .65 28.0 .67 53.6 .62 76.0 -- 86.1 
6 Digits 4.9 -- 14.5 .86 42.5 .45 60.2 .52 78.2 
Months 1.3 -- 7.0 .82 35.3 .68 61.6 .4.9 78.6 
Reading (2 facts) 3.9 -- 23.2 .94 58.2 .71 82.1 -- 90.5 
Reading (6 facts) 0.0 -- 3.8 -- 19.3 .69 44.5 .62 68.1+ 
Definition (descr.) 3.9 -- 16.4 -- 23.6 .48 40.1+ .59 63.8 
60 Words 0.0 -- 4.1 7.6 -- 21.6 .18 27.0 
7 Digits 0.0 2.5 5.8 -- 18.8 .23 25.5 
Three Rhymes 0.0 0.0 3.4 -- 20.2 .21 26.6 
26 Syllables 0.0 -- 0.0 -- 1.8 -- 4.3 -- 9.7 
Average Interval: .76 .677 .56 .405 
Progress Ratio: +.41 +.25 +.04 -.25 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
6 Digits 78.2 -- 88.5 -- 96.6 -- 98.5 
Months 78.6 -- 93.5 -- 98.3 -- 100.0 
Reading (6 facts) 68.4 .37 80.2 -- 89.3 -- 95.7 
Definition (descr.) 63.8 .39 77.0 -- 86.6 -- 87.0 
60 Words 27.0 .45 43.6 .42 60.4. .39 74.3 
7 Digits 25.5 .52 44.6 .38 59.4 .25 68.9 
Three Rhymes 26.6 .30 37.3 .37 52.0 .37 66.4 
26 Syllables 9.7 -- 17.4- - 22.0 .36 34..1 
Average Interval: .406 .39 .34- 
Progress Ratio: -.25 -.28 -.37 
TABLE 17. 
R O W E 
(Michigan Children.) 
NON -RELATIONAL Th1NKING 
(unconnected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
Counting 20-0 29 .91 64 .84 90 -- 93 --- 87 
Days of Yeek 3 -- 9 .83 35 .59 58 .35 71 
5 Digits 3 -- 24- .76 52 .39 67 .17 73 
Definition (Desch) 12 .69 33 .47 51 
Months -- 22 .92 56 .16 62 
6 Digits -- 20 .29 29 .4-7 47 
60 Words --- 8 .51 25 (.70) 51 
Three Rhymes -- 0 -- 12 -- 18 
7 Digits. o -- 21+ .35 36 
Average Interval: .91 .81 .565 .328 
Progress Ratio: +.57 +.40 -.03 -.4-3 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Days of Week 71 .70 94 -- 100 
5 Digits 73 .57 91 -- 93 
Definition (descr.) 51 1.00 85 -- 86 
Months 62 1.00 94- -- 90 
6 Digits 47 1.00 82 -- 69 
60 Words 51 .78 79 -- 79 
Three Rhymes 18 .48 33 .13 38 
7 Digits 36 .49 55 .28 66 
Average Interval: .75 .205 
Progress Ratio: +.30 -.65 
DOUG] 3ERTY 
FIGUR E 5. (Cont. ) 
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TABLE 18. 
T E R M A N, L Y1'rï A N, O R D A H L. 
(Californian Children) 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING. 








Three Commissions 72 .61 91 -- 93 
Comprehension (2) 55 .39 70 .55 86 -- 93 
16 Syllables 56 .35 69 .68 90 -- 95 
Morning & Afternoon 60 .67 82 -- 97 
5 Digits 31+ .61+ 59 .41 74 .31 83 -- 93 
Concrete Differ. 23 .84 54 .31 66 .36 78 -- 90 
Days of Week 0 .71 27 1.00 65 .49 81 -- 91 
3 Digits Backwds. 2 1.00 35 .64 60 .70 83 -- 90 
Counting 20 -0 -- 16 1.04 48 .36 66 .4.7 81 
Definition ( descr.) -- -- 43 .49 62 .24 71 
4 Digits Backwds. -- 18 .77 44 .46 62 
Three Rhymes -- 4.8 .36 62 
Months -- -- 30 .75 59 
Reading (8. facts) -- -- -- 26 .77 55 
60 Words -- -- -- 21 .81 50 
6 Digits. -- -- -- 32 .62 56 
20 Syllables 35 .44 52 
Average Interval: .66 .66 .497 .546 
Progress Ratio: +.22 +.27 -.04 +.05 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Counting 20 -0 81 -- 96 
Definition (descr.) 71 .40 83 
4. Digits Backwds. 62 .36 75 86 -- 91 
Three Rhymes 62 .57 81 83 -- 94- 
Months 59 .54 78 -- 90 -- 93 
Reading (8 facts) 55 .37 69 .34. 8o -- 93 
60 Words 50 .33 63 .38 76 -- 85 
6 Digits 56 .4.0 71 .29 80 -- 87 
20 Syllables 52 .28 63 .38 76 -- 82 










Average Interval: .106 .38 .13 
Progress Ratio: -.22 -.26 -.75 
TABLE 19. 
TERMAN, TR O S T, WADDLE 
(Californian Children) 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING. 
(unconnected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
16 Syllables 38 .75 67 .30 77 -- 86 
Morning & Afternoon 68 .67 88 -- 95 
5 Digits 26 .46 43 .82 74 .20 80 
Concrete Differ. 30 .80 61 .36 74. .20 86 -- 91 
Counting 20-0 19 .57 38 .49 57 .71+ 82 
Reading (8 facts) -- -- -- 30 .52 50 
60 Words -- -- -- 32 .50 51 
Average Interval: .67 .51 .296 .586 
Progress Ratio: +.37 +.04 -.40 +.20 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Counting 20 -0 82 -- 97 
Reading (8 facts) 50 .36 61f .28 71 .17 79 
60 Words 51 .28 62 .19 69 (.68) 90 
7 Digits -- -- 37 .23 1+6 
Average Interval: .32 .235 .20 
Progress Ratio: -.35 -.52 -.59 
TABLE 20 
TERMAN AND CHILD S 
(Californina Children) 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING 
(unconnected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
16 Syllables 53 .23 62 .53 80 
5 Digits 50 (.00) 50 .58 72 (.06) 74 .31 83 
Concrete Differ. 19 .96 47 (.23) 62 .33 74 .40 85 
Days of Week -- 56 .89 85 -- 85 -- 98 
Counting 20 -0 7 (1.66) 62 .19 69 .78 95 
Definition (descr.) -- 34 (.61) 58 .54- 77 
Months -- 64 .86 91 
Reading (8 facts) -- -- 13 .99 46 
6o Words -- 35 .57 57 
Average Interval: .595 .666 .26 .636 













Months 91 -- 81 -- 96 
Reading (8 facts) 46 .30 58 .19 65 -- 62 
60 Words 57 .26 67 .51 83 -- 82 
7 Digits -- -- 43 .13 48 
Three Rhymes 74 .55 92 -- 81 -- 82 
Average Interval: .37 .35 .13 
Progress Ratio: -.26 -.3o -.74 
NOTE: The percentages used are taken from "The Stanford Revision of 
the Binet -Simon Scale ". 
Age: 
TABLE 21 
D O U G H E R T Y 
(Kansas Children) 
NON - RELATIONAL THINKING 
(unconnected with environment) 
5 6 7 8 9 
Counting 20-0 46.3 .90 79.0 -- 89.7 
Days of Week 68.7 .70 90.3 -- 98.3 
Definition ( Descr.) 28.4. .53 48.1+ .80 77.6 
6 Digits 16.4. .69 38.7 .94 74.1 
Months 0.0 -- 11.3 1.17 50.0 
Average Interval: .705 .97 
Progress Ratio: +.04. +.43 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Definition (Descr.) 77.6 -- 77.6 -- 81.8 
6 Digits 74.1 .25 81.6 -- 75.0 -- 87.0 
Months 50.0 .76 77.6 -- 84..1 
60 Words 20.7 .59 40.8 .77 70.5 .56 87.0 
Rhymes 17.2 .61 36.7 .81 68.2 .56 84..8 
7 Digits 27.3 .38 41.3 
26 Syllables 27.3 .49 45.7 
Average Interval: .55 .79 .497 
Progress Ratio: -.19 +.16 -.27 
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The Eeries derived from Bobertag and Goddard are incomplete, (tables 
22 and 23, and figure 6). The break in the Bobertag graph is due to the two 
tests at 8 -9 yielding intervals too remote from their own average. If, 
however, we were to ignore the smaller and accept the larger as represent- 
ative, we have still evidence of a decrease at 8 -9, as in Burt and Rowe, 
with a revival at 9 -10. 
Both these graphs show a later peak of development, namely, at 6 -7 
and 7 -8. 
The Binet and Lévistre and Morlé figures, like those of Dougherty, 
commence only at 7 -8, and are seen in tables 24 and 25, with graphs in 
figure 7. They are very similar in tendency, and, like the graphs for 
relational thinking from the saine sources, show a sudden decrease to year 
9 -10. They do not, however, show us the beginnings of the development of 
this type of thinking. 
We have, however, two additional sets of data which show the develop- 
ment of this level of thought between ages 5 and 7. Irene Cuneo and 
L.M. Terman published in 1918 (23) percentages of passes of 112 Kinder- 
garten children, details of which, in regard to this type of thinking, are 
given in table 26. It will be seen that there is a very marked increase 
in rate of development at 6 -7, the 5 -6 interval showing an average of .378 
and that of year 6 -7 an average of .945. 
A similar result was found in test data obtained by the writer from 
Moray House School, Edinburgh. All the children there are tested by the 
headmistress of the infant department as soon as they enter school, and 
someties later also. The number of cases obtained, which are spread over 
a period of eight years, is as follows: 251 children at 5 years, 24 at 
6 years, and 4J. at 7 years. The average age for the 5 -year -olds was 
FIGURE 6, 
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B O B E R T A G. 
(Breslau Children) 
Age: 
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5 Digits 
Concrete Differ. 













73 (.61) 93 
85 
53 (.02) 54 
(unconnected with environment) 
6 7 
¿5 .63 69 
.64. 42 .94 77 




Progress Ratio: -.06 +.28 +.25 
Age: 9 î0 11 12 
6 Digits 54 .82 82 -- 91 
7 Digits 21 .13 -- 25 
Three Rhymes -- 34 .4.1 50 
60 Words -- 60 .28 7o 
Average Interval: .82 .13 .345 
Progress Ratio: +.21 -.81 -.49 
TABLE 23. 
G O D D A R D 
(New Jersey Children) 
NON - RELATIONAL THINKING 
(unconnected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
16 Syllables 0.0 -- 15.6 .36 25.9 
Definition (use) 60.0 .80 85.3 -- 92.0 100 
Age 50.0 .89 81.4 -- 95.1 
Morning & Afternoon 56.0 .42 71.4. .70 95.7 
5 Digits -- 20.6 (1.19) 71+.7 (.31) 83.7 
Reading (2 facts) -- -- 7.1 1.05 1+0.7 .83 72.2 
Counting 20 -0 -- -- 26.5 1.59 83.1 -- 91+.1 
Concrete Differ. -- -- 73.5 .64. 97.7 -- 94.4 
Days of Week -- -- 54..2 1.28 95.5 -- loo 
Reading (6 facts) -- -- -- 24.1 1.58 81.1 
Months -- -- -- 64.7 .78 88.8 
Average Interval: .70 .53 1.14. 1.06 
Progress Ratio: -.24. -.42 +.24. +.16 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Months 88.8 97.1 
60 Words 44..1+ 1.44 92.1 
7 Digits 21.6 .67 1+-5 .1 1.12 84..1 
Three Rhymes 72.0 .59 90.0 -- 100 
26 Syllables -- 14.3 .86 41.6 
Average Interval: .90 .99 
Progress Ratio: -.02 +.08 
F I G U R E 7. 




































Average Interval: .986 .91 
Progress Ratio: +.57 +.41+ 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
60 Words 10 .4.8 25 .53 -- .53 65 
7 Digits 10 .4.0 -- .40 35 
Three Rhymes 21 .365 -- .365 47 
Average Interval: .4-8 .4-3 .43 













Progress Ratio: -.46 -.84 -.84 
TABLE 25. 
LÉV I S THE and MORLE' 
(Parisian Children) 
NOTN- RELATTIONAL THINKING. 
(unconnected with environment) 
5 6 7 8 9 
20 .84 50 
40 1.09 80 
30 1.75 90 -- 100 
-- 20 1.68 80 
-- 30 .77 60 
1.226 1.225 
+.53 +.53 
9 10 11 12 
60 .27 70 
20 .59 40 .125 -- .125 50 
.43 .125 .125 
TABLE 26. 
CUNE O AND TERMAN 
(Californian Children) 
NON- RELATIONAL THINKING 
(unconnected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 
Three Con,unissions 73 .23 80 -- 96 
Age 44 .56 66 1.25 96 
Comprehension (2) 62 .57 81 -- 96 
16 Syllables 40 .40 56 1.09 91 
Morning & Afternoon 111 .15 50 .77 78 
5 Digits 46 .20 64 1.15 91 
Concrete Differ. 17 .54 34 .59 57 
Counting 20 -0 2 -- 14 .79 39 
Definition ( descr.) 0 8 .98 39 
Average Interval: .378 .945 
TABLE 27. 
M O R A Y H O U S E C H I L D R E N 
Age: 5 
NON- RET,ñTI°NAL THINKING 
7 
(unconnected with environment) 
6 
5 Digits 45.8 .54 66.6 1.01 100 
Concrete Differ. 31.9 .68 58.3 1.23 97.7 
Counting 20-0 3.2 .91 33.4 1.79 93.2 
16 Syllables 55.1+ .29 66.6 .83 93.2 
Definition (descr.)24.7 1.00 62.5 .84 88.6 
Three Rhymes --- 8.3 1.22 47.7 
4. Digits Backwds. -- 8.3 1.71 65.9 
Average Interval: .684. .985 (reduced by 1/5) 
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5 years 4 months, that of the 6- year -olds 6 years LF months, and of the 
7- year -olds, 7 years 7 months. As the 6 -7 year interval is thus 15 months 
while the 5 -6 interval is exactly 12, the results (shown in table 27) in 
respect of the former interval have been reduced by one fifth. The average 
for year 5 -6 is .684 and that for year 6 -7 is .985. 
To sum up those figures which show the progress of this level of 
thinking between the ages of 5 and 7, Burt (normal), Rowe, T.L.O. and T.T.W. 
show a marked progress at 5 -6, continued in three of the four cases through 
6 -7 but with a tendency to decrease either during that year or immediately 
afterwards. On the other hand, T. and C., Bobertag, Cuneo and Terman, 
and the Moray House school data show a higher rate of progress at 6 -7 than 
at 5 -6. In Bobertag this continues through 7 -8, while Goddard shows great- 
est progress at 7 -8. 
If we consider the seven complete graphs at our disposal - that is, 
including Bobertag and the Burt M.D. children, - we find that whether the 
highest point be at 5 -6 or 6 -7, a certain zero point is afterwards reached 
at either 7 -8 or 8 -9 after which the development takes a different course. 
Comparing this tendency with that of the development of relational thinking, 
it can be seen that the latter does not appear to arise out of the former, 
but that, in fact, relational thinking takes an important step forward in 
development just when the rate of progress of the simpler type of thinking 
is beginning to decline, or has already fallen below the average rate. This 
is especially noticeable in the three Terman graphs. Goddard appears to be 
the only clear exception. After this zero point in simple thinking, there 
is an increase in the rate of progress in Bobertag, Rowe, and the three 
Terman graphs, while in the case of Burt (normal and M.D.) the downward 
tendency is checked. 
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It is interesting to note at this point that the graphs from Burt's 
figures synchronise with the others in regard to these fluctuations, - in 
spite of the fact that his children are on the average six months older in 
each year. This can only mean that the bulk of the change in each case 
takes place during the first half of the year in question. 
Summarising the results in regard to relational thinking, we find that 
out of the 10 graphs for normal children, 6 show the maximum rate of develop- 
ment during year 7-8, and 2 - Binet and Lévistre & Morlé - during 8 -9. 
In regard to what takes place later, we have found two tendencies. In 
Burt, Bobertag, Goddard, and Rowe, there is a low rate of development at 
8 -9 with an acceleration at 9 -10. Dougherty is above average at 8 -9, but 
also shows an increase toward 9 -10. In the French data, on the other hand, 
following the maximum acceleration at 8 -9, there is a low interval at 9 -10. 
Terman's Californian children seem to yield results between these two. 
There is a decrease at 8 -9 without however any recovery at 9 -10, except to 
a slight extent in T. & C. 
From the percentages at our disposal we can infer that there is no 
substantial relational thinking below age 7. 
With a view to examining at closer range the early development of 
these two types of thinking, by means of tests specially designed for the 
purpose, an experiment was devised and carried out by the writer with 
children of Moray House School, Edinburgh. Two tests were arranged - one 
which would involve elementary imagery- control, and the other involving 
relational thinking in an elementary form. The two tests were given at 
the same time to each child individually, every child in the school between 
II 
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the ages of 5 and 9 inclusive being tested. The tests were then repeated 
at a date which was exactly a year later for each child, and which there- 
fore covered a range from 6 to 10. At the same time the new group of 
5- year -olds was given the test, as well as all new- comers of ages 6 to 10. 
There are thus two series of results, which can be treated independ- 
ently; but as a considerable number in each series were the same children, 
we have also a series of actual retests of the age -intervals from 5 - 10. 
In the first series there are 161 children (83 boys and 78 girls), 
and in the following year the number was 205 (100 boys and 105 girls), 
making a total of 366 individual tests (183 boys and 183 girls). Those 
retested among these numbered 1+4 (74 boys and 70 girls). 
The first part of the test consisted in repetition of letters and 
digits in the reverse order, thereby excluding the factor of mere imitation 
or echoing so liable to be present in forward repetition. The letters 
comprised three words of three letters each, and one word of four letters; 
and the numbers likewise consisted of three of three digits and one of four. 
The three smaller numbers are those used in the Stanford -Binet (1916) 
alternative 7 -year test, and the larger number is one of those used in test 
If of the 9 -year level. The three smaller uords were chosen so that they 
should represent various combinations of consonant and vowel. The words 
and numbers are as follows: 
D 0 G C R Y A R11 CART 
2 8 3 4 2 7 5 9 6 6 5 2 8 
Except in the case of children in their first school year, the test 
was given in the following way: 
In order to obviate any risk of the child not understanding what was 
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required of him, the word " B 0 Y " printed in large block capitals was 
first shown to him with the remark: "Here's a word you know well" or, 
"I wonder if you know this word ", according to the age of the child. "Now 
this word is spelt 'B . . 0 . . Y' But if I were to ask you to spell it 
backwards, how would you spell it ?" 
Thereupon the child replied: "Y . . 0 . . B" 
"Right. . . Now, you could spell a few little words backwards for me, 
couldn't you? I'll spell them forwards, and then you'll spell them back- 
wards. Well, the first word is 'Dog' - D . . 0 . . G" etc., 
When the word "cart" was reached, one said: "The next word is a little 
more difficult, because it has four letters. It is the word *cart". 
If the child was accustomed to use the phonetic pronunciation of 
letters - ascertainable by the way in which the original "Y . 0 . B" 
was pronounced - this pronunciation was used by the investigator. 
With regard to the numbers, the procedure was as follows: 
"Now, you could do the same with numbers, couldn't you? If I say 
'1 . . 2 . . 3' you would say '3 . . 2 . . 1'. Do you understand ?" 
With younger children an actual written number of three digits was 
first shown and the child asked to read it backwards, as with the word "boy ". 
There was thus no doubt in the mind of the child as to what was required. 
When the four -digit number was reached the child was warned that it had 
"four figures in it ", as in the case of "cart ". Except in the case of the 
children of class 1 in the first year, the word or number was said only 
once. In the case of the words, the word itself was first said and then 
spelt by the tester. The rate was about one letter or digit per second. 
The testing was begun early in February on each occasion, but the 
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children of class 1 were not tested until the beginning of the summer term. 
They had thus two full terms of school work behind them, and so were 
familiar with small words and with figures. The writer has before him the 
reading book which such children have completed by the end of the second 
term. It contains such sentences as: 
"A robin sits on a twig" 
"Winifred has a cup of milk" 
There was thus no question of these younger children not being 
familiar with words of the size given in the test. Nevertheless, in 
order to counteract any disadvantage due to lack of familiarity with 
letters and figures on the part of this group of children, they were made 
to repeat each set of letters or digits forwards, several times, until it 
was seen that they knew them. Then they were asked to proceed with the 
backward repetition of the word or number in question. Even then, When 
the child tended simply to repeat the word or number forwards, the tester 
said: "No, begin with G - or 3" - as the case might be. Thus every 
possible assistance was given to these children of the youngest class. The 
following year, however, no such help was given to the children of this 
class, so that the difference due to this coaching might be estimated. 
Generally speaking, there were two types of error - one being to forget 
the first digit of a series, and the other being to return to the original 
"forward" order. Thus in the case of "arm ", "m . . r . . m" was a frequent 
rendering, and, for 5 . . 9 . . 6 one got "6 . . 5 . 9 ". 
The advantage of including both numbers and words in such a test is, 
that it calls out two forms of imagery control. In the case of the words 
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the letters are less likely to be forgotten, but just because the child 
has been accustomed to spell these words in the normal way, he has to over - 
corne the strong associative tendency to spell them forwards. With the 
numbers, on the other hand, there is no pre -established association, but 
here the child must grip his image very firmly, otherwise he may easily 
forget the first digit given him. In this way the first half of the test 
shows the child's power to move freely in his imagery, despite strong 
association, while the second part shows his power to grip and retain an 
image, unaided by any previous memory. 
Whenever a child made a mistake, he was warned - not in such a way as 
to make hire nervous - but so that, through mere carelessness, he should not 
repeat the error. When a mistake occurred, one said : "Here's another 
one. Be careful this time:" or "That wasn't quite right, was it? Never 
mind, try another one." In cases of forgetting one said "Forgotten it, 
never mind try another one." Sometimes in cases of forgetting, instead of 
remaining silent, the child invented a digit in the place of the one for- 
gotten. In such cases the former warning was given. This warning was 
found to bring about a subsequent correct response on many occasions. 
.Immediately upon completion of this test, the test for relational 
thinking was given. It was necessary to devise for this purpose a test 
which involved the grasping of a relation, and yet the performance of which 
was simple enough for the youngest to understand. The following procedure 
was decided upon: The tester asked the child to stand facing him at a 
distance of about three feet, and then said : "stow I am going to move one 
of my feet, and I want to see if you can copy me - do just as I do;- only I 
want you to be very careful to watch which foot g use." The last four 
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words were said slowly and with emphasis. Then the tester, remaining 
standing, crossed his feet, placing the right foot on the opposite side of 
the left foot, so that they touched. 
The tendency of the younger children, of course, was to move the left 
foot and place it on the other side of the right, not realising the 
reversed relationship in which they stood to the investigator. No indica- 
tion whatever was given if the child used the wrong foot, and, after tell- 
ing the child to replace his foot, the investigator said: "Now I'm going to 
move my head, and I want you to copy me just the same." Then he inclined 
his head to the right. Of those children who were correct in only one of 
the actions, it was in the great majority of cases the "leg" action which 
was correct. 
The number of children at each age was as follows: 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
1st. Year: 26 47 34 31 23 -- 161 
2nd. Year: 25 41 48 37 32 22 205 
51 88 82 68 55 22 366 
Of these, the following were actual re- tests: 
Ages: 5 & 6 6& 7 7& 8 8& 9 9& 10 Total 
25 42 29 29 19 11{)1 
The average age of each of these groups was as follows: 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1st. Year: 5;8z 6;6 7 ;6 8;6 9;4 
2nd. Year: 5;7a 6 ;6 7;6 8;6 9;6 1O;4 







F I G U R E 8. 
(First year: black. Second year: red.) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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months for all but age 5 (both years), age 9 (1st. year), and age 10. 
These lay between 2 and 3 months. 
As the ages are calculated to the nearest week, it happens that 
children within two days of their next birthday are considered as belong- 
ing to the following year. This, however, occurred in only four cases - 
three in the first year test, and one in the second. 
We shall consider first the reverse digits and letters test, but 
excluding the large word and number since these are more difficult in 
degree, and will be dealt with separately later. 
Allowing for one slip in each series, and therefore making a "pass" 
2 out of 3 words, and 2 out of 3 numbers, the following are the results: 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1st. Year: 8 17 22 26 19 
67 30.7 36.0 64.7 83.8 82.6 
Interval: .14 .74 .61 -- 
2nd. Year: 5 15 36 33 29 22 
cr0 20.0 36.6 75.0 89.0 90.6 100 
Interval: .50 1.02 .39 -- -.. 
Two years 
combined: 13 32 58 59 48 22 
á 25.5 36.4 70.7 86.8 87.3 
100 
Interval: .31 89 56 
Progress Ratio: -.47 +.51 -.05 
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In figure 8 these percentages are expressed graphically; and it will 
be seen first of all how closely the two years correspond in spite of the 
fact that in the second graph we have mainly the same children a year older. 
The difference of 12% at age 5 between the first and second year is due 
presumably to the coaching given at this age during the first year test. 
That this difference is so small, and that, with the utmost efforts on the 
part of the tester only 30 of the first year 5- year -olds could succeed in 
this test, indicates how little control was possessed by children of that 
E.ge over their mental imagery. Even at age 6 the proportion is no more 
than 36jó, although in the first year there are 15 children who belonged to 
class 1, and so received the help given to the 5- year -olds. 
It will be noted that the greatest progress is made between age 6 and 7 
in each year, followed closely by the 7 -8 interval in the first year test. 
The following are the figures for the re- tested children: 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
1st Year 8 15 19 25 15 
32.0 35.7 65.5 86.2 79.o 
Age: 6 7 8 9 10 
2nd. Year 10 31 26 26 19 
¡á 4.0 73.5 89.6 89.6 loo 
Interval: .22 1.00 .78 
The largest interval is again 6 -7, followed by considerable progress 
It is true that the 5 -6 intervals do not represent a full year, but, 
when adjusted for this, they become only.18 and .57, respectively. 
at 7 -8. Owing to the coaching given to the youngest children in the 
first year, the percentages at 5 and 6 are somewhat higher in that year 
than they would otherwise have been, all the children of 5 having been 
helped, and about a third of those of 6. This means that both the 5 -6 
and the 6 -7 intervals should be a little larger than they appear here. 
If we reduce the age 5 percentage to say 22%, the difference being roughly 
that clue to coaching between the first and second year test at this age, 
the 5 -6 interval would then be .52. Without allowing for any increase in 
the 6 -7 interval due to the coaching factor, the difference between the 
two intervals is still a large one. 
We may now summarise our results for the years 5 to 8, in respect of 
this type of mental operation, in the following manner: 
5 -6 6 -7 7 -8 
interval interval interval 
greater greater greater 
than than than 
6 -7 5 -6 5 -6 or 6 -7 
Burt (N.) T. & C. 
Rowe Bobertag 
T. T. W. Cuneo & Terman 
Moray House (Binet) 
Moray House (Special) 
5 -6 & 6 -7 
equal 
T. L. O. 
GoddArd 
Bearing in mind that in the case of Burt and Rowe the 6 -7 interval 
follows closely behind the 5 -6 interval in regard to size, we may say 
that, as between these two age -intervals, the emphasis lies more upon the 
year 6 -7. In regard to the 7-8 interval, we do not of course know the 









(First year: black. Second year: red. ) 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Moray House (Binet) figures extend so far. But there is a tendency in 
Burt (M.D.) Bobertag, and the writer's own Moray House test, for a 
certain high rate of progress to continue through the 7 -8 interval. It 
would appear, in short, that this developmental change takes place over 
a period of about two years, and that where the highest point of progress 
is at 5 -6 it is continued through 6 -7, and that where the greatest 
progress is at 6 -7 development is continued at a slightly less high rate 
during 7 -8. It will be noted that only in T. T. W. and T. & C. does 
the change seem to complete itself in one year. 
If we now consider the more difficult part of the Moray House 
imagery test - the four- letter word and four -digit number - making the 
"pass" one correct out of two, we get the following results: 
Age: 6 7 8 9 to 
1st. Year: 10 18 24 27 22 mi. AO 
% 38.4 38.3 70.5 87.1 95.6 
Interval: .00 .84 .56 
2nd Year: 8 15 32 35 29 21 
32.0 36.8 66.6 94.5 90.6 95.4 
Interval: .13 1LZ.Z .86 
Two years 
combined: 18 33 56 62 51 21 
35.3 37.5 68.3 91.2 92.7 95.4 
Interval: .ó6 .8o .75 
Progress Ratio: -.89 +.48 +.39 
The following are the figures for the re- tested children: 
Age: 
1st. Year 











Age: 6 7 8 9 10 
2nd Year: 8 26 27 26 18 
ó 32.0 61.9 93.1 89.6 94.7 
Interval: -- .67 .4.8 
Graphs of these results are shown in figure 9. The most notable 
feature of the above figures is the very slight progress made during 5-6. 
The coaching in the first year has brought the 5- year -olds to the level 
of achievement of year 6, and in the re -test has actually brought them to 
a higher level. It is interesting to note that, on the other hand, the 
actual percentage of passes at 5 is higher than in the test for smaller 
words and digits. This would appear to be due to the fact that while 
the four letters and digits test is more difficult in degree, the standard 
of scoring is lower (1 out of 2 as against 2 out of 3). This lower 
standard - especially after the practice involved by the three previously 
given words and numbers - enabled a certain number of children to -pass, 
but the majority had to wait uhtil age 7 before having the necessary 
mental structure. There is therefore a natural tendency for the higher 
rate of progress seen at 7, to be continued into the 7-8 interval which, 
in the case of the second year test, is actually larger than 6 -7. This 
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is just what is to be expected in a test which is slightly more difficult 
in degree but not in structure. 
An interesting comparison with these results is found in an experiment 
by Mary H. Young in regard to audito -vocal digit spans (24). Children 
from 4;0 to 7;11 in two Philadelphia public schools (581 cases) were tested 
for forward repetition of digits, one out of three constituting a pass. 
Also, 1179 children, representing all the children of Bloomington, 
Indiana, public schools, between the ages of 6;0 and 10;11, were given the 
same test, as well as a reverse digit test. 
The following were the results for a forward digit span of five or 
more digits: 
Interval: 
5 6 7 8 9 lo 
40 229 346 203 225 217 
118 394 251 245 232 
33.9 58.1 74.9 
.63 .46 .2o 
80.9 91.8 93.5 
MOAN* OWNS 
The results for the reverse digit span test involving three or more 
digits, were as follows: 





215 235 228 
252 244 232 
Interval: 
28.7 60.5 85.3 96.3 98.3 
.83 .78 
Both of the above tests belong to the 7 -year level of the Terman- 








( Young: black. Moray House - 2 years: red.) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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during the 5 -6 interval, reaching 58% at 6, continuing through 6 -7, and 
falling off rapidly during 7 -8, while the reverse digit test yields a 
large interval at 6 -7 and an almost equally rapid development during 7 -8. 
It reaches only 28% at 6, yet overtakes and passes the results of the 
other test by year 8. 
The results of this reverse -digit test are shown graphically in 
figure 10, in conjunction with the graph of the Moray House experiment. 
In the majority of cases, however, the 5 digits test shows most pro- 
gress during the 6 -7 interval, as the following figures show: 
Interval: 5 -6 6 -7 7-8 
Burt (normal) 1.02 (.50) 
Bobertag .64 .94 (.42) 
Goddard -- 1.49 .31 
Rowe (.51) .76 .39 
T. L. 0. .64. .41 .31 
T. T. W. .46 .82 .20 
T. & C. .00 .58 .06 
Moray House (Binet) .54. .81 11.011. 
Cuneo & Tennan .20 1.15 
(The intervals in brackets are those wholly above 75% or 
below 25%, and were therefore not Shown in the tables.) 
It will be seen that only Burt and T. L. 0. show a larger interval 
at 5 -6 than at 6 -7. 
Coming now to the Moray House test for relational thinking, the 
results, for both actions correct, are as follows: 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1st. Year: 1 5 6 21 23 
J 3.8 10.7 17.6 67.7 60.8 









(First year: black. Second year: red.) 
















/0 0;() 19.5 29.2 51.3 87.5 86.3 
Interval: -- .31 .58 1.09 
Two years 
combined: 1 13 20 40 42 19 
2 14.8 24.4 58.8 76.4 86.3 
Interval: .35 .91 .50 .35 
Progress Ratio: -.34 +.72 -.06 -.34 
Graphs of these percentages are shown in figure 11. It will be seen 
that here the principal increase is after year 7 - from 7 to 8 in the 
first case, and from 7 to 9 in the second, the largest advance in the 
second year test being from 8 to 9. The re -test figures are: 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
1st. Year: 1 4 5 19 12 
4.0 9.5 17.2 65.5 63.2 
Age: 6 7 8 9 10 
2nd. Year: 6 12 14 25 17 
24+.0 28.6 48.3 86.2 89.5 
Interval: .50 .61 .91 .68 .84 
The emphasis in the above is upon the 7 -8 and the 9 -10 intervals. 
Since there is nothing inherently difficult in this test - nothing in 
the performance of it which even the youngest child cannot grasp - it is 
a clear test for the emergence of relational thinking. If we now place 
ltr FIG'U R E 12. 
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(Relational test: black. 







the two -year graph for the imagery -control test beside the combined graph 
for relational thinking (figure 12), we shall see the connection between 
the development of these two types of thinking. It will be noted than 
when the development of imagery- control is at its height, that of relation- 
al thought has hardly begun, and that the latter takes a leap forward just 
as the former is beginning to decrease in the rate of development. The 
same graphs, expressed in terms of "progress ratios ", are also shown. 
These show very clearly the lack of connection between the development of 
the one function and of the other. 
Certainly, one could not think at all without some control over 
imagery as a basis. For example, in this relational test, the child has 
to picture himself standing in the tester's place. The crux of the test 
is, however, not merely the ability so to picture himself, but the realis- 
ation of his need to do so. Relational thinking is apparently a function 
which begins after imagery- control has been established and which it needs 
as a basis for its development, but with which it is not genetically 
connected. 
It should also be mentioned that, as the following figures show, the 
changes in the rate of development are most evident during the first six 
months of the year in which they take place. The figures below are those 
of the combined years of each test showing the percentages and intervals 
for each six months. It will be seen that the largest interval is 
between 62 and 7 in the imagery test, and between 72 and 8 in the relation- 




7 62 7 
l0 13 19 26 32 
38 741 40 2 
26 32 4.0 65 76 
Interval: .17 .22 .614. .32 
RELATIONAL TEST 
Age: 5 6 62 7 72 8 82 9 
o 6 7 10 10 18 22 23 
38 1+1 4.7 2+.0 1+2 33 35 33 
0 15 15 25 24. 55 63 70 
Interval: -- -- .37 .84 .20 .19 
As already pointed out, the synchronisation of the Burt graph with 
those of the other investigators is explicable only on the assumption 
that the greatest change takes place during the first six months of the 
year -interval. The above figures seem to confirm this. 
The fact that, according to seven of the ten graphs derived from the 
various investigators, marked progress in relational thinking is seen 
between 7 and 8, is further confirmed by this test. Of the three other 
graphs, the two French series are also found to be above the average at 
7 -8, but they reach a higher point at 8 -9. 
Viewing the Moray House experiment from the point of view of the 
actual percentages, it may be said that the majority of children have 
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reached the stage of simple relational thinking by age 9. In regard to 
imagery- control, the majority have achieved this by age 7. In both cases 
the bulk of the progress covers two years - from 5 to 7 in the one, and 
from 7 to 9 in the other - a range from about 25 ó to 75%. But in each 
case there is a special emphasis on one of these two years, when progress 
is most marked, - year 6 -7 in the case of imagery -control, and year 7 -8 
in the case of relational thinking. 
There remains to be considered the increased progress in relational 
thinking at 9 -10, as seen in Burt, Bobertag, Goddard, Rowe, Dougherty, and 
T. & C., and the question arises as to why T. L. 0. and T.T.W. do not show 
this and why the 8 -9 interval with them is so much greater, while, in the 
French data, it is the largest interval in the series. 
Comparing Burt and T. L. 0. at year 8 -9, we find that the latter 
shows markedly higher intervals in respect of the following tests: 
Burt. T. L. 0. 
Giving Change .35 .56 
Sentence -building .31 .62 
Absurdities .14. .91 
This is occasioned by the following percentages: 
Burt T. L. 0. 
8 9 8 9 
Giving Change 68 79 38 60 
Sentence - building 34 4-6 44 68 
Absurdities 24 29 16 1+7 
Progress in the first test has been retarded with T. L. 0. and 
these children achieve during 8 -9 what Burt's children have already 
achieved by 8. In the other two tests, T. L. 0. is ahead of Burt and 
reaches at 9 percentages which Burt does not reach until 10. (The tests 
for sentence building are not quite similar. Burt allows here two 
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sentences, but only one chance is given. Terman requires one sentence 
but gives three chances and allows one error.) 
Comparison of Burt and T. T. W. shows the following: 
Burt. T. T. W. 
Date .42 .60 
Giving Change .35 .86 
Sentence bui11ing .31 .52 
Absurdities .l4 .55 
Here we have the same tests, together with "Date ". The corresponding 
percentages are: 
Burt T. T. W. 
8 9 8 9 
Date 71 84 48 71 
Giving Change 68 79 29 62 
Sentence - building 314. 46 48 68 
Absurdities 21+ 29 29 50 
The tendencies here are the same. The first two tests show T. T. W. 
to be a year behind Burt, and in the remaining two Burt is a year behind 
T. T. W.. In other words, during 8 -9 T. L. O. and T. T. W. make up some 
lost ground and at the same time anticipate some of the progress more 
normal to 9 -10. We have already seen that in the second year of the 
Moray House test the largest interval in "relational thinking" appeared 
at 8 -9. Something of this tendency would seem to be present in the 
T. L. 0. and T. T. W. graphs, and serves to level up the 8 -9 interval. 
It is due to this larger 8 -9 interval, rather than to a lack of progress 
by year 10, that these two graphs do not show a relative increase at 9 -10 
as the majority of the other graphs do. In fact, the "significant" ten - 
year tests show percentages equal to, or greater than, those of Burt at 
this age. 
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Postponement of the 7 -8 development seems to be present also in the 
French data, where all the 8 -9 intervals are large, giving the very 
pronounced peak at 8 -9 in both these graphs. The usual progress is not 
maintained at 10, however, in fully half of the tests at that age. 
After imagery- control has been established at 7, further development 
tends to follow that of relational thinking in Bobertag and Rowe, and this 
tendency in these later years can also be seen in Binet and Lévistre and 
Morlé. In Burt a modified form of it is seen in the change in direction 
taken by the graph after 8 -9. In Terrnan's three series, and in Dougherty, 
there is an increase at 8 -9, and this would seem to be also in accordance 
with the development of relational thinking in respect of the larger 
interval found at that age. But whereas in relational thinking this 
served merely to smooth out the graph in T. L. O. and T. T. W., here it 
appears quite clearly. The relational thinking graph in T. & C. and in 
Dougherty is not snoothed out at this interval, but the 8 -9 interval is 
not so low with them as in Burt, Bobertag, Rowe and Goddard. 
This tendency for non -relational thinking to develop now similarly 
to relational thinking, although in the earlier years the two types 
appeared to develop on different lines, suggests that ego -development is 
connected in some way with relational thinking. For, once the ego is 
able to adopt an objective relation to imagery and to control it, all 
further development on these lines - as in repeating 7 digits, 26 syllables, 
and the like, - is a matter of the increasing strength or awakeness of the 
ego. On the other hand, since relational thinking and imagery- control 
appear to be unconnected in their first development, one of them, at least, 
during this first period is not connected with 
ego -development. Imagery 
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control may arise through a dissociation of imagery from the motor system, 
and not through any activity on the part of the ego. 
Increased progress in relational thinking at 10, where it occurs, is 
in contrast not only to the 8 -9 interval but also to those which follow - 
(with the exception of Goddard). In "An analytical and comparative study 
of the Binet-Simon test responses of 1306 Philadelphia school children" 
(25), the author (Arthur Philips) remarks upon this ten -year level. He 
has examined children of the 3rd, 5th, and 6th "grade" only, the average 
ages of whom are 8, 10, and 11 respeOtively, and the percentages of passes 
for the individual tests are given. But, unfortunately, the 9- year -olds 
not having been tested, we cannot make use of the data for a serial graph, 
The author, however, notes a very substantial increase in the number of 
passes between 8 and 10, compared with those between 10 and 11, even 
allowing for the difference in the interval and for the fact that the 
average I. Q. of the 11- year -olds is rather lower than that of the 10 -year 
children. He remarks as follows: (p. 34) 
"The impressive fact that emerges in comparing the percentage of 
gain in the passes of the 5th grade over the 3rd grade, and of the 
6th grade over the 5th is the enormous gain in ability to pass the 
tests in the two year interval between the 3rd and 5th grades, and 
the meagre gain in the one year interval between the 5th and 6th 
grades." 
(p. 35) "It is doubtful, however, whether the large gain in the two 
year interval over the one year interval is to be attributed entirely 
to the fact that the 6th grade is inferior to the 5the There is 
room for the opinion that sometime between 8 and 10 years or between 
the 3rd and 5th grades the child makes such rapid growth intellect- 
ually that the ten year level might be called the intellectual level." 
The following are Philips' figures for those "relational" tests 
which are less than 75% at year 8, showing the progress through 10 and 11, 













































As will be seen, the average interval for the years 8 -10 is more than 
four times that of 10 -11. As we do not know the nature of the 8 -9 interval 
here, we cannot say how much is attributable to year 10: but the relatively 
low rate of progress during the year 10 -11 is clear in the case of each test. 
The third aspect of mental development, that of non -relational 
thinking connected with the immediate environment, needs little comment. 
The data for Burt (normal), Rowe, T. L. O., T. T. W., T. & C., B(dbertag, 
Goddard, Dougherty, and Lévistre and Morlé, are shown in tables 28 - 36 and 
graphically in figure 13. In this figure the graphs are shown in conjunc- 
tion with those of simple thinking not connected with the environment. 
The last four series are incomplete. Binet has no intervals in this series. 
The figures and graph for Burt's M. D. children have already been given in 
table 8 and figure 1, but the graph is shown again here. Tables 37 and 
38 give the relevant figures for the Moray House (Binet) and Cuneo and 
Terman data. 
It will be seen that there is a general tendency for these new graphs 
to follow those of thinking unconnected with the environment, especially in 
the earlier years. This is borne out by the Moray House and Cuneo and 
Terman results. This tendency is understandable when we consider that 
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thinking connected with the immediate environment depends at first for its 
accuracy upon the ability to apprehend the environment as it is, and the 
keeping aside of all possible intruding ideas or images in the light of 
which the environment might be erroneously apprehended. In other words, 
it involves primarily the ability on the part of the child to free himself 
from his ideas and images, and which is the prelude to a control and 
objectification of them. It is for this reason that the child does not 
correctly observe the facts before him in the "missing feature" test until 
he has reached an age at which he eases to read into the environment what 
he expects to find there. 
The quantitative analysis of Binet test data appears therefore to 
agree very closely with the qualitative changes to be observed in the 
scale itself in its most recent forms. Where there is a qualitative 
change, a quantitative increase in the rate of development appears. The 
rate of development of imagery- control is found most consistently to 
reach its highest point about the age of 7, where this quality of test 
first clearly makes its appearance in the scales. Relational thinking 
which, according to the most recent scale, is present at 7, is seen, 
however, to develop qualtitatively most rapidly between 7 and 8 in the 
majority of cases, and in this respect the original Terman revision agrees 
exactly, showing at the same time the succeeding hiatus between 8 and 9 
(table 1). The qualitative change at 10, involving relational thinking 
on a higher level, is also seen in a quantitative increase where this is 
not blurred by a late development of the previous change. After age 10 
there is a gradual increase in the abstractness of the ideas which can be 
objectified and no sudden qualitative change. This can also be seen in 
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the graphs, all of which, except Goddard, remain below the average line 
during these two following years. 
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NON - RELATIONAL THINKING. 
Age: 
(connected with environment) 
5 6 7 8 9 
2 sleights 68.3 .58 85.8 -- 92.2 96.1+ 99.1 
Fingers 62.5 .77 86.6 -- 95.3 98.6 99.3 
13 Pennies 51.6 1.03 85.8 -- 96.6 -- 99.0 -- 100. 
Diamond 49.8 1.04 83.8 -- 95.6 97.6 -- 98.3 
4. Coins 4.8.8 .98 82.8 -- 94..0 -- 97.2 -- 97.6 
Divided Card 47.2 .94 80.8 -- 86.2 -- 92.2 -- 96.0 
Picture Descript. 49.8 .68 73 . 5 .1+0 84.7 -- 93.6 -- 96.8 
Right & Left 52.0 .65 75.7 -- 83.8 -- 90.1 -- 97.1 
Pence ¿ Halfpence 18.9 .65 4.1. 8 1.09 80.5 -- 90.1 96.8 
Missing Features 34-.0 .80 65.3 .72 87.3 -- 95.6 -- 98.6 
9 Coins 1.3 -- 9.9 .76 33.3 .61 57.2 .53 76.0 
Suggestion 1.3 -- 5.3 -- 6.9 -- 23.6 .23 31.4. 
Average Interval: .81 .71+ .61 .4-3 
PROGRESS RATIO: +.12 +.12 -.09 -.35 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
9 Coins 76.0 -- 85.8 -- 95.1+ -- 97.7 
Suggestion 31.4. .24 40.1 .08 4-3.1 .33 56.2 
Average Interval: .24 .08 .33 
Progress Ratio: -.64 -.88 -.50 
TABLE 29. 
R O W E 
(Michigan Children.) 
NON - RELATIONAL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age 5 6 7 8 9 
Right & Left 56 1.00 88 91 
Picture Descr. 65 .75 88 -- 97 98 -- 98 
Missing Features 55 .48 73 .64 95 -- 93 -- 98 
Diamond 67 .60 85 -- 88 -- 91 -- 100 
4 Colours 38 .92 73 .57 91 -- 96 -- 98 
Stamps 18 .79 45 .74 73 .61 93 -- 82 
9 Coins -- -- 40 .50 60 .36 73 
Average Interval: .756 .65 .555 .36 
PROGRESS RATIO: +.15 -.02 -.16 -.45 
Age: 9 10 11 
9 Coins 73 .57 91 
Average Interval: .57 
Progress Ratio: -.114. 
TABLE 30. 
TERMAN, LYMAN, ORDHAL 
(Californian Children) 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
2 Weights 70 .74 94 -- 96 
4 Colours 74 .43 86 -- 97 
Aesthetic Compar. 73 .62 94. -- 96 
Divided Card 70 .70 92 -- 95 
Right & Left 50 .55 71 .52 86 -- 95 
Missing Features 50 .39 65 .72 87 -- 96 
13 Pennies 4.6 .81 76 -- 93 -- 96 
4. Coins 4.7 .72 74 .53 91 -- 95 
Fingers 24. .74. 51 .55 72 .49 86 -- 95 
Picture Descript. 27 .76 56 .18 63 .81 88 -- 97 
Diamond 4. .77 30 .88 64 .59 83 -- 94 
6 Coins -- 27 .36 40 .61 64 .78 88 
Stamps -- -- 13 .83 39 .78 69 
Average Interval: .657 .53 .666 .78 
Progress Ratio: +.22 -.1 +.04. +.22 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
6 Coins 88 -- 95 
Stamps 69 .68 90 -- 96 -- 97 
Average Interval: .68 
Progress Ratio: +.06 
TABLE 31. 
T E R M A N, T R O S T & W A D D L E. 
(Californian Children) 
NON - RELATIONAL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
Missing Features 33 1.08 74. .43 86 -- 97 
13 Pennies 25 1.11 67 .80 92 -- 91+ 
4. Coins 25 1.55 81 -- 95 -- 98 
Fingers 25 .85 57 .66 80 -- 88 -- 98 
Picture Descript. 23 1.15 66 .33 77 95 -- 100 
Diamond 10 1.17 48 .57 70 .1+0 82 -- 91 
Stamps -- -- 26 .61+ 50 .23 59 
Average Interval: 1.15 .558 .52 .23 
Progress Ratio: +.48 -.28 -.33 -.71 
Age: 9 10 11 12 
Stamps 59 .76 84 -- 91 -- 100 
Average Interval: .76 
Progress Ratio: -.03 
II 
TABLE 32. 
TERMAN & CHILDS. 
(Californian Children) 
INN- RELATIONAL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 
4 Colours 





















































































































NOTE: The percentages used are taken from "The Stanford Revision 
of the Binet -Simon Scale ". 
TABLE 33. 
B O B E R T A G. 
(Breslau Children.) 
NON - RELATIONAL THINKING. 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 
Divided Card 

















































G O D D A R D 
(New Jersey Children) 
Age: 5 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING 
8 9 
(connected with environment) 
6 7 
Copying Square 67.6 .68 88.0 -- 100 
Divided Card 62.5 .31 73.7 
Right & Left 68.2 .42 81.4. -- 88.2 
Aesthetic Compar. 56.0 .61 77.5 -- 94.1 
Missing Features 63.1 .87 90.6 -- 91.9 
Fingers 37.5 1.76 95.0 -- 100 
Diamond 43.6 1.47 92.2 -- 92.3 
Picture Descript. 4.8.6 .76 76.8 -- 93.2 
13 Pennies 72.7 .64 94.9 -- 97.1 
4 Coins 33.3 1.43 84.1 -- 92.8 
Stamps -- 4.8.4. 1.07 84.9 100 
Average Interval: .505 1.155 1.07 
Progress Ratio: -.44 +.28 +.19 
NOTE: There is one interval at 9 -10: 9 Coins: 68.8 .80 95.5% 
TABLE 35. 
D OUGHER TY. 
(Kansas Children) 
NON-RELATIONAL THIlNKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 5 6 7 8 9 
Copying Diamond 71.6 .66 93.5 
Counting Stamps 40.3 .95 75.8 -- 94.8 
9 Coins 16.4 .47 30.6 1.16 74..1 
Average Interval: 69 1,16 
Progress Ratio: -.09 +.53 








LÉV I S THE & MORLÉ 
(Parisian Children) 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
Age: 7 8 9 10 
Missing Features 30 1.36 80 
Picture Cescript. 70 .86 100 
4 Colours 40 1.48 90 
Pence & Halfpence 40 1.48 90 
9 Coins -- 20 2.80 100 
Suggestion 20 .31 30 
Average Interval: 1.295 2.80 .31 
Progress Ratio: -.06 +1.03 -.78 
TABLE 37. 
CUNEO & TERMAN 
Age: 
(Californian Children) 
NON -RELATIONAL THINKING 
7 
(connected with environment) 
5 6 
2 Weights 52 .56 73 .71 100 
4 Colours 65 .22 73 .65 96 
Aesthetic Compar. 71 .19 77 -- 96 
Divided Card 60 .36 73 .49 87 
Right & Left 46 .71 73 .49 87 
Missing Features 35 .67 61 .83 87 
4 Coins 38 .62 62 .80 87 
Fingers 8 .73 31 1.02 70 
Picture Descript. 29 .91 64 59 83 
Diamond 8 .70 30 1.29 78 
6 Coins 2 -- 2 .63 26 
13 Pennies 44 .38 59 1.33 100 
average Interval: .55 .80 
TABLE 38. 
Age: 
MORAY HOUSE CHILDREN 
5 
NON - RELATIONAL THINKING 
(connected with environment) 
6 7 
Fingers 39.1 .83 70.9 .76 97.7 
Diamond 17.2 .95 50.0 1.11 95.5 
4 Coins 72.5 .37 83.4 
Missing Features 72.1 .59 91.7 
Picture Descript. 53.8 .33 66.6 .72 88.6 
13 Pennies 62.2 (1.05) 95.9 
Divided Card 51.4 028 62.5 1.18 100 
Right & Left 59.0 .44 75.0 
if Colours 72.1 .38 83.3 




SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS. 
We can now see that our conclusions are substantially in agreement 
with those of Piaget (1 and 2); for, whenever thought remains ttnobject- 
ified, the phenomena of ego -centrism and pre -causality will tend to arise. 
Ego -centrism, in fact, may be defined as the result of the lack of 
dissociation of the ego from its thoughts. Thus, until the age at which 
ideas can be fully objectified, namely at 7, and relational thinking 
reaches a certain degree of development, namely at 8, thought will tend 
to be ego -centric and pre -causal. Up to that time the child has, it is 
true, thoughts or ideas, but he tends to "live in" them; he is more or 
less subjectively tied to them. On this account it will be difficult 
for him to see things from any point of view but his own; for only when 
one can picture a situation and its relationships objectively, can one 
place oneself in the position of another person. 
Further, ego -centrism will tend to appear on any level of thought 
the corresponding ideas of which are not yet objectified; and therefore 
after the changes at 7 and 8, ego -centrism will, on our analysis, be 
transferred to the abstract realm and to that of relations between complex 
ideas, since abstract ideas are not objectified until 11 or 12, and the 
latter not until 10. This is what Piaget found. In his chapter on 
Verbal Understanding (1) he describes the application of a test of proverb 
interpretation to children of age 9 to 11. In this test a number of 
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proverbs together with sentences expressing the same ideas (but arranged 
in no particular order) are presented to the child whose task is to select 
the sentence appropriate to each proverb; and it was found that children 
of these ages fail to respond correctly owing to "syncretism" of reasoning 
- even when each separate sentence is at least literally understood. 
This test involves, primarily, the cognition of two complex ideas in rela- 
tion, an ability not normally present until 10, and the abstraction and 
objectification of an ethical rule, which does not appear until 12 (Table 
2). Hence it is understandable that these children were obliged to fall 
back upon syncretic thought - i.e. non -analytical, because non -objectified, 
thought. 
But this repetition of ego -centrism on the level of pure thought 
when it exists no longer on the plane of concrete reality, need not be 
explained, as Piaget appears to think, as the outcome of the child having 
a new task to tackle - of his having to serve a new apprenticeship on 
this higher level, relearning on this plane what he had previously learned 
on the other. It appears, on the contrary, to be simply a question of 
what the child can, or can not, objectify at any given stage. It is a 
question of how far the ego is able to detach itself from its mental 
surroundings. If the child can cognise an object, as such, at 6, and can 
use the category of Whole and Part in connection with that object, and yet 
cannot use this same category in the sphere of ideas, it is not because he 
has not yet learned or practised this function, but it is due to the fact 
that at this age he is not yet able properly to objectify ideas. After 
all, one must first be able to perceive an object before one can begin to 
think about it; and if a child of six is not yet able to bring ideas into 
i 
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mental focus, we can hardly expect his thinking about ideas to be clear or 
logical. Similarly, a child of 8 or 9 who can objectify concrete ideas 
and apprehend them in terms of relations, will be lost when asked to 
apprehend a relation between two abstract ideas. It is not that he needs 
to relearn how to see the abstract ideas in relational terms. He does not 
yet see the abstract ideas. 
Piaget, however, appears to regard ego -centrism as something funda- 
mental - as a pre- socialised state of mind which alters with the need for 
socialisation. Apart from the fact that this would hardly explain how 
this change comes about at a definite chronological age, inst4ad of varying 
with each child's individual environment, we are in danger of viewing the 
data too much in the light of a theory. If we refrain from theorising 
and content ourselves simply with characterising the events, we observe 
that certain changes take place at certain ages, and that these consist, 
after age 7, of the progressive objectification by the ego of the various 
grades of ideas and their relationship. Given these changes, it is then 
easy to understand how progressive socialisation becomes possible; and we 
can see that ego -centrism can be the result simply of the ego's relation- 
ship to mental occurrences - to its living in the ideas and its consequent 
inability to treat them as objects. 
Piaget,of course, would not deny this. Speaking of autistic thought 
(2) (p.11) he says: " . . . it is because it is not detached from the ego 
that this sort of thinking does not know itself ". The present writer's 
contention is, however, that it is better not to assume that the change is 
brought about by environmental demands, but, since it is a change apparently 
closely associated with chronological age, to regard it simply as a stage 
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in growth, like that of adolescence and the mental changes which accompany 
that. 
In the same way it is not necessary to explain imitation in a child 
as being due to a confusion between himself and others. In this connec- 
tion Piaget remarks (2) (p. 179): 
" . . . in virtue of his very ego -centrism the child is not 
conscious of his own thought, he has not the feeling of his own 
ego; consequently, he is always imitating things and people, owing 
to that sort of confusion between self and others which Janet made 
the characteristic feature of imitation." 
It is true that awakeness to one's own ego and awareness of one's 
thoughts develop mutually; but it does not follow that a child imitates 
because his ego -feeling is weak. A child imitates because he does not yet 
think. To think, thoughts must be under the control of the ego. At the 
imitative stage they are not yet under this control, and therefore they 
act directly upon the motor system. As the ego gains control over ideas 
and imagery, it inhibits this tendency and retains the thoughts for its own 
purposes. The thoughts then tend less to pass out into action and more to 
retain a mental life of their own; and thus phantasy arises. But a child 
can "lose" himself just as much in his own phantasy as he can in imitation. 
It is not a question of self -feeling in either case, but of the different 
relationships between the ego and its ideas. 
Apart from such questions of theory, however, the fact remains that 
we find Piaget's conclusions to be implicit qualitatively in the Terman- 
Binet scales, and quantitatively in Binet test -data drawn from the most 
widely differing environments. 
m The term Imitation is of course used here in the restricted sense alrea- 
dy outlined in Part 1, and does not include purposive imitative 
activities which, being mddiated by thought of a conscious kind, are 
under the control of the ego. 
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But we have still to deal with the remainder of Mars. Isaacs' records 
of "Discovery, Reasoning and Thought" (chapter 4) namely, sections 1, 3 
and 4, entitled: Applications of Knowledge ", "Social Interchange of Know- 
ledge", and "Miscellaneous ", as well as the chapter on "Biological Inter- 
ests", viewed from the aspect of thought processes. 
In these, Mrs. Isaacs claims, we have evidence which contradicts 
Piaget's findings to the effect that thinking in children below 7 is pre- 
causal and ego -centric. She holds that while ego -centric thought does 
appear in these earlier years, it is accompanied by objective rational 
thinking, and that there is no abrupt change from one stage to another. 
The mental ratios of her children, havever, range from 114. to 166, 
with a mean ratio of 131, and Piaget, in his reply to this contention (26) 
points out that the average mental age of her children is nevertheless 7. 
The question remains, then: do these changes which we have examined both 
in the Binet scales and in the various percentage -series, represent chron- 
ological age only when we have to do with the average, or "at age ", child, 
and do children above the average in mentality develop in a different way, 
the changes coming earlier and more gradually? 
We shall gain better insight into this question if we analyse the 
records which Mrs. Isaacs gives in the remaining sections. of this chapter. 
If we extract every instance where the correct (non- egocentric) use of the 
word "because" has been used spontaneously by a child under the age of 7 
(and not dragged out of him by adult questionings), all remarks involving 
explanations dealing with physical causality, and all deductions and 
inferences, by children under that age, we should be able to judge the 
validity of Mrs. Isaacs' claim. 
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The relevant extracts are as follows: (Commencing on page 111 and 
proceeding through the sections already named) 







IIU' i RENEE 
A.1. 8.7.25 Dan 4.;1 A.2. 16.10.21 Christopher 4;1 
13.5.26 Dexter 1;10 22. 6.25 Dan 4;1 
a 18.3.27 Phineas 4;0 9. 3.26 Priscilla 6;6 0 
A.2. 19.10.25 Dan 4;5 26. 4-.26 Christopher 5;8 
E 19.10.25 Frank 5;11 18. 5.26 Christopher 5;9 
22.6.26 Dan 5;1 24.10.26 Dan 5;5 
3.2.27 Dan 5;8 16.11.26 Jessica 4;1 
B. 3.12.25 Priscilla 6;4- 
PHYSICAL 
CAUSALITY 
B. 4. 3.27 Dan 5;9 
Sub- 
"SOCIALL INTERCHANGE OF KNOWLEDGE" 
DEDUCTION 
Section "BECAUSE" Sub - AND 
Section INFERENCE 
A. 13. 2.25 Christopher 4;5 A. 31.10.24. Dan 3;5 
20. 2.25 Tommy 3;0 23. 4..25 Frank 5; 6 
24-. 3.25 Harold 5;2 1. 5.27 James 5;1 
8. 3.26 Tommy 4;1 13. 5.27 Lena 14;5 
E 11. 5.26 Dan 4;11 -. 7.27 Dan 6;1 
B. 2. 2.26 Frank 6;3 1.10.27 Denis 3;10 




3. 2.25 Christopher 4;5 
-. 6.27 Dan 6;1 
fd On 3.2.27 Priscilla is agâin quoted as being 6;6. 
a misprint for 7;6. 
E Also classifiable under Physical Causality. 




"R1 CAUSE" PHYSICAL 
CAUSALITY 




In addition to the above, there are a few instances in Section 2 
( "Increase of Knowledge: Problems and Experiment ") which are not included 
in these other sections. These are: 
Page "Bi!CAUSE" Page DEDUCTION & 
INFERENCE 
139 17.2.27 Phineas 4;0 129 1.2.26 Dan 4;8 
141 25.2.27 Phineas 4;0 134 1.11.26 Dan 5;5 
134 15.71.26 Dan 5; 6 
135 2.12.26 Phineas 3;9 
140 22.2.27 Phineas 4;0 
The following have not been included, because they appear to have 
been dragged out of the child by adult questions and therefore do not 
represent spontaneous expression: 
P. 139. "17.2.27. Pláineas: 4;0. . . . Later on, when he had matches 
in the tube, he lit the burner at the bottom only, and this 
made the matches smoulder. After doing this several times, he 
asked, "Why does it smoke ?" Miss C. said "Why?" He replied, 
"Because there are matches." At a later point when he had 
taken the matches out, and thought he had quite emptied the 
tube, he had left one inside unintentionally. The tube 
smoked, and he asked, "Why is it smoking?" Miss C. returned 
the question, and he replied, "There must be a match inside. "" 
"24.2.27 Phineas (4;0) held the flame of the Bunsen in 
some water, and then put it right in. When the flame went out 
he asked, "Why did it go out ?" Piss C. "Why ?" Phineas - 
"Because of the water. "" 
"25.2.27. Phineas (4;0) held some wet raffia in the fire, 
and asked: "Why won't it burn ?" Ivïiss C. - "Why won't it ?" 
Phineas - "Because it's wet." He held it against the flame 
for some time, and when it began to burn he said, "It's burning 
now." Miss C. - "Why is it burning now?" Phineas - "Because 
it's dry." "What made it dry ?" "The flame," he replied. 
Similar incidents occurred on 22.2.27 and 21.3.27 with the same 
child. On the other hand, Phineas was questioned in this way on 18.3.27 
(Sect. A.1.): 
"Phineas (4;0) was blowing through a rubber tube in water, and 
watching the bubbles rise and break. hiss C. asked, "What's 
making the bubbles ?" He said "The wind in here" (pointing to 
the tube). "Where does the wind come from ?" "From my mouth, 
because I'm blowing." 
This "because"has been included in our list, since it appears to be 
a gratuitous response by the child although ultimately the outcome of 
questioning. The phrase "from my mouth" would have been an adequate reply 
to the question. 
In Chapter 5 (Biological Interests) there are fewer instances, most 
of the records here relating, naturally, to practical activities. Those 
to be found, however, are: 
DEDUCTION & 
Page "RECAUSE" Page INFERENCE 
174 8. 3.27 Lena 4;3 172 19. 3.25 Frank 5;1+ 
200 8. 5.27 James 5 ;1 188 8. 7.26 Dan 5;1 
188 9. 7.26 Priscilla 6;10 
193 15.11.26 Dan 5;5 
The above classifications are not intended to be rigid. Some six 
of the "Becauses ", in fact, might also be classified under physical 
causality, while some of the inferences also have implied causality. We 
shall therefore consider the instances as a whole. 
There appear to be 27 children mentioned in Mrs. Isaacs' records; 
and their names, arranged according to the school session in which they 
first appear, are given below. Opposite each name is shown the number 
of times the child appears in the above tables as having spontaneously 
expressed one of these three types of thought, and the number of sessions 
or part -sessions during which he or she appears to have been in the 
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school while still under the age of 7. It is of course to be understood 
that the period during which each child is here stated to have been at the 
school is assumed only from the appearance or non -appearance of the name 
in the records, and may not in every case be correct. 
1921+ -5 1925 -6 1926 -7 
Dan 18 
Christopher 5 
Frank 5 2 
Priscilla 3 2 
Tommy 2 (3 
Iá rold 1 (1 Paul 1 (1 
Theobald 0 1 
Duncan 0 1 
Benjie 0 1 
Martin 0 (1 
Robert 0 (1 
George 0 (1 
Cecil 0 (1 
(3 sessions Phineas 5 (2 sessions) James 3 
3 Lena 2 2 
) Dexter 1 ( 1 
) Jessica 1 ( 2 
) Penelope 0 ( 2 
) Herbert 0 ( 2 
) Alfred 0 ( 2 


















) Denis 1 
) Joseph 0 






The first thing which strikes one in regard to the above table is the 
fact that out of the 27 children, 14 - or more than 50% - are not recorded 
as having given any expression to such modes of thinking at all. Secondly, 
one notes that out of the 4.8 recorded instances, no less than 33 of these 
were occasioned by four children - Dan, Christ,Dtier,, Frank, and Phineas - 
and that of these, Dan is responsible for 18. 
Of course allowance must be made for the fact that some of these 
children were present in the school for a longer period than others, and 
so had more opportunity of displaying their mental powers. But even if 
we allow for this, Dan is relatively outstanding with an average of 6 per 
session, followed by Frank and Phineas each with 2.5 per session. James, 
who had only one session, has 3 to his credit; Christopher and Priscilla 
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have an average "score" of 1.6 and 1.5 respectively, seven more have an 
average of 1 or less, and the remaining ]4 have nothing. 
It cannot of course be supposed that these records contain everything 
of interest Which these children said during these three years; but 
what concerns us here is not so much the actual number of such expressions, 
but the fact that, having thus "creamed" the records of the best that is 
in them in this connection, this is seen to consist of a mere fraction of 
the total number of children, ¿. out of the 27 being responsible for more 
than two- thirds of this material. Even if we include those instances 
where the expressions appear to have been extracted from the child by 
means of adult questioning, this only emphasises the result, since all of 
these were concerned with Phineas - one of the four children mentioned. 
In making these extracts, the records have been given a most liberal 
interpretation, the term "inference ", for example, having been given a 
wide connotation, including such cases as that quoted of James (p. 150) 
where, in referring to the size of the school, he says, "Then it must be 
big if it's bigger than an aeroplane - an aeroplane is such a big thing." 
and the case of Conrad (p. 113, 11.12.26) where it is very doubtful if 
the child really understood the terms he was using. 
Apart, however, from an inquiry into the cases of these particular 
forms of thought, a glance through the records in general will show how 
very frequently a certain few names recur. For example, in the records 
of "Discovery, Reasoning and Thought" for session 1925 -26, Dan is quoted 
some 27 times, Christopher 20, Frank 9, Priscilla 9, Tommy 8, Phineas 3, 
Alfred 3, Dexter 2, Jessica 1, Herbert 1, and the remaining four children 
-167- 
not at all. Thus over 50% of the total records under this heading for 
this session is the output of two children - two of the four already 
mentioned. Phineas appears to have arrived only after the first term 
and is not yet greatly in evidence - perhaps because of his age (2;11). 
But in the following session he occupies a very prominent place in the 
records, and he has no less than six consecutive pages almost entirely 
devoted to him in Section 2. 
It is impossible to overlook these facts and to avoid the conclusion 
that these records as a whole, and in particular those instances which 
show evidence of these forms of reasoning, are mainly the outcome of a 
very small proportion of the children who attended the school. But the 
total group, as Mrs. Isaacs herself admits, was a highly selected one, 
with a mean mental ratio of 131; therefore it can hardly be maintained 
that these records show such thinking to be generally present during the 
earlier years - even in the case of highly intelligent children - and 
that therefore Piaget's thesis is disproved. There can be little doubt 
that Dan's thinking and behaviour do not conform to Piaget's conception 
of the child of that age, but he stands more than head and shoulders 
above the rest of the children, if we can judge by these records; and 
even if we add the three or four others who come next to him in prominence, 
we are still left with more than four -fifths of the children of whom 
little or nothing is said. 
In the field of physics one exception will disprove a theory; but 
it is not the case in the field of biology, where a few departures from 
the rule do not disprove a general law. If Mrs. Isaacs could have shown 
four -fifths of her children to have the mentality of Dan, her conclusions 
1 
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against Piaget might have been justified. But the fact that her records 
have so little to say about the majority of the children, is full of 
significance; and it would be difficult to conceive of a greater tribute 
to Piaget's conclusions than this, that after three years of work with 
a highly selected group of children in the most stimulating of environments, 
her results should be so meagre. 
But in this thesis we have adopted a rather different criterion of 
mental structure, one which, the writer maintains, is more fundamental. 
than the criterion of ego -centrism used by Piaget, namely,the relation 
of the To to its ideas, and which, in certain circumstances, will tend 
to produce ego -centrism. This does not mean that, given that mental 
structure in which ideas are still in a non -objectified relation to the 
ego, ego- centrism or syncretistic thought will always arise. In such a 
relationship the ego lives in the ideas, and because it cannot view them 
objectively, there will always be a tendency towards syncretism; but 
there is no reason why, on occasions, the right thoughts or conclusions 
should not be expressed by the child. The point is - not whether young 
children can produce statements which in themselves are rational - but 
whether these statements are, or are not, the outcome of controlled 
thinking. For the purposes of education the all- important distinction 
must be made between what a child can objectify and so control, and what 
comes from him as the spontaneous reaction to a given situation. In the 
latter case the reasoning need not be a conscious process; and an educat- 
ional system which confuses these two phenomena, imagining the former to 
be present whenever it sees the latter, can only do injury to the child. 
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Therefore when we ask ourselves: "san this or that child reason ?" we must 
ask the further question: "Do his conclusions spring spontaneously out 
of the demands of the concrete situation in which he finds himself, or can 
he reason at will ?" In other words, does the ego of the child control 
the reasoning process, or does the situation? In the former case we can 
make demands upon the child - we can ask him to think. In the latter 
case such demands can only be harmful. 
In this connection we can see the folly of the procedure of "returning" 
a child's questions upon him and forcing him to discover for himself the 
answer which he expects of the adult. The fact that the child asks the 
question signifies that his own thinking pôwers are not yet ripe for the 
task of answering it himself, (except in cases of mere laziness); and we 
can succeed only in forcing into consciousness processes Which still belong 
to a sub- conscious level. Equally pointless is the same procedure as a 
means of psychological investigation. If we worry a child with such 
questions we merely discover what is not normally there. We knomalready 
from the child's acts that categories such as causality are at work or in 
use subconsciously from the earliest years. But what is important for us 
to know is at what age these concepts come naturally into conscious use 
and later to objectification. The responses we obtain through badgering 
the child with his awn questions tell us no more than that, if we dig 
deep enough, we can always drag something into the daylight; while such 
behaviour on the part of an educator who is anxious to "develop" the 
thinking processes by this means, is parallel to that of the impatient 
child who cannot wait until the plant appears above the surface of the 
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earth, but must always be digging up the bulb to see how it is getting on. 
The natural irritation which can be produced in the young child by 
such practices is aptly illustrated in the following example. In 
Appendix C to "Intellectual Growth in Young Children" we are given some 
further records of children "whose parents have been in touch with the 
methods of the school, and follow out those parts of the technique which 
are practicable in an ordinary home "; and in the section devoted to the 
"later history of James and Denis ", we find the following (p. 356): 
"The boys (7;2) and (5;5) were with their father one evening 
in Golders Green Road. In the middle of the road there is a refuge 
with two red lights. Denis said to his father: "What are those 
lights for?" He replied, following his usual method, "What are 
they for ?" James gets very annoyed with this way of dealing with 
questions; he said, "When people ask you a question what do they 
ask you a question for ?" His father said: "Well, what do they ask 
you for ?" James - "Because they don't know, and they want you to 
tell them .'" 
James, having suffered from this form of mental persecution for 
some time, is angry even when the victim is not himself, and he takes 
up the cudgels on behalf of his younger brother. 
Of those parents who practised this technique with their children, 
Mrs.Isaacs adds (p. 355): "In particular, they meet the children's 
questions and expressions of opinion with frank respect and interest .." 
This deference toward the child mentality does not operate 
apparently, on such occasions as this. To throw a question back at the 
questioner in this way, is the reverse of treating either it or the 
questioner with respect; and it is mere insincerity to maintain that our 
attitude to the child is one of respect towards all his forms of mental 
expression, while we ignore one of the most obvious of them - the 
natural expectation on. the part of the child that the adult will answer 
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his questions. But James's perfectly formulated rebuke is passed over 
in silence. In the long run, it is the previously formulated technique 
of the school to which attention is paid, and not the requirements of 
the child, whenever the two run counter to one another. The general 
educational theory is, respect for the freedom of the child and his modes 
of expression, and a meeting of his requirements with appropriate material 
and opportunity. But, as we have already seen, there enters into the 
practical technique an attempt to develop the adult type of mentality in 
the child - whether he wishes it or not - an attitude which is in 
direct conflict with the general theory. 
Further, on the psychological side, there is the theory that the 
child, by being brought into contact with a varied environment, will 
give expression to modes of thinking which are not otherwise manifested; 
and Mrs. Isaacs complains of Piaget that his children were subjected to 
conversations instead of being brought into contact with the environment 
itself, as was done with her children. But it is just in so doing that 
she has failed to give us the very evidence which is of psychological 
importance. For it is only in the manner in which children are found 
to discuss an environment which is not present to them, that we are able 
to judge whether or not they are masters of their own thoughts, and 
therefore how far their thought- processes are ripe for direct training. 
It is important that we should be awake to the real - if not always 
clearly conscious - aims of some modern educationists; and the tendency 
to make the child into a little adult is one of them. It appears to 
arise from the lack of a clear conception of what is meant by "thinking ", 
-172- 
no allowance being made for the different relationships which the ego may 
have to its thoughts. The danger of basing an educational system upon so 
superficial a psychology is obvious. 
We must now take into account the possibility that, while the changes 
in mental structure may follow more or less according to chronological age, 
the relative "brightness" of the ego itself may nevertheless vary with 
different children, and that a very bright child in this sense may be no 
further advanced in mental structure than a normal child of the same age. 
By "brightness" ds meant the ability on the part of the ego to handle what- 
ever mental events it may have under its control at the time. For example, 
a normal child of 7 can control mental imagery and can repeat three digits 
backwards. A child, however, may be able to repeat four or even 
five digits in this way. It is a matter of the greater or less strength or 
agility of the ego in handling the material at its disposal. On the other 
0 
hand, if the child has not reached the age at which his images become so 
far detached from the ego as to be objectifiable, ego - brightness can do 
little to alter that fact. A concrete example will illustrate this. 
During the test conducted by the writer at Moray House school, among 
the 5- year -old children in the first year was a boy with an I.Q. of 160. 
In the test of repeating letters and digits backwards, he showed a ready 
understanding for what was required and made very strenuous efforts to 
perform the test, but he failed completely. After much coaching he was 
able to repeat only the one word "dog" correctly, and no numbers. He was 
unable to control the image, and fell back always into the forward order. 
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He was then 5;44, with a "mental" age of 8;7. The following year (age 
6;4,-, iii. A. 10;2:A he again failed in this test, succeeding in only one 
word (cry) and in two numbers. He still muddled the letters and the digits, 
and obviously realised that he was doing so. He was given the test a 
third time, at the age 
s 
of g 7; - µ N A. 11;10, and on this occasion he was 
able to repeat all six words and numbers correctly and with obvious ease. 
Here, then, was a child whose mental structure developed at the same 
time as that of the normal child, and yet whose "brightness" was 606 above 
that of the normal child. 
The reverse of this is seen in the case of a boy aged 8;1+ with an I.Q. 
of 79, which gave him a mental age of 6;7. According to his mental age 
he should have been barely able to pass the test, whereas in actual fact he 
did so with ease, being correct in all six words and digits. Thus in 
spite of his mental age he did without any apparent effort what the 
cleverer child at 6;4 (whose mental age at that time was supposed to be two 
years greater than this boy's chronological age) could not do. It is clear 
that structurally this boy's mentality was quite normal for his age, and 
that his backwardness must have been due to some deficiency in ego- develnunent. 
(He also passed the "relational thinking" t4st.) 
From these two cases one can see that so- called mental age is appar- 
ently no indication of mental structure - at least in regard to the change 
at 7; and yet, from the educational point of view, this change is one of 
the greatest important e. What, one might ask, would be the effect on the 
first - mentioned child had he been placed in a class more in accordance with 
his mental age and where demands would have been made upon powers of 
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imagery-control which he did not yet possess? While it is plain that to 
have placed the other boy in a class of 6- year -olds (where theoretically he 
belonged) would have been to have starved him in the exercise of his 
mental functions. 
We may thus assume that mental structure and ego brightness are two 
different things, and that, as in the two cases cited, one child may have 
more than a normal ego - brightness with a normal mental structure, and another 
may have a normal structure but be subnormal in brightness. There may, 
of course, also be cases where the mental structure is retarded or advanced 
while the ego -development is normal; and the small percentage of 5 -year- 
olds who succeeded in the imagery- control test may perhaps be classifiable 
under this heading. But whatever the situation may be, the structural 
factor must be taken into account before we can begin to talk about mental 
age in any really scientific sense. 
The various forms of the Terman-Binet scale show that this conception 
of mental structure has not been adequately built into it, nor, in fact, 
to the Binet scale in general. We have seen how often in our qualitative 
analysis we have had to pass over a test as "non- significant" for a given 
age. By means of these non -significant tests a bright child may score a 
mental age to which, from the point of view of mental structure, he is not 
entitled. For example, to quote Burt's figures, although the "Fingers" 
and "5 digits" tests show a practically equal percentage of passes at age 
7 (95.3% and 94.0% respectively), at age 5 they are passed by 62.5% and 
37.3ìb of the children. Both tests belong to the 7-year level, but the 
second requires a certain imagery- control and the first does not. 
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Similarly, "Counting 20 -0" and "Giving Date" are passed by 76.0 ,á and 
71.4% of children at age 8, but by 28ó and 9.6; at age 6. Thus it is 
possible for tests to be equally easy at one age but not equally difficult 
at an earlier age. The difference would seem to be that one of them 
requires a mental structure which is present at the later age but not 
normally so at the earlier, while the structure required by the other is 
already in the process of development. In the last two tests mentioned, 
the one involves imagery -control and the other the objectification of 
ideas in relation. The former structure has already begun to develop at 
6, but the latter begins only after year 7. 
It is therefore possible to see how, by passing tests which belong to 
a higher age but which do not demand a higher mental structure - being more 
difficult merely in degree, - a child may attain a higher mental age than 
is justified by his mental structure at the time. It is theoretically 
possible, for example, for a child to be credited with a mental age of 10 
without being able to objectify complex ideas in relation, - simply by 
repeating 5 digits backwards in place of the test for "absurdities ", and 
by answering the two simpler "Comprehension" questions. 
Moreover the full structural significance of even some of the 
"significant" tests is doubtful. For example, in the test for repeating 
three digits backwards or five digits f or cards, the child is given up to 
three chances to produce one correct answer, and some children may pass 
after having made two errors. But it is plain that a child who can 
succeed in this operation only once in three attempts, does not yet possess 
a control over his imagery; and the 7 -year level could hardly be credited 
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with this particular structure were it not for other tests at the same age 
pointing to a similar structure and requiring a more satisfactory score. 
Until a child can control his imagery, whatever his other mental 
attributes ivy be, he has not reached one of the most important stages of 
his development; and it is absurd to credit a child with a mental age of 
82 - as in the case quoted - when he does not yet possess the mental control 
which is normal to the majority of children of 7. iental test results, in 
short, are merely misleading from the educational point of view, if they 
ignore this factor of mental structure. If they are to be of value at all, 
they should be tests primarily of structure, leaving aside mere brightness 
as a secondary consideration. But a test is not a test of structure unless 
it shows that the child can really perform the operation on the majority of 
occasions, allowance being made only for a slip. It was on this basis that 
the writer's test given to the Moray House children was made. It made 
demands which could be met only by children who had a natural and assured 
control over imagery, and yet it did not demand for each single operation 
more than the minimum degree of concentration necessary for such an opera- 
tion al; all. Taiciug tiuee as tue iuiiii ìn>u number of letters or aigits wnose 
reversal can be said to produce a real problem in imagery -control, the 
function was demanded of the child two out of three times in each case, 
sufficient to show that the ability was normally present whenever called 
upon. To the child who really p©ssesses the power to control imagery, 
this prolongation of the test does not make it more difficult, and the l- 
and 8- year -olds rattled through it with ease; but it does so for those who 
can perform this operation only by chance, or with great effort, - i.e. for 
those in whom this mental structure is not yet fully developed. This is 
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to be distinguished from the method of increasing the difficulty by 
making each operation harder, - e.g. by asking the child to repeat a 
greater number of letters or digits at a time, but requiring only one 
correct response out of three. Such a test is merely misleading, for 
it eliminates the child who can actually control imagery but who lacks 
the greater concentration necessary for such a task. 
There is little doubt that Binet had originally in view this 
conception of different mental structures in the child at various ages, 
for in introducing his 1908 scale he says: 
"L'enfant ne diffère pas seulement de l'adulte en degré, en 
quantité, mais par la forme même de son intelligence; on ne connaît 
pas encore cette forme enfantine; dans nos experiences actuelles, 
nous n'avions fait que l'entrevoir. Elle réclame bien certainement 
une étude." (27) 
And Terman, in an article entitled "dental Growth and the I.Q." (28) 
says that the Binet scale 
"is constructed on the theory that mental growth does not imply 
equal development of all the particular capacities at once, or in 
the same particular capacities at all periods; that certain differ- 
ences in mental functions appear in a more or less definite order. 
It is adapted to bring out the fact that the 11+. -year -old, for 
example, excels the 7-year -old not merely in the maturity of certain 
mental functions, but that he is mentally able to do various kinds 
of things which the 7- year -olds can not do at all." 
In spite of these statements, however, the factor of structure (or 
"form" of intelligence, as Binet expresses it) has never been clearly 
distinguished from the "quantity" factor - or degree of maturity within 
that structure - in the Binet types of scale. 
In the 1916 Stanford revision, taking the 5 -year level of achieve- 
ment as a basis, we were able to find only three "significant" or new 





doubtful), three at 8, none at 9, one at 10, and two at 12. Thus, out 
of 48 tests in the years 6 to 12 inclusive, no less than 31 or 32 (two - 
thirds) deal with functions seen to be already present in previous years. 
That significance can we attach to a "mental age" derived from such a 
psychological mixture? How far does it represent the mental functions 
normally belonging to that chronological age, and how far merely the 
more skilful use of functions already present at an earlier age? 
A closer view of this subject can be obtained by examining the 
251 cases of 5 -year -olds of Moray House school, the detailed records of 
which the writer has procured. These show that 106 of the children 
passed one or more of the individual tests beyond age 7; and it is 
interesting to note which of the 7- and 8-year tests these brighter 
children passed. Omitting the vocabulary test at year 8, the following 
are the figures: 
Fingers Pict.Descr. 5 Digits Bow -knot Concrete Diff. Diamond 
0 
, 
55.7 66.0 57.5 21.7 50.0 28.3 
Counting 
Ball & Field 20 -0 Compreh. Similar. Defin (sup). 
6.6 8.5 54.7 22.6 60.4 
It will be seen that the majority of these brighter 5- year -olds 
fail in the "Bow -knot" and "Diamond" tests, presumably because they have 
not the power of motor -co- ordination of the normal 7- year -old, but that, 
in spite of this, they can pass on to the "Comprehension" and "Definition" 
tests at year 8 and make up for this deficiency, as far as "mental age" 
is concerned. 
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As we have seen in our qualitative analysis, definition in terms of 
description involves merely a more complete objectification of concrete 
ideas than is involved in the concrete differences test, so that a 
child who can pass the latter may without much greater difficulty pass 
the former also. Repeating 5 digits, likewise, involving a certain 
control over imagery, belongs to the same function; while the basis of 
the test for comprehension is objectification of an imagined situation. 
This is apparently the easiest of all the relational thinking tests, as 
the majority of our percentage tables show, and is probably due to the 
fact that the situations to be considered are familiar and therefore 
require the minimum of concentration. But in the case of "Similarities" 
and the "Ball 8 Field" test much more deliberate thinking is demanded. 
In the first, a relating idea has to be found, and in the second there 
must be a grasping of the related possibilities of the situation and 
some form of planning in accordance with these. 
In these Moray House figures there is a high correlation between 
the 5 digit and the concrete differences tests on the one hand, and the 
comprehension and definition tests on the other. Where one of these 
children passes the five digits test he also passes either or both of 
these 8 -year tests in 52 out of 61 instances; while passing the 
concrete differences test is found to be accompanied by the passing of 
either or both of these other tests 4.9 times out of 53. On the other 
hand, the comprehension or definition test is passed in 96 cases out of 
the 106, and only in 19 instances unaccompanied by either "5 digits" 
or "concrete differences ". 
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At age 5, as we have already seen, the average child can objectify 
the image of a total concrete situation. What the majority of these 
brighter 5- year -olds are able to do, apparently, is simply to achieve 
one aspect of the 7 -year intelligence through a greater power of 
abstraction from that imagery. There is no evidence that they can 
control imagery to the extent that the 7 -year -old is able to do it - as 
in the reverse repetition type of test, - for in "comprehension" and 
"definition" we have only the observation in imagery of a familiar 
situation and of a familiar object, while repeating 5 digits forwards is 
apparently an easier task than 3 digits backwards. (According to T.L.O., 
at age 5, 31ÿó pass in the former and only 2% in the latter. See also 
Mary H. Young's Digit -span test.) Moreover, as already indicated, 
the majority of these selected children of 5 have apparently not the 
normal 7- year -old motor control. This is in agreement with the 
majority of the investigators quoted. T.L.O. gives,at age 5, 11% 
for the bow -knot test, and 4. ó for copying diamond; T. & C. and T.T.W. 
give 16% and 10% for the diamond test, and Cuneo & Terman 8%; while 
Bobertag and Goddard give only 32% and 43% at age 6. Burt and Rowe 
are the only exceptions, with 49% and 67% at age 5. 
In short, these Moray House children do best - ahead of their age - 
in those tests which are less significant or non -significant for age 7 
and 8, and fail most in those in which more controlled thinking, or 
motor co- ordination is required. The high percentage for "picture 
description" should be noted. 
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It may of course be argued that in the new scales "comprehension" 
now appears at year 7, and that "picture description" and "concrete diff- 
erences" have been brought down to age 6. But "similarities" now appears 
at 7 also, while the diamond test is still retained at this level. 
Only 9 out of the 106 children succeeded in any of the 9 -year tests, 
and in 6 of these cases the only test passed was "five weights ". One 
child passed both "five weights" and "finding rhymes ", and of the remaining 
two, one passed "giving date" and the other "giving change ". It will be 
noted that the five weights test is the most concrete of this series as far 
as relational thinking is concerned. 
Thus we are again faced with the anomaly that a group of tests, all 
of which may be equally suitable for a given age, are not all equal for 
children a year or two younger. It means that while we must allow the 
same credit in mental months for each test passed by the older child, we- 
ought not to do so in the case of the younger child. But that would be 
unworkable; and so the present system continues to exist at the expense 
of remaining dishonest. 
The question of the constancy of the I.Q. is one into which we cannot 
enter here. It is sufficient to point out that, in so far as the ratio 
of M.A. to C.A. has been found in re -tests to be fairly constant, this may 
easily be attributable to the small part which structural development plays 
in the scale. For if structural development at each age were tested in an 
adequate degree, and tests of one structural level were not juxtaposed with 
those of another in the same year, fluctuations in test ability would show 
themselves round those ages at which structural changes take place - as 
Shown in our graphs of test data when tests involving different mental 
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structures are separated from one another. 
This would not of course apply to the normal child who was able 
always to pass the tests just at the appropriate age; but a child a little 
in advance in structural development would tend to show, about the time 
of the 6 -7 change, for example, a sudden rise in ability at an earlier 
age than his contemporaries, and so, for the time being, a higher I.Q.. 
A child, on the other hand, whose structural development was retarded, 
would show a low I.Q. during the time when the change was taking place in 
his contemporaries, reverting toward a more normal I.Q. later, when the 
change had taken place also in him. 
The whole conception of I.Q. constancy, of course, depends upon the 
assumption that there are no such marked changes - a fact which appears 
to be in curious contradiction with the statements by Binet and Terman, 
just quoted - and the introduction into the scale of so many non- signific- 
ant tests serves to blur any evidence of changes which there might be. 
It is thus possible to understand how a certain constancy of I.Q. can be 
attained, even in individual cases, while, taken in the mass, any irreg- 
ularities which might remain will be averaged out. That this smoothing 
factor is not always successful, however, can be seen from the occasional 
expressions of doubt on the part of investigators, some examples of which 
are to be found in the following: 
F. Mateer: "The diagnostic fallibility of Intelligence Ratios" 
(1918) (29) 
Edgar A. Doll: The Growth of Intelligence: (1920) (30) 
Bird T. Baldwin & Lorle I. Stecher: "Additional Data from con- 
secutive Stanford -Binet Tests" (1922) (31) 
(Catherine Murdock & Louis R. Sullivan: "Some evidence of adol- 
escent increase in the rate of mental growth." (1922) (32) 
Gertrude Hildreth: "Stanford -Binet re -tests of 141 school 
children." (1926) (53) 
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C. S. Slocombe: 'Why the I. Q. is not, and cannot be constant." 
(1927) (34) 
Psyche Cattell: "Constant changes in Stanford-Binet I.Q.." 
(1931) (35) 
Claude L. Nemzek: "The constancy of the I. Q. s of gifted children." 
(1932) (36) 
Ralph R. Brown: Time interval between test and re -test in relation 
to constancy of I.Q." (1933) (37) 
R. L. Thorndike: "The effect of the interval between test and 
re -test on the constancy of the I.Q." (1933) (38) 
The fact that from such a scale a smooth mental growth curve can be 
derived, does not indicate that mental growth is smooth, but simply that 
the tests are so arranged that it appears so. For example, in "A method 
of scaling psychological and educational tests" by L. L. Thurstone (39), 
the author derives a growth curve based on his method of "absolute 
scaling ", from Burt's percentages of London School Children. In figure 1E. 
of this article, the central curve - which, according to Thurstone, 
represents "the mean intelligence of children of successive ages ", is 
arrived at by slumping together every type of test quoted by Burt in each 
pair of consecutive age -groups. But in actual fact, this graph is no 
more than the response from year to year of the average child to a 
mixture of tests of all structural types - a mixture, moreover, in which 
the proportion of one type to another is constantly changing. It has no 
more meaning than if one were to weigh, at regular stages of their growth, 
irregularly varying mixtures of peas and beans. From the resulting 
series. one could, indeed, plot a curve of growth, but it would be very 
hard to say what it could mean save that the objects tended to increase 
in weight with age. The shape of the curve would be meaningless. unless 
we could ascertain how far its direction at any point was due to one or 
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other of the ingredients, or merely to the varying proportions of the 
mixture. 
In the article by C. S. Slocombe quoted above (34), the author 
calculates from the data of re -tests carried out by Baldwin & Stecher 
over a period of six years, commencing with children age 6, that the 
correlations between repetitions of the Stanford -Binet tests vary with 
the interval between them. This was also found by Thornlike (38) from 
the results of 36 experiments by various investigators. Slocombe 
concludes as follows: 
" .. it would seem that there is a factor common to early 
tests, causing the high correlation, and another common to late 
tests causing high correlation. But the comparatively low 
correlation between early and late tests indicates that the two 
factors are not the same." (p. 423) 
If these conclusions are correct, this may well be due to the fact 
that the early tests are mainly concerned with control over imagery and 
concrete ideas, and the later tests with relational thinking; and these 
two functions, as we have seen, appear to have no genetic connection 
with one another. Thus there cannot be a single curve of mental growth, 
but only a curve for each separate function. Anything else is merely 
misleading. 
In "The biological significance of intelligence tests" by David Yd. 
Oates (1+0) the author shows that "ability to speed "is a function which 
matures early and yields no further increase with age, and he concludes: 
"The score in an intelligence test is always a measure of a 
complex thing. . . A consideration of the data here presented 
emphasises the necessity for analysing the activities involved 
in intelligence tests from the point of view of the functional 
maturity of the processes underlying them. The nature of the 
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curve of growth of intelligence may be determined largely by the 
appropriateness of the test material to the functional maturity 
of the processes to be expected at a particular age level." 
(1). 442) 
A still smoother curve of mental development is arrived at by 
Thurstone in "The mental growth curve for the Binet tests" (4.1). As this 
curve is based on mental age, all that has been said above applies to this 
also. 
Another factor in the Binet type of intelligence test which serves to 
conceal any irregularity in mental growth, is the fact that the tests for 
each year are specially arranged to suit the average child of that age, 
and that therefore any difference in the mental intervals between diff- 
erent consecutive ages can never come to light. In the article by Murdock 
and Sullivan already mentioned (32), the authors remark (p. 354): 
"The unit of mental age scales, by its very definition, is of 
such a nature that it tends to conceal any differences in rate 
of mental growth. Eleven years mental age means the mental 
age of the average eleven - year -old child. If, on the average, 
children should develop little mentally from 10 to 11 years of 
age, and develop much from 11 to 12, properly arranged mental 
scales, of the age standard type, would entirely conceal such 
change in the rate of development." 
Baldwin and Stecher, in the article already quoted (31), make the 
same point (p. 560): 
"Mental age scales tend to conceal any differences in the rate 
of mental growth that may exist." 
No one maintains, of course, that the mental intervals in the Binet 
scale are equal. On the contrary, in order to support the assumption 
that the I.Q. is constant, it has to be assumed that they are not equal 
and that the mental interval from 5 to 6 is equal to that between 10 and 
12. The basis for this assumption lies in the distribution of mental 
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age, in which it is found that the middle 50¡ of cases extends over twice 
the number of months at 12 than it does at 6, and that the distribution of 
I.Q. is approximately constant at any age. (Terman; 16). Our graphs 
derived from test data showed, certainly, that the rate of progrdss 
between age 11 and 12 is always less than that between 5 and 6 or 6 and 7, 
but there was no indication that between these points development of any 
of the three mental functions we have considered takes place according to 
this law. 
In an article "Interpretation and Application of the I.Q." by 
Frank N. Freeman (42) the author points out that in order that the I.Q. 
should be valid, the curve of growth must take one of two forms. Either 
it is logarithmic, of the form y = log x, or it is straight. In the 
former case this would apply to all individual,;, both above and below 
normal, the distance on the vertical axis of any given curve from the 
median being constant. (See figure 2 of article quoted). If, on the 
other hand, mental growth takes the form of a straight line, that repres- 
enting individuals above and below normal would diverge from the median 
line, as shown in figure 3 of the article. 
But while either of these possibilities satisfies the required con- 
ditions for I.Q. constancy as far as the ratio of the median to the other 
curves is concerned, only one of these satisfies the conditions in regard 
to the median curve itself. For not only must the median curve bear 
this ratio to curves above and below it; its own parts must bear this 
ratio to each other, so that the development between years 10 and 12 
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satisfy the theory. Naturally this does not hold in the case of a 
straight line, but it does so in the logarithmic curve. If the T.Q. is 
constant, then, mental development must follow this curve. 
If we now take the age- series 5 to 12 and work out "progress ratios" 
from the intervals between the logs of these numbers, we get the following 
results: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -7 7 -8 8 -9 9 -10 10 -11 11 -12 
P. R. + .46 + .24 + .07 - .06 -.15 - .24 - .30 
This gives us the data for a curve on the same lines as those we 
have already derived empirically, and if we superimpose this theoretical 
graph upOn any of these it will be seen how far this theory of mental 
growth accords with the facts. The only graph to which it approximates 
is that of Burt for non -relational thinking unconnected with the environ- 
ment, although the dip at 8 -9 is of course ignored. Similarly it cuts 
through all the changes in the other graphs representing this function. 
Still less does it follow the course of relational thinking. It can be 
said only that it begins above the average line and ends below it, and in 
that respect it has something in common with practically all the empirical 
graphs; but it of necessity ignores the developmental changes which take 
place on the way (Figure 14). 
That this theory of development does not correspond with even the 
rough facts - that is, with the results of all three mental functions 
slumped together - can be seen from the following. If we take from 
Tables 3, 15, and 28 (Burt's data) the S.D. intervals for the year 5 -6, 
we find that the average interval (16 tests) is .81. Similarly, if we 
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consider all the tests common to both years of the 10 -12 interval (10 
tests), we get an average interval of .72. So far, this is more or less 
in accordance with the theory. But the 8 -10 interval similarly treated 
yields an average interval of .81 also (11 tests). This is not in 
accordance with the theory. 
If we take Terman's own figures upon which his conclusions as to 
the theory are based (T.L.O. series), we find the following average 
intervals: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .66 1.06 1.01+ .64 
No. of tests: 20 11 15 9 
Here again 5 -6 equals 10 -12, but the theory does not hold for both 
the intervening intervals. Theoretically, calculating from the logarith- 
mic curve, and taking ..66 as a basis, the figures should be: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .66 1.01 .81 .66 
The actual figures for Burt's data are as follows: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .81 1.40 .81 .72 
No. of tests: 16 9 11 10 
Theoretically, taking .81 as a basis, these should be: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .81 1.28 1.00 .81 
It will be seen that in both cases the theory breaks down in respect 
of the 8 -10 interval- the period during which the development of relation- 
al thinking is taking place. In the Terman data, as we saw in the graphs, 
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consider all the tests common to both years of the 10 -12 interval (10 
tests), we get an average interval of 072. So far, this is more or less 
in accordance with the theory. But the 8 -10 interval similarly treated 
yields an average interval of .81 also (11 tests). This is not in 
accordance with the theory. 
If we take Terman's own figures upon which his conclusions as to 
the theory are based (T.L.O. series), we find the following average 
intervals: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .66 1.06 1.01+ .64 
No. of tests: 20 11 15 9 
Here again 5 -6 equals 10 -12, but the theory does not hold for both 
the intervening intervals. Theoretically, calculating from the logarith- 
mic curve, and taking ..66 as a basis, the figures should be: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .66 1.04 .81 .66 
The actual figures for Burt's data are as follows: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .81 1.40 .81 .72 
No. of tests: 16 9 11 10 
Theoretically, taking .81 as a basis, these should be: 
Age: 5 -6 6 -8 8 -10 10 -12 
Interval: .81 1.28 1.00 .81 
It will be seen that in both cases the theory breaks down in respect 
of the 8 -10 interval- the period during which the development of relation- 
al thinking is taking place. In the Terman data, as we saw 
in the graphs, 
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this development takes place a little later than in Burt, and this same 
fact reappears here. The greatest progress during the years 6 to 9 is 
already made, in Burt's data, by year 8, hence the 8 -10 interval is too 
small for the theory. With Terman's data, considerable progress comes 
after year 8, and hence the 8 -10 interval is too large for the theory. 
If we were to add the 6 -8 and 8 -10 intervals together, we should get 
a fairly close correspondence between the theoretical and the actual 
figures in both cases: 
5 -6 6 -10 10 -12 
Burt: (Actual) .81 2.21 .72 
" (Theoretical) .81 2.28 .81 
Terman (Actual) .66 2.10 .64 
(Theoretical) .66 1.85 .66 
But it is precisely during this middle interval that most of the 
changes we have been studying take place, and we should succeed only in 
blinding ourselves to facts which it is important for us to know. That 
these facts do not appear in Terman's curves of rt_. A. and I.Q. distrib- 
ution is apparently due to the blurring effect of the scale in the 
calculation of mental age, since mental age can be achieved through passing 
tests which are structurally non -significant. When, however, calculations 
are made direct from the actual percentages of passes, fluctuations in 
development begin to show themselves; and these changes appear still 
more clearly when the different forms of thinking are separated from 
one another. 
Even Thurstone's growth curve derived from Burt's total percentages 
is not so smooth as it looks. If we take the intervals between his 
figures for each successive year and calculate progress ratios therefrom, 
the results are as follows: 
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5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12 
+.46, -.03 +.15 -.21 +.07 -.17 
Here, in spite of the fact that his curve represents all types of 
test slumped together, the familiar "peaks" at 6, 8, and 10 already begin 
to appear. 
The fallacy which appears to lie at the root of mental testing, and 
which Spearman (43) has effectively discussed, is the attempt to add the 
results of different mental functions together and to express the 
conclusion in unitary form. And further, as these functions - of which 
we have distinguished ti_ree broad cognitive types - do not develop at 
the same time or at the same rate, it is possible through the presence 
of non -significant tests to score a mental age for which the appropriate 
mental structure is lacking. 
A teaching experience of the present writer's will further illustrate 
this point. Be taught elementary classes for two years in a boys' school 
in Edinburgh, and at the beginning of the second session a boy aged 8;1 
was sent up to his arithmetic class from the Kindergarten department. 
This boy had a reputation of being rather bright mentally and very care- 
ful and neat in his work. As the school was a small one, there happened 
to be no class at that time quite suitable for his age and scholastic 
level, and so it was arranged that he should do independent work in 
arithmetic under the writer's supervision while remaining in the Kinder- 
garten class for the other subjects. This boy had an I.Q. of 119 and 
so was "mentally "9;7 at this time. 
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The boy had begun to do long division in the Kindergarten class, 
and the writer continued this with him. At the same time the Kinder- 
garten teacher introduced him to elementary grammar in the form of the 
parts of speech. But the boy's arithmetic home-work, which at first 
was exemplary in its neatness, grew more and more untidy. The figures 
became large and irregular and were scrawled obliquely across the page 
regardless of guiding lines in either direction, the size and irregularity 
of the figures increasing as the sum proceeded. One would not have 
recognised it as the work of the same child. 
At first the writer ascribed this to some temporary laziness, and 
reprimanded the child. Later, however, nervous fidgetings and grimaces 
were noticed. This nervous tension was observed quite independently 
by the headmaster who communicated with the parents to inquire if anything 
disturbing had arisen in the child's home environment. The parents 
reported that the child was tending to lie awake at night, and on one 
occasion when the father had visited his room about 10 p.m. the boy, who 
was still awake, had remarked: "There are twenty nouns, aren't there, 
Daddy?" 
At the writer's suggestion the grammar lessons and the long division 
were stopped at once, and he noted the obvious relief of the child when 
told that the long division would be given up meantime. Very soon the 
behaviour of the child returned to normal and his work resumed its 
former neatness. 
The following term the writer had the task of trying to reintroduce 
this child to grammar, and he found the following. The child understood 
quite well what was meant by a noun or "naming" word, and by a verb or 
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"doing" word, and could point accurately to a phrase in which such a 
word occurred, but he could not pick out the individual word. Instead 
of the verb, for example, the adverb belonging to it would frequently be 
pointed to. It was clear that the child recognised "action" in the 
phrase but could not abstract from it the specifically active word. This 
meant that he was capable of recognising in the phrase the presence of 
an element corresponding to a single idea; but his failure to cognise - 
in the light of this idea - anything but the phrase as a whole, showed 
that he could not yet cognise the words in relation to one another, i.e. 
the relation of parts within a whole at the level of concrete ideas. In 
short, it would appear, this child could not yet think relationally at 
the ideational level. 
Nevertheless, before the end of the session, i.e. before he was 9, 
this child was able to distinguish all the parts of speech successfully 
and without any apparent strain. As we have seen, the simplest form of 
relational thinking reaches its highest rate of development between 
years 7 and 8, while tests involving this type of thinking first appear 
in the Stanford -Binet scale at 8, and in the new scales at 7. This boy 
began to succeed in work involving thinking of this kind about the age 
of 82, and was therefore, in respect of mental structure, not a day ahead 
of the average child and, if anything, slightly retarded - in spite of 
his I.Q. 
The writer has unfortunately no record of how the boy progressed 
in regard to arithmetic, as he was in the hands of another teacher for 
this subject during the second and third terms. But long division, like 
simple grammar, presents no difficulties to the normal child of 9;7 years 
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chronologically; and the incident goes to show how the health of a child 
may be endangered through assuming that his so- called mental age has any 
necessary connection with his mental structure. 
A child may be ''bright ", but the scope of that brightness is largely 
conditioned by the mental structure in which the ego is free to operate. 
The one cannot be a substitute for the other. Ego -brightness may be 
termed the quantitative aspect of intelligence, and mental structure the 
qualitative. Real mental age will depend, obviously, on the structural 
aspect, and it is with this aspect that the genuine educator should be 
most concerned. He wants to know what a child can do or grasp naturally 
and without strain; and strain will obviously arise if a child is asked 
to objectify or manipulate ideas of a type which, even though he may act 
or think in terms of them, he is not yet able to bring into objective 
mental focus. In the case of the child just quoted, it was fortunate 
for him that the school was a small one and in which great personal 
interest was token in the children, resulting in the blunder being noticed 
and rectified quickly. But what, one wonders, would have been his fate in 
a large school, placed on account of his mental age among 4.0 or 50 9-year- 
olds and in charge of a teacher who believed in the validity of the I.Q.? 
In all probability, punishment, first of all, for supposed laziness or 
carelessness, and ultimately nervous breakdown. 
The other aspect of the question - the case of children who have the 
necessary mental structure for a task, but who are below the average in 
brightness, will be ddalt with later in connection with a special teaching 
experiment carried out by the writer. 
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It may be objected that what we are criticising here is fundament- 
ally the method of arriving at "mental age", and that in the Point Scale 
method of testing the conception of mental age has been abolished. But 
we do not abolish a conception merely because we cease to talk about it; 
and we cannot in fact get rid of the implication of mental age so long as 
we try to measure the intelligence of a child for scholastic or educational 
ends. For what does it mean in such circumstances except an assessment 
of his fitness for this or that level of mental work? And that is simply 
to assess him in terms of the school class for which he is thought to be 
fitted. The term "mental age" ceases to be implied only when we are 
dealing with adults. 
If, then, mental structure is the important factor from the point of 
the educator, special attentioh must be paid to the periods at Which these 
changes arise; and our graphs have seemed to show that these are connected 
with chronological age - a fact indicated by the abrupt increase in rate 
of progress when a certain age is reached, in spite of the tests involved 
not all being significant for the age in question. Graphs representing 
only significant tests would show, presumably, still more abrupt changes. 
This is shown in the two Moray House tests where the tests used were 
specially significant for the two functions concerned. 
If maturity of mental structure varies at all from chronological age, 
it would seem to vary within narrow limits; and if this be so, it is more 
important for the educator to know the chronological age of his pupils 
than anything which an ordinary mental test can tell him. But there are 
still those who, given even uniformity of mental structure in a class of 
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children, would nevertheless hold that it is essential to divide the 
bright from the dull, on the grounds that it is impossible to teach both 
adequately at the same time. With this educational point we shall deal 
in the final section. 
In the meantime, the writer has tried to show that the only sound 
method of gaining an insight into the intellectual needs of the child is 
through the "direct" method of approach. He has described the type of 
test which must be applied for the discovery of "structure ", and how it 
happens that ordinary intelligence testing fails to bring out these 
structural differences. Further, it has been shown that these various 
levels of structure consist of a particular relation of the ego to its 
ideas and images, and of these (in the earliest years) to the motor 
system, and that these structures tend to appear in connection with 
chronological age. These structural factors, it has been pointed out, 
must be distinguished from the factor of ego - brightness which is 
describable as the quantitative factor in intelligence. Finally, it is 
maintained, that it is this structural aspect, rather than that of 
brightness, which is of importance from the point of view of the 
educator. 
This raises certain educational problems which will be discussed in 
the concluding section. 
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P A R T 5. 
SOLE EDUCATIOP'AL COIdCLUSIOPdS 
In our introductory remarks we referred to the practice in present - 
day schools of introducing certain subjects at an age or in a manner the 
appropriateness of which seemed to be in need of psychological investiga- 
tion. It would now appear that a subject should be introduced to the 
child at the age at which he attains the appropriate mental structure, 
and in a manner which conforms to that structure. Taking as illustration 
the subjects which were mentioned, it is clear that the understanding of 
Algebra involves primarily the ability to objectify an abstract idea. 
Arithmetical terms, such as are found at least in the use of the "four 
rules ", are always referable to concrete objects. But an algebraical 
symbol is referable in turn only to some number. It is purely abstract. 
Further, an algebraical term represents two or more abstract ideas in 
relation. Thus, referring to table 2, we can see that the earliest age 
at which purely abstract ideas begin to be objectified is 11 or 12, while 
objectification of abstract relational concepts appears first at 12. It 
would therefore seem unwise to attempt to introduce this subject before 
the age of 12. 
In regard to Geometry we have a somewhat different situation. In 
this, as in Algebra, we are dealing with abstract ideas; and although 
figures are drawn to illustrate the arguments, these are not intended to 
be taken literally. They are merely a symbol for what is being discussed, 
and one of the first things which the pupil must learn is that "proof"_' is 
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something independent of the empirical figure. 
To follow the argument of a theorem, one must be able to objectify 
abstract ideas in relation, for these are the material of the argument. 
But to reproduce the argument in other than parrot -like form, or to carry 
out any kind of constructive geometrical thinking (such as exercises or 
problems on a theorem), involves the ability to manipulate the ideas 
concerned. Our table does not indicate when manipulation of abstract 
ideas begins; but we have seen that objectification of mental imagery is 
possible some two years before it can be manipulated, and that concrete 
ideas, objectifiable at 7, are probably not manipulated until age 10. We 
have good reason to expect, therefore, that manipulation of abstract 
ideas will not be present much before l4 or 15. 
It is true that in the new Terman scales manipulation of abstract 
ideas, in the form of a sentence- building test (using abstract ideas as 
components) appears at the "Superior Adult 1" level. But at this stage 
one suspects that the vocabulary element also enters into the test and 
that a younger person might fail simply through unfamiliarity with the 
words. As the authors admit: 
" . . . . in the present instance success depends less upon the 
ability to combine isolated elements into a meaningful whole than 
on word comprehension. Failure is rarely due to inability to 
combine the words into a single sentence." (p. 289 -290) 
Leaving aside the question as to the age at which manipulation me 
abstract ideas actually arises, the present writer carried out an experi- 
ment to discover how far it is correct to say that it is not present at 
age 12 -13, the age at which theoretical geometry is today begun in most 
schools being 12 +. 
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A test consisting of three geometrical questions was drawn up, the 
first being a simple problem on triangles, the second, a question dealing 
with the difference between equality in angles and in triangles, and the 
third a problem dealing with the size of angles. 
The test was given in three secondary schools in Edinburgh to 
children who had begun theoretical geometry not more than six months 
previously, and who had had experience in solving problems of this type. 
One of the classes had not covered all the ground necessary for question 3, 
and these children are not considered in the results of this part of the 
test. The three questions were as follows: 
1. See if you can do this little problem: - 
AB and CD are two straight lines bisecting 
one another at X. 
Join AC and DB. 
When you have done this, you have 
Two triangles, ACS and BDX. 
Prove that these two triangles are 
equal (congruent). 
Be careful to give a reason for everything 
you say. 
WRRITE YOUR PROOF HERE:- 
(Space allowed for proof) 
2. Here are two angles, ABC and XYZ 
They are both the same size of angle. 
Now take your pencil and produce the line 
BA right to the edge of the paper, calling 
this point "D ". Then produce the line BC, 
in the same way, right to the edge of the 




That would you say about the sizes of the two angles DBE and XYZ? 
Are they equal in size or not? 
WRITE YOUR ANSWER ERRE: - 
Now join XZ. 
What would you say about the sizes of the two triangles DBE and XYZ? 
Are they equal in size or not? 
WRITE YOUR ANSWER HARE:- 
3. Here is another little problem, different from the first one:- 
Here we have two straight lines, of the 
same length, meeting at A. 
First of all, join BC and produce it 
beyond C to a point X. 
Now produce the line CA in both directions, 
producing it beyond C to a point Y, and 
beyond A to a point Z. 
Now here is the uestion:- If the 
angle YCX = 70 , what is the 
size of the angle BAZ? 
Write down every step in your proof, and be careful to give a reason 
for everything you say. 
(Space allowed for proof) 
In school A the test was given to three parallel classes - the 
brightest class and two others, in school B to two average parallel 
classes, and in school C to one class - the brightest. The details are: 
Boys Girls Total 
School A. Class l.Al. 32 -- 32 
2..M- 33 -- 33 
2.A5 38 -- 38 
School B. Class 1.B2 17 21 38 
1.C2 22 15 37 
School C. Class l.Al 14. 224- 38 
Total: 156 60 216 
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There are thus two classes consisting of the brightest children 
(1.A1) two rather less bright (2. A/. and 2.A5), and two mediocre or 
perhaps rather below average (1.B2 and 1.C2), the number of children in 
each of these groups being 70, 71, and 75, respectively, with average 
awes 13;0, 13;5, and 12;11. The average age of the whole group of 216 
children is 13;1. The whole should therefore form a fairly representa- 
tive selection. 
Unfortunately, as School A was a boys' school, the girls in the 
total group are very much in the minority. But as it is usually consid- 
ered that boys tend to have a superiority over girls in mathematical 
subjects, this unevenness of distribution is on the right side for our 
purpose; and if the conclusion shows that the ability to think at this 
level is not pr,,=:sent in this group, it should apply all the more strongly 
to a group more equally distributed as regards sex. 
In this experiment we are not concerned to discover simply how many 
children were correct in each fast and how many failed, for a child might 
have the mental structure necessary to fulfil the task, and yet lack 
the brightness to do so successfully. In solving a geometrical problem 
one must be able not only to manipulate abstract ideas, but also to 
think of the right ideas to manipulate - to remember, for example, the 
theorems which might be appropriate to the particular situation. For 
this reason a child may fail in question 1 through a mere lack of ability 
to see on what lines the argument should go, and not through any lack 
of power to handle abstract material. 
On this account we shall not take into consideration those cases in 
which a child failed to complete questions 1 or 3; but every child who 
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gives us a completed argument believes that he or she has solved the 
problem; and our present concern is how many of these have failed, and 
why. For a child who is content with an incorrect argument is one who, 
in making arbitrary assumptions or deductions, has failed to fit 
abstract ideas into their proper relation. 
In order to manipulate these ideas for the correct solution of such 
a problem, one must be able to use ideas and relations taken from 
different theorems. That is, ideas and relations from different con- 
texts must be fitted together into a new context. To cognise ideas and 
relations in a given context is one thing, but to lift these from their 
context and, relating them to other ideas, build up a new context, is 
quite another. New links have to be formed and a new pattern made. It 
is in this forming of new relational links that manipulation is involved. 
As in the case of the young child who, first perceiving objects in imag- 
ery as part of a concrete situation, is able only later to abstract from 
this imagery and to manipulate separate images, - or, being able to objec- 
tify concrete ideas in relation is not yet able to manipulate these ideas 
into other relations (as in "sentence- building ", for example) - so it is 
in the case of abstract ideas. These are first met in a related context, 
and the child has still to develop the ability to transfer them from that 
context and to manipulate them into another. To be able thus to trans- 
fer ideas, however, is to be distinguished from the ability to know 
which ideas to transfer. The latter belongs to knowledge and brightness, 
the former to mental structure. 
As examples from the geometrical experiment will show, the child who 
is not yet able to manipulate abstract ideas tends towards two types of 
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error. Either he simply makes arbitrary assumptions in order to prove 
what he wants to prove, in which case he does not even attempt to trans- 
fer ideas from another theorem; or, in transferring ideas, he brings 
with them relations which belonged to the ideas in the original context 
but which are not applicable in the new. In other words, instead of 
uprooting the appropriate idea and transplanting it cleanly into the new 
context, he brings with it other ideas or relationships which cling to 
it by virtue of their former connections. Thus, while he is able to 
grasp abst_cact ideas in relation in a given context, he is apparently 
unable to disentangle them from that context. 
The following is an example. Boy: age 12;4: Class l.Al. School A. 
_ riswer to question 1: 
"Proof: CX = DX (given) 
AC = DB (given) 
LO = LD : straight line CD cut by transversal AB, 
cutting at X. 
Compare two triangles ACX and BDX. 
Apply point B to A and line BD along AC, so that D lies on C, 
and line BX lies along AX. 
Therefore the triangles are congruent." 
After making a purely arbitrary assumption (AC = DB) he transfers an 
idea - rather confused - from the theorem on parallel lines, making 
C equal. D. Then he transfers the idea of superimposing triangles from 
the theorem dealing with two sides and the included angle, together with 
some of the "given" data belonging to it. Thus in both of these trans- 
ferences relations are carried over which do not hold in the present case. 
The following is another of the same type: Boy: 12;5. Same class. 
"Compare triangles ACX and BDX so that point B falls on point A 
and line BX lies along AC. 
We have AC = BX and AX = BD (given) 
" " 4'A = ZB, LC - LD, ¿X = 4,x. 
Therefore triangle ACX and triangle BDX are equal in all 
respects." 
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This happens i:n a number of cases. The proof of a theorem of 
congruency (usually that of two sides and included angle) is transferred 
wholesale with the "given" elements of that theorem, and applied here 
without any reference to the "given" of the present problem. 
The theorem on parallel lines also keeps intruding, presumably 
because the lines AC and DB, being parallel, suggest it. 
Here is the case of a boy; 12;6 : same class: 
"LM = .4 AXC because they are vertically opposite. 
/CAX = /DBX because alternate 
'BDX = ACX because alternate 
Three angles of one triangle = Three angles of another. 
Therefore Triangles are congruent." 
In the following case from the same class (boy; 12;11) we have mere 
juxtaposition of statements which have no logical connection: 
"Compare two triangles ACX, BDX. 
We have AC equal to DB (construct.) 
Therefore triangles ACX = BDX 
We have two sides and an included angle of a triangle in the 
one, and two sides and an included angle in the other. 
In particular ¿C = 
And again: Boy: 13;4: (same class) 
"L AXC = _BXD (vert. opp.) 
LACX = BDX alt. ) 
Therefore triangle AXC and triangle BXD are equal in all 
respects. 
Lastly, we have the purely arbitrary type: Boy: 13;9: (same class) 
"Angle A in the 
C tt tt 
Line AC in the 
tt CX " " 
Therefore 
Therefore 
first triangle = angle B 
" triangle = " D 
first trian -le = line RD 
" triangle = " DX 
the triangles are congru 
the triangles are equal 
in the second triangle. 
" " " triangle. 
in the second triangle. 
" " triangle. 
ent. 
in all respects." 
Thus we have cases varying from those who make no attempt at all to 
solve the problem by means of manipulation of the available ideas, to 
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those who try to do so but who fail through inability to free the ideas 
from the empirical situation from which they were taken. 
.Among the more elementary sources of confusion are: the assumption 
that triangles are congruent because the respective angles are equal: 
that AC and BD are equal because they are parallel: and a tendency to 
prove the problem by means of the empirical figure, either by measurement 
or by means of the apparent visible equality, etc., of the lines and 
angles. The following is an interesting case illustrative of this last 
type of error, pathetically tingled with tit -bits. from one or two theorems 
which even in themselves have not been understood. Yet the child 
obviously thinks that he understands the situation. This is a boy, age 
13;3, School A. Class 2.A4. (It should be noted that all the cases 
quoted hitherto are taken from 1.A1 - the brightest class). 
"To prove: That the two triangles are congruent. 
Proof: Since straight line AB and CD bisect at X. 
Lines AC and DB are drawn. If they are compared they are 
found to be equal. This is because that the straight line 
AB cuts CD and forms vertically opposite angles. These are 
joined at the points at the end and so become equal to one 
another. Another way is when they are placed together after 
they have been cut exactly. Two of the ends meet the other 
two and when you look at the third point it is exactly resting 
on the other point. This makes the two congruent." 
With regard to those cases giving a correct solution, the following 
minimum type of answer has been accepted: 
AX =.BX (given 
CX = DX (given 
AXC = `$XD (vertically opposite) 
Therefore triangle ACX = triangle BDX. 
Formal reference to the congruency theorem on which the final step 
of the argument is based has not been insisted upon. Of those who refer 
to it, reference is either by enunciating the theorem, or by the actual 
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process of applying the one triangle to the other, in the manner of proof 
of that theorem. In about two- thirds of the correct answers reference is 
made to the theorem. 
To accept the word "given" as an explanation of the equality of the 
lines AX and BX, CX and DX, instead of a more direct reference to bisection, 
does not preclude the possibility of a mere mechanical transference of the 
data from the original theorem itself; and, in fact, in the great majority 
of cases merely the tern "given" is used. But reasonable leniency is 
desirable in this experiment. 
On the other hand, a mere statement as to the equality of the correct 
lines and angles has not been accepted. The danger of doing otherwise 
is exemplified in the following case where all three steps are factually 
correct, and yet where the reasons given show that the proof has not been 
understood at all. (Girl: 12;6. School B. Class 1.B2) 
"AX = BX (because AB is a straight line) 
CX = DX (both peril. to AB and they are one straight line) 
4AXC = `BXD (because AB bisects CD at X) 
These "reasons" are plainly a blind transference from some quite 
irrelevant theorem which the child has "learned" but not understood. 
Those cases, however, showing correct answers but without reasons, 
have been noted, and their number kept separate from those in which the 
argument is definitely arbitrary or nonsensical. 
One other point must be mentioned. This test was given to schools 
A and B in February of the session in which theoretical geometry had been 
begun (i.e. in September of the previous year), and to school C in March. 
In every case the ground necessary for the solution of questions 1 and 2 
had been covered, and practice in problems similar to question 1 had been 
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conducted in the ordinary course of the school work. Unfortunately, 
it was afterwards discovered that in school C actual theoretical geometry 
had not been begun until the beginning of the second term, and question 3 
was not possible for these children. But the groundwork for questions 
1 and 2 had been done. 
No restrictions as to time were made in administering this test. 
The teacher giving the test was asked to allow half an hour or more, if 
necessary, and to eliminate the time factor as far as possible. 
The following are the results for question 1: 
Total number of children attempting the test: 216 
Number who completed the question: 176 
Number of correct answers, with reasons: 37 or 21 ó 
Number of correct answers, without 3 reasons: 9 or 5;ro 
Number of arbitrary or nonsensical answers: 130 or 714ÿo 
The percentages are of course based upon the 176 children who 
completed the question to their own satisfaction. 
In question 3 we have a task of a less theoretical nature, in which 
ideas taken from three different theorems are involved in the discovery 
of a concrete fact, the size of a specific angle. The errors here, 
however, are of a similar type, consisting mainly in arbitrary 
assumptions based either upon the appearance of the figure, or upon 
transference from other theorems or problems. Of the first kind are: 
that line AB equals line BC; or that the triangle is equi- angular; or 
that exterior angle BCY equals exterior angle BAZ. Of the second kind 
are: that angle BCA and angle BAZ are equal because they are "corres- 
ponding" angles; or that angle YCX and angle BAZ are alternate angles. 
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Still another variant is a transference from a theorem which itself has 
been misunderstood, such as, that the exterior angle of a triangle being 
equal to the sum of the two interior opposite angles, we have only to 
halve the value of the exterior angle in order to arrive at the value of 
each of the two interior angles concerned. Thus the argument runs: 
¿YOB = 110° 
Therefore .::CBA = 55° and LBAC = 55° 
Therefore , BAZ = 125° 
Some examples of this transference from other theorems are almost 
impossible to follow. Here is a case of a girl: 12;9. Class 1.C2; 
school B: 
"4-YCX = 70° (given) 
`YBC = 110 °(adjacent angles formed by two straight lines) 
XCZ = less than 180° and more than 90 °, adjacent angles formed 
by two straight lines. 
Therefore ¿BCA + SCAB + 'ABC = 180 °, 3 angles of a triangle. 
0BAZ = 110 °, angles about a point make u 360 °. 
Because LYCX = 70° and triangle ABC = 180° = 250u. 
Therefore &BAZ = 360° - 250° = 110 
o 
." 
On account of the fact that school C had not covered all the 
ground necessary to answer this question, and also because, being the 
last of the three questions it suffered most from the time element, 
only 65 children completed this part of the test. The answer to this 
problem being numerical and therefore upen to guessing, no account has 
been taken of answers which are not accompanied by some attempt at 
argument. The results are as follows: 
Total number completed: 65 
Total correct: 17 or 26 
Correct, but insufficient reasons: 1 or 1.96 
Incorrect: 47 72.5% 
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These percentages, it will be noted, are very similar to those 
resulting from question 1. 
Question 2 is of a rather different order. We have here a test 
of the ability to comprehend two abstract ideas and the relationship 
between them, - that of an angle and of a triangle. As the child in 
this test must be able to view almost the same situation in terms first 
of one idea and then of another, it serves to demonstrate his ability to 
move freely among such concepts. It is essential, of course, that 
both parts of the question should be answered correctly. All that is 
required is a simple "Yes" or "No ", although some children have also 
attached reasons for their statements. A few of these (10 in number) 
have given the correct answer but attached the wrong reason, and these 
are therefore counted as having failed. Some also have given no answer 
to one or both parts of the question. Those failing to answer both 
parts have not been considered, as well as those answering correctly in 
one part but omitting to answer the other. But any case in which only 
one part is answered and that incorrectly, is counted as a failure. 
The number of cases discarded through lack of completion is 18. 
There is also another type of case in which an incorrect drawing of the 
figure, or a misunderstanding of the question, appears to have caused a 
wrong answer. These cases, also 18 in number, e some obvious, some 
doubtful, - have also been set aside. There thus remain, out of the 216 
cases, 180 answers with which we can deal. 
The great majority of the errors have to do with the second part of 
the question - the triangles. The following are the results: 
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Total number completed: 180 
Correct: 82 or 45.5ÿo 
Incorrect: 98 or 54..5 
Of those who failed: 
Error in regard to angles: 21 or 21.5% 
triangles: 71 or 72.5% 
It It both: 6 or 6.0% 
From this we may gather that more than half of these children were 
incapable of handling such elementary geometrical ideas, the great major- 
ity of those who failed being unable, apparently, to pass without con- 
fusion from the conception of an angle to that of a triangle. There is 
no question here of manipulation of ideas; it is merely a switching -over 
from one idea to the other. But this ability to free oneself, at will, 
from the consideration of one idea and to take up another, is an essential 
preliminary to manipulation; and it should surely be present in 100% of 
the children of a class before we expect them to enter upon the theoretical 
stage of geometry. 
It. is not to be supposed that these children would be incapable in 
other circumstances of judging that, of two triangles, the one which is 
large enough to contain the other is the bigger triangle. Their difficulty 
apparently is to grasp all the attributes of the concept "triangle" at one 
and the same time, and not to be misled into viewing a triangle from its 
angular aspect only. This is exemplified in those cases where the child 
has added a reason for a wrong answer to the "triangle" part of the 
question, and which has been done in nearly half of these cases, (33 out 
of 71). 
In 17 of these it is categorically stated that the criterion is one 
of the size of the angles. Actual examples are: 
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"Yes, because the angles are equal." 
"They are equal in size, because no matter how small they are, 
or how large, the three angles together make up 180 °." 
"Yes, they are equal, because if the three angles of each 
triangle were measured they would be exactly the same number 
of degrees. " 
"Triangle XYZ is equal to triangle DBE. It is the amount of 
turning that counts." 
" B in first triangle = Y in second triangle. 
E t' t1 Z ft It 
D ft it = X II If 
Yes." 
One boy, having failed to produce BA right to the edge of the paper, 
is prevented from viewing DBE as a triangle. He therefore answers: 
"No, because DRE is not a triangle and XYZ is a triangle . . " 
So far, the answer would be legitimate in the circumstances. But he adds: 
"Triangle XYZ is larger, because the three angles of a triangle 
make up together 180 °." 
The belief here seems to be that a figure is larger than another if the 
sum of the degrees contained by its angles is greater. The following 
case shows the same view very clearly: 
"The angles of triangle XYZ and DBE are equal. The size of the 
sides do not count, but the angles do." 
The following shows the child's inability to grasp the concept of 
triangle in its entirety and to hold together as parts of one concept the 
double aspect cf sides and angles. This girl (12;7) cannot combine the 
two but wavers between what are to her, apparently, two incompatible 
ideas, deciding finally upon the irrelevant one: 
"The actual sizes of the triangles are not equal, but the 
angles of the one are equal to the angles of the other. 
Therefore DBE = XYZ." 
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In 11 cases out of the 33, the "angle" criterion of size is not 
specifically stated, but is implied. The following are examples: 
"No (because DE and XZ are not parallel)" 
"No, the triangles are not equal as XYZ has a sloping side 
and DBE has not." 
"No, they are not equal in size because XYZ is an acute angle 
and DEB is a right angle (I measured it with my protractor) 
therefore triangle DBE is not equal to triangle XYZ." 
"The two triangles DBE and XYZ are not equal in size. The only 
angles that are equal in the two triangles are(DBE 
This reference to DE and XZ not being parallel, or that the angles 
involved by them are not equal, is due to the fact that X and Z did not 
happen to be drawn equidistant from the edge of the paper - an accident 
which of course in no way affected the test. 
The following cases are interesting as indicative of indecision 
between the two criteria: 
"As above, DBE is bigger in size" (from the first part of the 
question it is clear that he means 'length of arms') "but in 
degrees triangle XYZ has more." 
"They are the same size in angle although one has been enlarged." 
"The triangles are (words omitted) size but their areas are 
different." ('the same size' is presumably meant.) 
This apparent inability to grasp at one and the same time both the 
angular and the linear aspects of the concept "triangle ", seems to show 
that such ideas are not yet fully objectifiable by these children. They 
cannot bring both aspects into mental focus at once. In other words, it 
is the relationship which they cannot objectify. It is, of course, a more 
subtle relationship than anything which will confront them in elementary 
algebra. 
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The remaining 5 cases have to do with sides rather than with angles, 
and in three of these the "argument" is obscure. But the remaining two 
cases are worthy of note. One is a boy of 13;1, from the brightest 
class in school A. He has proved the congruency problem of question 1 
correctly, with a reason given for eve_y step, and with the argument 
laid out and written in a manner that would gladden the heart of an 
examiner. One would say that here, at least, is a child of 13 who 
understands what he is doing in geometry. 
His answer to the second part of question 2 is as follows: 
"They are equal. 
Two straight lines (BD and DE) and an included &BE _ 
Two straight lines (XY and YZ) and an included 4 XYZ. 
(Congruent)" 
The other case is that of a boy (12;8) from class 1.A1, school C: 
"Yes, they are equal in size because of the proposition: If 
two triangles have two angles and a side of the one equal to 
two angles and a side of the other." 
He has evidently had this proposition well engraven on his memory, 
for he also "proves" question 1 by means of it. 
In this connection it must now be added that of the 37 children who 
had successfully completed question 1, and thereby indicated, apparently, 
that they were capable of understanding congruency and something of the 
method of geometrical proof, no less than 12 failed immediately afterwards 
in the angle -triangle question, showing thereby that they succeeded in the 
first question not through insight but by some mechanical means; two 
failed to give any answer to the question; and one drew the figure incor- 
rectly. The remaining 22 were correct. Of those 12 who failed, 6 
failed in the "angle" part of the question, 5 in the "triangle" part, and 
1 in both. 
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Thus we cannot say that 37 out of 176 children (21ó) showed under- 
standing in the handlinÚ of a simple geometrical problem, but, at the 
most, 25 or 14;ó. The average age of the 22 who passed in both questions 
1 and 2 is 13;4, 6 being under 13 and 2 over 14.. It is perhaps worth 
noting that the average age of these children is above that of the total 
group of 216 children, which is 13;1. Normally, it should be the duller 
children who tend to be above the average age in a school group of the 
same scholastic level. This dëparture from the rule, as far as it goes, 
points to the fact which the whole of this experiment seems to show, that 
the child at the age of 13 has not yet the mental structure necessary for 
geometrical thinking. 
The plain facts are, that out of this group of 176 children, 86% 
failed in questions 1 and 2 - which does not mean, be it noted, merely that 
86jó of a group of children failed to find the solution to a problem, for 
that would be a fact of little moment. It means that this percentage 
failed out of a group of children who believed that they had found a 
solution, and that their errors were not those of ignorance of fact or 
carelessness of calculation, but were due to inability to handle the 
material with which they were expected to work. The result shows a kind 
of "syncretism of reasoning" at the abstract level. 
The positive evidence supplied by this experiment is suported by the 
fact that no Binet test up to the 12 -year level involves the ability to 
manipulate abstract ideas. It is probable that this first appears with 
adolescence. In the meantime, it is difficult to see what educational 
advantages are to be derived from the teaching of theoretical geometry to 
children of 12 -13. In even the best class in our present group of 
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children - class 1.A1, school A - which has the highest percentage of 
passes in both questions Land 2, the actual numbers are 7 out of 32 
boys, or, if we consider only those who have completed question 1, 7 out 
of 25 - that is, 28% of a group of children presumably selected for 
their brightness. 
Apart, however, from the question of educational advantage, with 
which an examination system does not appear to be greatly concerned, it 
is possible to see how examination results in this subject can neverthe- 
less be achieved. For if it is possible that out of a group of children 
who solve a problem of congruency successfully, one third do not know 
the difference between an angle and a triangle, it can readily be under- 
stood how theorems can be learned and repeated, to the complete satis- 
faction of the examiner, by quite a large percentage of children who need 
not in the least understand what geometry is about. The embarrassing 
readiness with which previously learned theorems can be quoted has been 
seen in this experimental test; and there is no reason at all why all 
this knowledge should not be utilised by the children to secure good 
marks in an examination. 
So long as no other criterion than that of the class exercise and 
the examination is used, the fallacy which underlies the assumption that 
children of 12+ can grasp geometry, will remain unnoticed. The fallacy 
is, that the ability to grasp abstract ideas in relation, and so to 
follow an argument involving these, is not the same thing as the ability 
to free these ideas and relations from that context and to manipulate 
them correctly in another context. There is little reason to doubt that 
the first begins to be possible at age 12. The Binet scale shows this, 
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if we accept the Terman scales as valid for this purpose; while, apparent- 
ly, children of that age are able to learn and repeat theorems. But this 
is not geometry. It is merely the repeating of an argument which has 
been learned. The whole educational value of the subject, it is hardly 
necessary to say, lies in the reasoning being produced - or reproduced - 
out of the free rational activity of the individual, and not merely from 
his memory. A theorem, to be really understood, must be grasped in its 
universality - not merely as a particular argument printed in a school- 
book - and must be reproducible by the individual in any context. 
Geometry should not be taught until this kind of mental structure is 
present; and theorems "learned" in these earlier years can in no sense be 
a training for the rational activity which develops later. One cannot 
train a mind for an activity the necessary structure for which is not yet 
present. The most one can do to the mind in such circumstances is to 
strain it. 
As already pointed out, ideas of any kind are first met in a context. 
To manipulate them involves the abstraction of them from that context, and 
this, in turn, involves the ability to view them in a universal light and 
independent of that context. This means that the ideas must be object- 
ified in their full abstractness; and manipulation is thus reducible to a 
question of the objectification of ideas. A concrete idea, for example, 
is not seen in its most abstracted or isolated form until it can be defined 
in terms of an abstract idea - in class definition. This is possible at 
age 9 or 10 according to the majority of Binet test investigators; and it 
is at these ages that we have seen manipulation of imagery and of concrete 
ideas also to be present. Previous to this, ideas are not found 
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completely isolated or universally viewed, but are seen either in a 
related context ( "Comprehension 3 "), or in terms of some particular 
aspect or quality ( "Differences" and "Similarities "), or in terms of parts 
within a whole (Definition by description). Thus manipulation appears 
to be made possible through a further stage of objectification; and the 
inability of more than h if of the children in the "angle- triangle" test 
- not to manipulatO - but simply to pass from one concept to the other, 
was also due to this lack of complete objectification of the concepts 
involved. 
The situation inxegard to this premature teaching of geometry was 
aptly illustrated in the course of a conversation which the present 
writer had with an intelligent schoolboy. The boy - age 14;10 at the 
time - who is well known to the writer, was aware that the latter was 
engaged in some research work, and one day asked what this work was. The 
following is a copy of a note made of the conversation immediately 
afterwards: 
"Asked me what my research work was. Explained it was 
endeavour to find changes in mental growth, so as to discover when 
certain subjects should be taught. He replied that this could 
surely only be found through actual trial of what children could 
grasp. I pointed out that the difficulty was to discover exactly 
when they did grasp it. 
Then he told me that it was only during the previous term (age 
114) that it suddenly dawned on him that geometrical reasoning was 
meant to be applied. Commencing theoretical geometry at 12 +, he 
had always, he said, been able to follow the arguments of theorems, 
and had learned them simply as something to be learned. But "riders" 
had always puzzled him, in that he could never understand how people 
knew the solutions. He took it that the arguments in regard to them 
had to be learned, like those of theorems. Now, however, he saw 
how reasoning could be used." 
This appears to be in accordance with the conclusions we have 
reached. The apparent suddenness of the mental change, at the onset of 
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adolescence, is interesting. The note of the conversation concludes as 
follows: 
"Then he added that he supposed school teachers were quite 
satisfied so long as they could get examination results (meaning 
that they did not trouble about whether the age was appropriate or 
not). I pointed out that many people in the educational world did 
not recognise that such sudden changes exist. His reply was: "Well, 
there must be a hanged lot of fools in education! " 
Without associating oneself, necessarily, with the opinion here 
expressed, this last remark is interesting in that it indicates the degree 
of certainty with which the boy regarded the fact of his own mental 
change and its abruptness. 
In this geometry test we have seen an e xample of the unsuitability 
of a subject to the mental structure of the children to whom it was being 
taught. We shall now examine the problems involved in the teaching of 
another school subject, namely, grammar; and a series of experiments 
carried out by the writer will be described, in which an endeavour was 
made to teach this subject in a manner suitable to the mental structure 
of the children concerned. 
The mental structure of the child between the ages of 7 and 12 is 
characterised by the fact that concrete ideas can be objectified in 
increasing stages of complexity, but not purely abstract ideas. These 
begin to appear about 12. If, then, we with to teach the child in 
accordance with his mental structure, we shall refrain from demanding of 
him during these years that he should objectify abstract ideas. 
At 8 -9 the child reaches a point when relational thinking is 
developed; and this, therefore, is the period at which grammar can be 
suitably introduced, since grammar deals with relations between 
words. 
But grammar can be nevertheless a very abstract subject, and it is 
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frequently taught as such - to the aversion of the majority and the 
bewilderment of the dull. 
During two years of experimental teaching in the small private 
school previously mentioned, the writer had the opportunity to tackle 
this problem. The problem is briefly this: 
Grammar consists primarily of two complementary approaches to a 
study of the sentence - a study of the parts ofspeech and their relation- 
ships, and a study of the sentence and its structure. The fact that the 
child at this age can define a concrete idea in terms of class would 
seem to suggest that he should be able to recognise the parts of speech. 
But in grammar we are not concerned with the definition of a word in 
terms of its meaning (as in the question 'What is a horse?') but in terms 
of its functions as word. We are classifying words and their relation- 
ships, not the meanings of words. Idow a word, Per se, is an abstract 
idea, so that when we ask a child to classify words - i.e. to objectify 
them - we are approaching the 12 -year level of thinking. In this way 
grammar may be very abstract and therefore unsuitable for the child of 
8 -9. 
But as we have seen that - according to the tests - a child can 
define a concrete idea in terms of use or function several years before 
he can do so in terms of class, we shall remain more within the frame- 
work of his mental structure at this age if we describe the parts of 
speech to him in terms of their function - speaking to him not of nouns 
and verbs, but of "naming- words ", "doing words ", etc.. There is a 
tendency today to introduce this form of terminology into grammar text- 
books and into teaching. The problem still remains, 
however, as to the 
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best way of illustrating these functions. The task is not so difficult 
in the case of the parts of speech, but it is another matter when we 
came to deal with the other aspect of the subject - the structure of the 
sentence - and are faced with the problem of demonstrating the "function' 
of such concepts as "subject ", "predicate ", and "object ". The difficulty 
is, of course, that we are dealing here primarily with structure, and 
function hardly enters into the matter. 
To grasp the grammatical structure of a sentence involves the 
objectification of abstract ideas in relation. How is this to be presented 
to the child of 8 or 9? This is the realm of the most abstractly handled, 
and hence badly taught, aspect of grammar; and the process of sentence 
"analysis" usually involves ruled columns in an exercise book in which 
the different components of the sentence, ruthlessly torn from one 
another, are locked up in separate compartments labelled "Subject ", 
"Enlargement of the Subject ", Predicate ", and so on. When a sentence 
has been thus shredded and tabulated, it remains a mere jumble of words, 
and the sentence itself - whose structure we are supposed to be examining - 
has ceased to exist. 
If we consider the child's mental structure between the ages of 7 
and 12, we shall find one golden rule for the teaching of any subject 
during this period. During these years the child is able to objectify 
only concrete or complex ideas, and as complex ideas are concrete ideas 
in relation, (the relation itself not yet being objectified), we can see 
that concrete ideas constitute the framework of all the child's object- 
ified thoughts at that time. But the essential fact about a concrete 
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idea is, that it is very closely allied to the mental image. It is 
something which can be pictured. Hence, teaching during this period 
should always be pictorial in character. It should appeälto the 
child's imagination. 
How can grammar be made pictorial? If so abstract a subject as 
this can be so treated - especially that of sentence -analysis - it will 
be unnecessary to demonstrate the possibility of this in the case of 
more concrete subjects. 
The problem is one of translating an abstract relationship into 
pictorial terms, and the following method was adopted by thevtriter in 
his actual teaching of this subject. Proceeding from the belief that 
the sentence is, above all things, an organic structure, the writer 
concluded that in analysis this organic nature must never be lost sight 
of. Hence he likened the sentence to a tree or plant, having a root, 
stem, and branches. The subject of a sentence together with the verb 
and the object (if any) are as inseparable as the root and main stem of 
a plant, while "enlargements" of the subject or object, or "extensions" 
of the predicate, belong to these in the relatively separable manner as 
branches belong to the plant. One can remove branches without 
destroying the tree, but not the main stem or the root. In other words, 
one can remove the branches" of a sentence and the remainder will still 
make sense; but if one removes the root or main stem, it no longer 
makes sense. 
This the children understood very easily, and sentences were 
analysed in this way, an outline of a pliant or tree being drawn and the 
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sentence written along the stem and branches thus: 
(Sentence: With a shout the boy threw the ball into the river.) 
Here we have grammatical analysis expressed in a picture, and one 
which retains the sentence in a recognisable form. It is analysed into 
its component parts, and yet we can still see how it all belongs 
together. By this means the structure of the sentence was readily 
grasped by the children, and soon quite elaborate sentences were dealt 
with, involving branches growing from the root, stem, or higher portion, 
according as they represented enlargements of the subject or object, or 
extensions of the predicate. Later, branches growing from other 
branches were introduced, so that the child was able to grasp in a 
picture the manner in which the different phrases depend upon the main 
body of the sentence and some of these, in turn, upon one another. In 
this way the manner in which one phrase may "modify" or "qualify" another 
could be understood. 
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The children enjoyed the work, and at the age of 10 -11 sentences 
such as the following were successfully tackled: (These were actual 
sentences set for home -work) 
"Seizing his arm in a terrible grip, Beowulf leapt swiftly to 
his feet, hurling the ugly monster to the ground." 
"Then slowly rose up the three fair sisters with a cruel smile 
upon their lips, creeping towards them, like leopards creeping on 
their prey." 
This, together with parsing, constituted the work in grammar during 
the last term. The lowest average mark during that term for grammar 
home -work, as well as for the terminal "test ", was 66% in both cases, - 
a boy with an I.Q. of 81. The marking was always strict and accurate. 
This seemed to show that, provided one remained within the mental 
structure of the children, they could grasp these grammatical relation- 
ships with ease and tackle even quite complex sentences. The most 
noticeable feature was, that these children had no difficulty in spotting 
the "root" or subject of the sentence, even when this was masked behind 
introductory phrases, as in the above examples. Normally, this is a 
very frequent type of error. When analysis is taught by the usual 
method, the child, floundering in a sea of abstractions, grasps at some 
imagined "rule" - such as, that the subject of a sentence is always the 
part which comes first, with the predicate in the middle, and the object 
at the end; and so, when he is presented with an inverted sentence, he 
is lost. The children taught by this method experienced no difficulty 
of this kind. They had no need to think in terms of "rules ". In this 
"picture" they had something which they could grasp. 
The class referred to, however, consisted only of nine boys whose 
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I.Q.s were: 81, 91, 106, 111, 111, 111, 117, 119, 126. The writer 
therefore was anxious to try a similar experiment with a greater number 
of children and of more average brightness, and also with backward 
children. 
An opportunity for the former was afforded him some time later while 
visiting a school in London. He arranged to give five lessons in 
grammatical analysis, using this method, to a class of 30 children there, 
age 10 -11. I.Q.s were not available, but these children were non- selected, 
being grouped solely according to age. After the completion of the 
series of lessons, a test was given at which there were two absentees, 
reducing the number to 28 (14 boys and 14 girls). The children were 
drawn for the most part from the rather poorer middle class of a London 
suburb. 
These children had had no teaching whatever in analysis of the 
sentence, grammar having been confined up to that time to the parts of 
speech. The lessons were given on a Tuesday and Wednesday of one week, 
and on the Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of the week following. The 
test was given on the Friday. In the test two sentences were given, and 
the children were asked to draw a plant or tree and write the sentence 
along it in the appropriate way, indicating by the placing of the phrases 
the subject, predicate, and object, with extensions. The actual 
grammatical terms were not introduced. 
The two sentences were as follows: 
"The old man walked with a happy smile toward the knight." 
"In the lofty hall the visitor lifted the great sword from 
the table." 
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The first sentence has a subject, predicate, and two extensions; 
the second, a subject, predicate, object, and two extensions. The point 
of importance in the first sentence is, of course, that it has no object, 
while in the second the subject is "masked" by an introductory phrase. 
The exact "placing" of the branches - i.e. attaching them to the lower, 
middle, or upper part of the stem according as the phrase was an enlarge- 
ment of the subject or object, or extension of the predicate - was not 
insisted on. Naturally, one could not go so far in five lessons. In 
four cases a child made the one branch grow out of the other. But this 
also is something the significance of which he could not fully understand 
at this stage. What was aimed at in these early lessons was to teach 
the children to distinguish subject, predicate, object, and any form of 
extensional phrase. This is very much more than is usually attempted in 
so short a time. The results were as follows: 
Sentence 1. 27 correct out of 28 or 96jó 
" 2. 22 " " " 28 " 78. 5 ó 
The error in two of the six failures in sentence 2 was due to one 
of the two extension phrases having been omitted, and not to any 
confusion of them with subject or object. Of the remaining four, two 
had the subject wrong, and two the object. Thus one can say in regard 
to sentence 2, that 24 out of the 28 understood how to distinguish between 
these four parts of the sentence, that is, nearly 86%. 
In teaching these children the writer experienced the same interest 
and enthusiasm on the part of the children as he had observed in the 
Edinburgh school. They were able to grasp the elements of sentence- 
structure almost at once, as the figures themselves show, and the con- 
fusion and difficulties which usually attend this branch of grammar were 
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almost entirely absent. 
The third experiment undertaken by the writer in this connection was 
with a group of dull children. He approached the headmaster of an 
elementary school in a poor working -class area, namely, South Bridge 
School, Edinburgh, with the request that he be allowed to teach grammar 
during one term to the dullest children of the most backward class which 
had received just one term's teaching in grammar. This request was 
readily granted, and six children (four boys and two girls) were selected 
by the class teacher as being the most backward in this subject, and of 
whom she had been able to make little or nothing during the previous term. 
The ages of these children at the beginning of the experiment were: 9;11, 
9;6, 10;0, 10;3, 9;11, and 10;9, and their I.Q.s were respectively, 97.5, 
88.5, 83, 80, 79, and 75.5. 
The grammar teaching during the previous term had consisted of 
formal analysis of the simple sentence and was being continued during the 
term in question. The writer taught these six children in a separate 
room each time a grammar lesson was being given to the remainder of the 
class - which occurred twice per week for a period of half an hour; so 
the time given to them in this subject was the same as they would normally 
have received in their own class. 
The "tree" method of analysis was used, the children using at first 
coloured chalks for their drawin7s. Towards the end of the term ordinary 
pencils were substituted and the formal grammatical terms introduced, when 
the children were taught how to "translate" into formal terms what they had 
previously written along the trunk and branches of the tree. Thus a tree 
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was first drawn and the sentence analysed in terms of it, and then the 
usual formal series of columns for subject, predicate, object, and ex- 
tension, was drawn out below and the appropriate sections filled in. In 
this way the children were brought into line with the remainder of the 
class in regard to method, in order that they should not find themselves 
at sea on their return. 
At the end of the term a test of three sentences was set and given 
by the headmaster who afterwards corrected and marked the papers. The 
test consisted of the following sentences: 
1. The little boy loved the animals. 
2. The kind driver patted his horse on the back. 
3. Yesterday the children played a game in the park. 
A mark was given for each item of analysis, of which there are 12. 
From the report made by the headmaster (reproduced below) it will be 
seen that the lowest score was 8 out of 12, made by a boy with an I.Q. of 
75.5. It will be noted also that, in the class examination at the end of 
the third term, three of the children had profited by the experiment to 
the extent of gaining 3 out of 5, 4 out of 5, and 5 out of 5, in the 
grammar question. The remaining three, on the other hand, had fallen 
back once more. 
HEADMASTER'S REPORT 
"During the second term (about three months) of session 1934-35 
Mr. Pelham Moffat was given permission to carry out an experiment in 
the teaching of grammar to six of the backward pupils of class Senior 
1.D (1st. year of the senior division - ages 9 -10 years). At this 
stage the analysis of the simple sentence is begun and this class had 
started formal analysis at the beginning of the session. These siy 
pupils were chosen by the class teacher for the experiment as they 
had shown little or no progress in this work. 
Mr. Moffat's experiment was an endeavour to show that with Pupils 
of low I.Q. a pictorial method of teaching this abstract subject 
-227"- 
would make a much more definite appeal and be more likely to have 
lasting effects than the mere formal teaching of this difficult 
subject. I shall leave the description of Ir. Moffat's method to 
himself and deal with the matter from the point of view of general 
results. 
To begin with, the children obviously enjoyed the time spent 
with Mr. Moffat, the drawing & the colouring involved in working out 
their sentences had a direct appeal to these backward children. 
Through hand and eye they found an approach to a subject, which, 
when presented in formal teaching, had, on the whole, been quite 
unintelligible to them. There is no doubt in my own mind that from 
this point of view the experiment was successful. In fact, even 
with children of average and over -average intelligence I am con - 
vinced this method of approach is valuable. Indeed most good 
teachers use some concrete method to begin with and then discard it, 
as is only right, when they think their pupils have grasped the 
essential principles of analysis. With backward children, however, 
the period of using some concrete method would have to be a fairly 
long one and probably with very backward children they would never 
be able to make the change over to purely abstract reasoning. 
From the point of view of time it would probably have been 
more satisfactory if the experiment could have been carried on for, 
say, two or three teens in order to find out the permanent effects of 
this method. 
However, even in the short time available it was clear that 
advance had been made, but, I think, from further observation since 
the end of the experiment some of the children would require to use 
this or some other concrete method for a longer period. 
Pupil 
The following table gives some details in connection 
experiment: 
Date I.Q. m Headmaster's Test (unprepared) 
with the 
e Teacher's Class 
of given at end of experiment on Test given 28/6/35 
Birth 2/4/25, pupils using Mr. 
Moffat's method. 
in the ordinary wqy 
and not using Mr. 
Moffat's method. 
Analysis of S.Sent. 
A 5.7.25 88.5 11 marks out of 12 Correct: 5/5 
(Partially 
B 6.2.25 97.5 10 " " " 
If (Correct: 3/5 
C 28.12.24 83.0 9 " " Wrong: 0/5 
(Nearly 
D 22.2.25 79.0 10 " " " " (Correct 4/5 
E 1210.24 80.0 lo " " Wrong: 0/5 
F 12.4.24 75.5 8" u u u Wrong: 0/5 
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This test consisted of 3 simple sentences 
No. 1. Subject and Predicate 
No. 2. " " and Object. 
No. 3. " " " and Extensions (2) 
e One simple sentence with Subject, Predicate, Object and 
2 Extensions. 
5th July, 1935. 
WILLIAM J. S. LITTLE, 
Headmaster, 
South Bridge School, 
Edinburgh." 
There is no reason for doubting that all six children would have 
maintained the level gained had pictorial teaching been continued after 
the period of the experiment. During the experiment itself they 
received,of course, much more personal attention than they would have 
received in their own large class; but the marks gained at the end of 
the experiment were proportionately high, especially for backward children, 
and a lower standard of achievement would still have been adequate for 
them to have kept up with the remainder of the class. This method was 
used because it is in accordance with the mental structure of the child 
at that age, and should therefore be maintained so long as that structure 
remains. It is not a question merely of using such a method as a 
convenient way of helping lame dogs over styles, and then of discarding 
it as soon as examination marks can be secured without its aid. 
From the three foregoing experiments it seems clear that if we 
approach the child in terms of his mental structure he will be found to 
give an immediate and marked response, whether he be bright or dull, and 
that, in consequence, the bright and the dull can be taught together 
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provided one has respect to this mental structure in the method of 
teaching. Hence, if mental structure is, as it appears to be, a 
function of chronological age, children of the same age should be given 
the same kind of teaching, and there should be no difficulty in regard 
to teaching bright and dull togetaer in the same class. 
The bright, of course, can always be pushed on; and it is usually 
believed today that we do a service to the super -normal child if we 
provide him with the means of utilising his powers of thought beyond the 
usual level of his years. It is thought that we thereby assist his 
development into a brilliant adult. It is not considered that we may 
merely harm him by encouraging his greater mental energy to find an 
outlet on higher levels of abstractness of thought, instead of confin- 
ing his activities to the plane of his normal mental structure. The 
superficial criterion of the I.Q. tends to blind us to this possibility. 
It is not a question of getting children to think abstractly as 
quickly as possible and of making them into adults before their time; 
it is a question of giving them the kind of mental food which they can 
assimilate without strain, and strain will arise when a child tries to 
bring into mental focus ideas which he is not yet normally able to 
objectify. A concrete case has already been quoted. The extent to 
which he tries to force such ideas into focus will depend, naturally, 
upon the strength or "brightness" of the ego of the child. A dull 
child will not try. He sits in class and allows everything beyond his 
reach to flow past hirn. The bright child will make an effort to grasp 
it. But on this account it is to the bright child that more harm may 
tend to be done. 
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It is therefore no cause for rejoicing that, for example, among 
the children of our geometrical test, at least WS were apparently 
able to handle geometrical concepts. On the contrary, it may almost 
safely be said that when 86;ó of a group of children of a given age show 
themselves unfit for a given type of mental work, it can hardly be 
anything but a strain upon the resources of the remainder. For mere 
scholastic attainment, with the incredibly shallow criterion of the 
examination system, is not what we must look to, but to the effect of 
our teaching u;. on the whole after -life of the child. The fact that a 
child can repeat theorems, and even understand them, at the age of 12, 
has no educational significance whatever - although those reponsible 
for the school curriculum seem to regard it as an essential. What has 
significance is the kind of mind which, as a result of our educational 
efforts, that same child will have at the age of 40. If we succeed in 
inducing him at 12 to perform mental operations for which he is not yet 
ripe, what effect will this have upon his mind as an adult? Or, con- 
versely and more generally, at what age ought this or that subject to be 
taught, and in what manner, so that the future adult may have the maximum 
of initiative, creativeness, and mental elasticity? And how far is the 
evident lack of these qualities around us due to a premature intellec- 
tualisation of the child at school? Until such questions are inquired 
into, education cannot even begin. What goes on under that name at the 
moment appears to be a more or less efficient system for the preparation 
of examinees. 
It is not suggested, of course, that modern education has no ideals. 
Theoretically, the aim of the modern school is to prepare useful citizens. 
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But in practice, the criteria, apparently, of what is good for the child 
to receive as a means to that end, and the age at which he should receive 
it, are the exigencies of the examination system and the age at which he 
can produce paper results. In regard to geometry, such results cali just 
be achieved at 12, and apparently no earlier; while the ground necessary 
to be covered for the purposes of a school certificate, prevents the 
postponement of the subject until later. It is between these two mill- 
stones - the limit of what the child can visibly stand, and the pass 
limit of a state examination - that future "citizens" are ground. 
A pathetic instance of the criterion of paper results was seen by 
the writer while visiting school B in connection with the geometry test. 
The teacher in charge of these classes handed him copies of a series of 
ten geometrical exercises which he was in the habit of using for these 
children, and by means of which he found it possible to achieve results. 
One of these is reproduced below. The original is in the form of a 
duplicated sheet which is handed to the child for him to fill in. It 
will be seen from this that just that factor which we found to be lacking 
in the child of this age - the factor of manipulation of the ideas - is 
here supplied by the teacher, and so, naturally, results can be obtained. 
EZCISE 4.. 
"Use the following statement: - 
Adjacent angles formed by two straight lines make up 180 °. 
AB and CD intersect at O. /ADD and 610B are bisected by OX and OY. 
Prove 
/, 
X0Y a right angle. 
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Y 
Given AB and intersecting at 0 
bisected by . . . and 4 . by 
Required to prove 
Proof AOD is bisected by .... 
OI)= l 2 
is bisected by 
. . IXOD + < = 2 ( 4 + 4 ) 
But C ADD + L B0D = ( ) 
:. LXOD 4, _ 
That is L, X0Y is 
Q.E.D. " 
It is no discredit to the teacher in question that he should employ 
such a method as this. On the contrary, by such means he provided a 
protection for the children from a mentally harmful situation. It 
indicates, moreover, that he knew precisely what mental powers they 
lacked. But the existence of such papers is a testimony to the psycho- 
logical ignorance of those responsible for the curriculum. 
Apart from such devices, however, it is plain that the introduction 
of a subject too early, or the teaching of it in a too abstract way, has 
the effect of splitting in two any unselected group of children of a 
given age. The duller children, being unable to force the required 
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ideas into mental focus, are left behind by those who - although their 
mental structure may be no different - have the ego -strength to do so. 
This situation brings about the necessity for a system of parallel 
classes of different levels of brightness. 
The present procedure in schools, it would thus seem, starts at the 
wrong end. First of all, teaching unsuitable to the child's mental 
structure is given, either through ignorance of that structure or on 
account of the exigencies of a curriculum dictated by official examina- 
tions, and then it is found that it is impossible to teach the bright and 
the dull together. Thereupon some criterion of division is found necess- 
ary, and some scholastic or mental test is employed; and as neither of 
these adequately indicates the mental structure of the child, being 
largely an assessment of mere brightness, they fit the requirements of 
this artificially created situation. Aid so, whether judged by schol- 
astic attainment or by I.Q., those children who are best able to force 
their mental structure to suit scholastic requirements are segregated 
from those who - more fortunately for themselves, perhaps - are less 
able to do so. 
If, however, in contrast to this present topsy -turry procedure, we 
were to consider the needs of the child to be the first essential in 
education, and so seek to give him only what is appropriate to his 
mental structure at any given age, we should find that these difficulties 
do not arise, and such forms of testing would become superfluous. For 
if a teacher has before him a class of children to whom he is about to 
teach algebra, the really important thing for him to know about these 
children is not which among them are bright and which are dull (he will 
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discover that soon enough), but whether or not their mental structure 
is such that they can think naturally in terms of abstract ideas. If 
they can do so, he will find, of course, that the bright children can do 
so more quickly or can cope with more complex situations, while the dull 
will handle their material more slowly. But these are facts of 
secondary importance. For what makes the subdivision of a class 
imperative is not that some pupils are slower than others - that factor 
is always present in even the most carefully selected group - but that 
some pupils cannot really grasp the subject at all. This was clearly 
shown in the case of the grammar experiment. A clear distinction must 
be made between mere slowness in handling those ideas which are object- 
ified, on the one hand, and inability to objectify the ideas, on the other. 
If the development of a child's mental structure is retarded and he 
cannot objectify the ideas normal for his age, that is quite another 
question, and how far this is the case is a matter of investigation. 
His I.Q. will not necessarily show it, as we have seen. As the grammar 
experiments showed, however, there would appear to be a wide range of 
children over which the requisite structure is normally present. The 
backward children in this case had no lack of the power to objectify 
concrete ideas in relation - else they could not have succeeded so well 
as they did. The fault lay - not in their being unable to handle con- 
crete ideas - but in the fact that in their own class they had been 
expected to deal with abstract ideas. They were certainly slow, but - 
kept within the framework of the structure normal for their age - the 
subject was by no means beyond their grasp. 
It is probable that a lack of the mental structure normal to a 
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given age is one of the basic characteristics of mental defect. This 
would appear to be so from the graphs of Burt's M.D. children, where 
relational thinking first appears at 9 instead of at 7, developing most 
during the 9 -10 interval instead of during the year 7 -8; while the type 
of thinking which develops in their case prior to age 10 - showing 
similar fluctuations to that of the normal children - is, however, of a 
lower level of structure. To sum up, we must distinguish between dull- 
ness of ego, and absence of normal mental structure. 
These general considerations in regard to education can be fully 
illustrated in the case of a school in which they were actually carried 
out. During a three months' visit to a well -known school in Germany 
the writer had the opportunity of seeing how education can be conducted 
with a view to meeting the actual needs of the child in the manner indi- 
cated above. This school (closed, unfortunately, in April 1938 on 
account of its not conforming to National- Socialist requirements) was the 
well -known Waldorf School in Stuttgart, which was conducted on Rudolf 
Steiner's educational principles and founded in 1919 with some 250 
pupils. So successful was the school that its numbers increased to over 
1000 by 1926 - a level which was more than maintained until the change 
in the German Government in 1933, when certain restrictions began to be 
placed upon the flow of pupils. The school was co- educational, and 
catered for children from nursery -class age up to university matriculation. 
Broadly speaking, the principles adopted involve the presentation of 
the school subjects to the children at such an age and in such a manner 
as will meet their actual mental needs, and at the same time the use of 
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these lessons as media for the ultimate harmonious linking of the 
intellectual, affective and conative elements in the adult. The intro- 
duction of certain subjects too early, or in too intellectual a manner, 
it is claimed, tends to divorce the intellectual from the conative 
element, and to weaken the affective and imaginative. The result of 
this, it is held, is a type of adult whose thinking does not come to 
fruition in action, or one who is subject to the domination of conative 
impulses devoid of accompanying thought; while the damping down of the 
affective -imaginative element in the child tends to kill what would 
become the creative element and the source of initiative in the adult. 
It is pointed out that in his earliest years the child expresses 
himself largely in terms of the conative element - in action and imitation. 
Later the imaginative and affective element predominates, showing itself 
in phantasy and in a love of rhythm. Only in the adolescent period, it 
is claimed, does the intellectual element appear in comparative separation 
from the imaginative and affective. Until that time, thought is largely 
imaginative and closely bound up with the feelings. 
As the physical organism of the child is busily engaged in building 
itself up during the earlier years, the bodily proportions not being 
properly completed until about the age of 6 or 7, it is maintained that 
demands of any kind upon the child's thinking should not be made before 
that age - the period of commencement of the second dentition. To do 
otherwise is to impare the health and vitality of the organism. 
During the miCìdle period (7 to 14) teaching must remain concrete 
and imaginative or pictorial, and it is held that teaching of an abstract 
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or intellectualistic kind during these years has a two -fold effect. 
First, it neglects and so starves the feelings and imagination, causing 
these to seek unhealthy forms of expression, while the link between 
thought and conation is broken. Moral ideals, for instance, which tend 
to appear in adolescence, will tend to remain as mere ideals, finding 
no affective support - no "bridge" whereby they may pass over into 
action. Impulse, on the other hand, will have no adequate intellectual 
or affective check; while the feelings and imagination, seeking stimulus 
from external sources and depending more and more upon these for their 
satisfaction, will lose their own spontaneous creative powers. 
Secondly, it is pointed out, to develop thinking in separation from 
the other elements mentioned - not in itself a bad thing at the right 
age - involves the èvelopment of the critical judgment. Judgment, 
however, has two aspects. It involves not only the power to dissect 
and analyse, but the ability to enter with understanding into the subject 
or situation judged. Understanding, however, except in the case of 
purely abstract subjects, involves more than mere intellectual ability. 
It demands imagination, feeling, and experience. It is what may be 
termed the positive or constructive aspect of judgment, whereas the 
analytical element may be termed the negative or destructive side. A 
balanced judgment requires both. But if we develop the purely thinking 
element in young children, we develop the critical element in advance 
of understanding and experience, and we awaken in the child the merely 
destructive side of judgment. We thus engender an antipathetic, 
destructive attitude toward life unbalanced by the sympathetic and 
constructive; and this, coupled with an affective nature which, being 
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starved craves for unhealthy excitement, can readily produce anti -social 
tendencies. 
Thus, it is claimed, not only the mental but the moral side of the 
child's nature is damaged by too early intellectual teaching. It is 
not merely a question of trying to counteract the intellectualism of 
one lesson by cultivating the child's aesthetic powers in another, giving 
- for example - theoretical geometry during one period and an art lesson 
during the next. This is already done in the ordinary schools and is 
there believed to constitute a "balanced" education. The bad effects of 
one lesson cannot be thus nullified by another. One might just as well 
try to counteract the effects of an indigestible breakfast by following 
it with a digestible lunch. By such a procedure we merely inhibit the 
beneficial assimilation of the lunch also. It was always the aim of 
the teaching in the Waldorf School to avoid producing this indigestion 
in the first place, to avoid presenting any subject during these years in 
abstraction from feeling and imagination. It was not that the children 
were not trained to think in these earlier years after the age of 7, 
but that their thinking was kept within the realm of the concrete and 
the pictorial - within the realm of what can be grasped in concrete ideas 
and imagery. This, together with a continual development of the 
feelings, not only in art and music, but through a humanistic and artist- 
ic element pervading every subject, led the children gradually into an 
attitude of sympathy and understanding toward human life and toward 
nature; and thus their understanding developed side by side with their 
awakening powers of thought. 
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By this means, not only was the creative element of imagination kept 
alive, but the affective side of their life was both fed and developed, 
harmoniously linking thought and conation. Then, when with adolescence 
the child's thinking tended naturally to take a more abstract turn, 
aesthetic and intellectual teaching became clearly divided, as in the 
ordinary school; but the moral ideals which the young individual could 
now form for himself, found support and not hindrance in an affective 
nature which had been continually cultivated to that end throughout the 
previous seven or eight years of school life. 
This is a brief and very inadequate account of the general manner in 
which education was conducted in this school. It omits many aspects 
of great pedagogical interest, but which, on that account, are not 
entirely relevant to the present discussion. It takes no account, for 
instance, of the particular ways in which the moral or aesthetic feelings 
were developed in and through the ordinary school subjects, the manner and 
use of punishment, the method of discipline at the various stages, and the 
way in which otherwise abstract subjects were kept within the realm of the 
pictorial. An indication of this last aspect, however, will be given 
presently. 
It is sufficient now to give some idea of the ages at which the 
principal school subjects are introduced in accordance with the above 
principles. No scholastic teaching is given before the age of 6 -7. The 
children are kept in the nursery class until that time, where anything 
that might be lea ned - such as songs or rhymes, or drawing and painting, - 
is learned through the medium of imitation. At 7 the child enters the 
school proper, and writing, reading and arithmetic are begun. Writing 
is taught before reading, since it involves a conative as well as a 
thinking element and thus helps to form a bridge from the first period to 
the second; and the children learn to read what they have already written. 
But the shape of the letters of the alphabet, as we have them today, is 
abstract and they have no longer any reference to the words which they 
represent. The alphabet, therefore, is introduced to the child pictor- 
ially. Thus, for example, in introducing the letter "W" the teacher may 
first speak to the children about the waves of the sea, which the class 
will then draw or paint, gradually arriving at the undulating shape of 
the letter through the picture, and which at the same time is the initial 
letter of the word. The other letters of the alphabet are similarly 
treated - "S" may be derived from "serpent ", "Pty" from "mouth ", and so on. 
Naturally, the teacher must be capable of entering into the child's 
phantasy and of exercising his imagination in his treatment of the differ- 
ent letters. In this way - a little story being told about each - a 
pictorial -affective link is made with the otherwise abstract form. 
Arithmetic is treated in a similar way. The child is not asked to think 
in terms of pure numbers before the age of 9. Up to that time all cal- 
culations are made in terms of something which can be mentally pictured 
- such as a barrel of apples to be divided, or little sums about the num- 
ber of ducks or hens in a farmyard. A story is usually attached to the 
proceeding, and so the children learn to think within the framework of 
phantasy. 
It is at the age of 8 -9 that grammar is begun, and is treated like- 
wise in a pictorial manner. At 10 a beginning is made of introducing 
the child to the kingdoms of nature, commencing with the animals, passing 
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to plants in the following year, and finally to minerals at 12. But 
there is no question of formal zoology or botany at this period, the 
subjects being treated at this stage more artistically than scientifically. 
History, as such, is first taught at age 11, preceded by some history 
of the neighbourhood at year 10, and accompanied by little biographies 
which, not given in book form, but graphically related by the teacher, 
play an important part in cultivating the moral feelings and an under- 
standing for life. Fairy- tales, fables,, and, later, the "Hero" stories 
of mythology form the material of such ethical training during the years 
7 to 9. 
Geography is also introduced at this age. To quote the "Lehrplan ": 
"Geographie: Die Heimatkunde erweitert sich zur eigentlichen 
Geographie. Die Bodenkonfiguration und die wirtschaftlichen 
Verhältnisse näherer Teile der Erde werden besprochen. Wie die 
Geschichte, die von Taten und Leiden der Menschenseele handelt, 
den Menschen in sich selbst hineinführt, so soll die Geographie 
ihn möglichst weit aus sich hinaus zu den Räumen der Erde führen 
und in den Kindern das Gefühl des brüderlichen Verbundenseins 
mit allen Erdgebieten erwecken." 
Something of the attitude toward school "subjects" can also be 
gleaned from the above quotation. 
In regard to the mathematical subjects, the child is introduced to 
arithmetical fractions at 10, and to algebra at 12. At the latter age, 
also, geometrical drawing is begun, but no theoretical geometry is given 
until 14. An introduction to physics and chemistry is also given at 12, 
but in terms of concrete examples and experiment, theoretical consider- 
ations being only gradually developed out of these. It is at age 12 
that some aspects of the teaching begin to deal with the abstract, such 
as in the case of algebra and in that of the physical and 
mechanical 
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laws developed out of the experiments begun at this age. The child is 
led to these as far as possible through a development of the subject out 
of his earlier aesthetic training, so that music leads on to acoustics, 
and painting to optics. 
It remains to mention that modern languages are taught by the 
"direct" method, two being given from the age of 7 upwards. The grammar 
of these languages is introduced at 11, and at this age also, Latin and 
Greek. 
The different fortes of artistic and manual work are also introduced 
at specific ages, among which are woodwork, wood- carving, clay- modelling, 
in addition to drawing and painting which are taught from the beginning; 
sewing, knitting, and darning - in which the boys take part, the girls, 
on the other hand, learning carpentry with the boys; while music, 
both vocal and instrumental, plays an important part throughout. In the 
Waldorf School there was not only a large choir, but both a senior and a 
junior orchestra, the former having some 50 performers. Choral 
recitation is also practised from the youngest class, as well as a new art 
called "Eurhythmy ". (This is in no way connected with 'Eurhythmics ".) 
No examinations are held at any time throughout the school course; 
but, on completion of this, pupils wishing to take university matri- 
culation are given a year's coaching for this end. Neither the lack of 
practice in sitting examinations, nor the introduction of many of the 
school subjects at a later age than is usual, seems to have adversely 
affected the scholastic results. On the contrary, the number of 
passes of the German matriculation examination during the period 1921 -34. 
by pupils of the school was 180 out of 214, or 85;x. 
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Moreover, the educational aims of the school appear to have largely 
succeeded. By means of refraining from a too early intellectualistic 
training, and by keeping alive the imaginative and creative element in 
these children, the school succeeded in producing young people remarkable 
for their initiative and resource; while the ethical and social training 
which was interwoven with the ordinary work, resulted in the development 
of unusual qualities of reliability and social morality. When the 
National Socialist régime already began to threaten the existence of the 
school in 1933, a number of testimonials from business men and others 
who had employed ex- pupils of the school, was collected; and the present 
writer was fortunate in obtni ning copies of some of these during his visit 
in 1934.. Employers in the most varied occupations testified to the 
unusual qualities of these ex- pupils of the school, and the following 
examples are typical: 
Owner of a Soap Factory, writing of 5 former Waldorf pupils, who 
had occupied posts on the clerical staff, as apprentices, and as journey- 
men: 
"Sie sind durchweg geistig beweglich and fleissig. Aufgefallen 
ist uns die allen eigene, stark soziale Einstellung and Hilf s- 
bereitschaft gegenüber ihren Nebenmenschen. . . Wir würden gerne 
unsere sämtlichen Lehrstellen auch künftig mit Waldorfshhülern 
besetzen." 
An Art Dealer: 
"Ich kann auch feststellen, dass sie, durch mechanischen Drill 
nicht verbildet Sand durch Überfütterung mit Stoff nicht verlehrt, 
den Aufgaben des Lebens offener gegenüberstehen, als die 
Schüler anderer höherer Lehranstalten, bei welchen der ober- 
gang von der Schulbank iris praktische Leben oft eine Jnnge 
Anpassungszeit erfordert." 
A Cigar IT.anufacturer writing of a young salesman: 
"Von den Eigenschaften, die ihn vor meinen sonstigen Ange- 
stellten, besonders vor gleichaltrigen jungen Leuten, aus- 
zeichnet, nenne ich vor allem seine grosse Fähigkeit, die 
Bedürfnisse der Kunden zu erfassen und auf dieselben einzu- 
gehen. . . . In seiner Pflichterfüllung ist er unbedingt 
zuverlässig. Trotz seiner Jugend konnte ihm die Führung einer 
Filiale übertragen werden, die er uber ein Jahr zu meiner 
vollsten Zufriedenheit leitet." 
The Proprietress of an Estate writing of a young girl - the first 
Waldorf pupil of whom she had had experience: 
"E. hat eine sehr geweckte Beobachtungsgabe, sie beurteilt ihre 
Mitmenschen gerecht und versucht ihnen. ein liebevolles Verständ- 
nis entgegen zu bringen. Es ist deutlich zu spüren, dass sie 
Lehrer gehabt hat, die sie individuell sich entwickeln liessen, 
ohne dabei egoistisch zu machen. Es ist ihr ganz klar, dass 
wir Menschen in Gemeinschaft leben müssen. Ihr Verhältnis zu 
Kameraden ist durch das lange gemeinsame Leben und Arbeiten 
mit ihnen in der Schule ein sehr erfreuliches. Ich kann dies 
nur erwähnen, weil es erlebt werden muss, wie Waldorfschüler 
und Schülerinnen kameradschaftlich untereinander sein können." 
A Dentist writing of a mechanic: 
"Er hat sich in seiner Praktikantenzeit derart anständig und 
strebsam verhalten, dass ich ihn in seinem Verhalten und seinen 
Leistungen an die Spitze meiner Praktikanten stellen möchte, 
welche ich in 25 Berufsjahren ausgebildet habe." 
Owner of Import and Export Business: 
. . . denn ich schätze das grosse Verständnis für rlie 
praktische Erledigung der verschiedensten Arbeiten sehr, welche 
der Schüler der Waldorfschule zeigt, und glaube bestimmt, dass 
diese nur auf die angewandte Lehrweise zurück2uföhren ist." 
The present writer also, during his three months' residence at the 
school was able to observe for himself what appeared to him as a much 
greater dental vitality among these children. Be had also conversations 
with the school doctor, who pointed out that one of the visible results 
of this way of education - in addition to an entire absence of school 
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nervousness - was the remarkably fewer cases of eye -sight defect in the 
school, as compared with other schools in Stuttgart. The writer was 
afterwards able to obtain confirmation of this statement from the records 
of the Medical Officer for Health in Stuttgart, details of which are 
given below. In the percentages for the Stuttgart schools the Waldorf 
School is of course included. 













1928/29 Stuttgart Schools: 10.7 15.0 33.8 29.6 
Waldorf School: 9.5 8.0 18.0 16. o 
1929/30 Stuttgart Schools: 13.2 16.4 35.1 28.9 
Waldorf School : 6.8 8.5 17.2 16.7 
1930/31 Stuttgart Schools: 13.5 16.7 35.9 30.2 
Waldorf School: 6.8 3.8 18.5 20.5 
1931/32 Stuttgart Schools: 13.2 16.6 35.6 29.6 
Waldorf School: 7.5 4.1 16.0 19.4 
1932/33 Stuttgart Schools: 13.1 16.9 35.6 29.9 
Waldorf School: 7.14 11.6 16.6 20.4 
1933/31 Stuttgart Schools: 13.6 16.0 35.2 30.3 
Waldorf School: 6.4 9.0 15.8 16.8 
It would appear that eye -sight defect in children has some connection with 
nervous strain, produced by the type of education they receive. 
Another physical result indicated by the school doctor was, that on his 
observation of these children, the period of the puberty change with them was 
shorter. This is understandable when one considers that, normally, mental 
work tends to retard physical growth and that children tend to grow more rapidly 
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during school holidays than during the term. Thus a too intellectualised 
curriculum may well tend to inhibit, and so unduly prolong, the physiological 
changes at puberty; and the question arises as to what effect this may have upon 
the mental and physical health of the child at that time, or later. This 
together with the whole question of the relation of school curriculum to 
physical growth, should form a fruitful subject for research. 
In the Waldorf School it was not found necessary to divide the bright 
children from the dull, although the children were of all types and drawn from 
every social class; and the classes were arranged in accordance with 
chronological age without respect to intelligence. Large classes were used, 
these numbering 4O to 50 pupils being quite common; and although there were 
usually two parallel classes in each year -group, these were not arranged either 
according to sex or ability. One of the principles of the school, in fact, 
is that each class should be, as far as possible, a representative slice of the 
community, both socially and intellectually - this being part of the social 
training of the children - and only distinctly mentally defective children had 
to be excluded. These were not, however, excluded from the school, but were 
in charge of a special teacher in a "Iiilfsclasse ". No child was left behind 
in a class for the purpose of repeating any given year's work, but moved up 
with his or her own class year by year. It is part of these educational 
principles that the mental needs of a child depend fundamentally upon chrono- 
logical age; and the fact that this school of over 1000 children was able to 
continue the practice of this principle throughout its entire existence, and with 
such conspicuously successful results, is almost in itself a refutation of any 
theory to the contrary. 
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It can thus be seen that not only is it possible to postpone the 
teaching of certain subjects without adversely affecting the scholastic 
results, but that this can yield, apparently, inestimable advantages to 
the pupils, both at the time and in adult life, and that it is possible 
to teach a class of children of widely varying intelligence without being 
obliged to retard the bright or to leave the dull behind. The whole 
point appears to be that, in the Waldorf School - as well as in the other 
schools in various countries which have since been started for the purpose 
of following these same educational principles - it is the aim of the 
teachers to adapt the subjects and the method of teaching to the actual 
needs of the child at each age, (i4e. in our terminology, to his 'mental 
structure l), the curriculum arising from that, and not, as is customary, 
from the needs of a state department. It must of course be added that, 
by a child's needs is here meant that which is demanded by his quality of 
mind as distinct from his degree of brightness; and it is at this point 
that those who do not recognise these qualitative differences in children 
will part company with us. In such a case one can only point to the 
results of the education in the Waldorf School where these differences were 
recognised, and invite them to compare these with the products of the 
ordinary schools where their own outlook largely holds sway. 
The writer had the opportunity while in Stuttgart of questioning an 
ex -pupil of the Waldorf School as to what he remembered his feelings to 
have been while a pupil there. This young man had been through one of 
the German universities, and had now returned to the school to take the 
teachers' training course. He replied: "As each new subject was brought 
to me, I felt: "That is just what I want:" 
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We may now consider some other subjects of a school curriculum in 
the light of our analysis in Table 2. Grammar, as we have seen, may be 
commenced at 8 -9, provided that it is presented in terms of concrete 
ideas in relation. It should not be taught abstractly, nor should it be 
introduced so early as age 7, since relational thinking has hardly begun 
then. 
Nature- knowledge which in any way involves a grouping of facts into 
wholes - such as flowers or animals into species, etc., should not be 
given until 10, when the child is able to grasp complex ideas in relation 
and simple factual rules. On the other hand, the giving of mere isolated 
facts of nature to a child of 7, for example, tends to force his attention 
toward concrete external details just at the time of the most rapid 
development of his conscious imagery. It is to the latter that we should 
appeal at this period. The age at which to encourage interest in the 
facts of the external world is after this imagery phase has died down, 
namely, at the zero point of 8 or 9. Prior to this stage, if we wish to 
act in accordance w ith the child's mental structure, we should allow him 
to live as much as possible in the element of phantasy. To interfere 
with this natural process in the child at that time is merely to help 
toward that killing of his imaginative life, to which reference has already 
been made. It will be noticed that in nearly all the graphs the 
"imagery" curve is predominant at this age. 
The same consideration applies to stories told to a child of this age. 
To give him "history" - even in the form of stories connected with local 
buildings of historical interest - is to give him poor material for the 
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exercise of his phantasy. A fairy -tale provides a far better stimulus 
and has at the same time in most cases an ethical value which the other 
has not. In the curriculum quoted at the beginning of this thesis, it 
was seen that children of 8 were to be given stories about Julius Caesar, 
the Goths and Huns, Agricola, and Egypt. There appear to be only two 
ways of treating history which can be of any real value to the child. 
The one is biographical and has ethical value; the other is developmental 
and has a value for understantíng. But it is difficult to see what 
benefit a child of 8 can receive from little scraps of -information which 
belong to neither category. History,as such, has no meaning unless seen 
as a continuous development, and this is admittedly beyond the powers of 
a child of 8. On the other hand, little stories about Julius Caesar, or 
the Huns, or the Egyptian pyramids, do not appear to have any ethical 
significance. 
Before we do anything with a child educationally, we should pause to 
consider why we are doing it. We may think it rather nice - from our 
adult point of view - that a young child should know something about the 
flowers and the birds. But are we giving him this information at a time 
when he most needs it? We feel we ought to tell him stories about 
something, and since, as adults, we are interested in history, we tell him 
about Julius Caesar and the pyramids. But what does all this mean to the 
child and of what value is it to him? We are merely wasting time which 
should be devoted to the cultivation of his feelings as a basis for his 
future social behaviour, and for which purpose the ethical content of 
Fables and the t emulating example of Hero -stories meet his needs at 8 -9. 
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History, when treated as a continuous development, should surely 
not be given to the child before he has the ability to grasp complex ideas 
in relation, and which is not normal before age 10. A. child who cannot 
see the relationships involved in the more difficult forms of "Absurdity" 
test, is not yet ready to grasp historical relationships; and the 
relationships which are then introduced should not be abstract - such as 
was observed recently by the writer in the history book of a girl of 11, 
where "a commercial crisis in Belgium" was cited as one of the prelim- 
inaries to the Hundred Years War. 
Geography, involving as it does a grasp of wholes of related ideas, 
should not be given before the same age. To be able at age 8 to mark 
towns and rivers on a blank map, and to know that linoleum is made in 
Kircaldy or linen in Dunfermline, is merely an exercise in factual memory. 
Like the tit -bits about Julius Caesar or Hannibal, it is merely so much 
"examinable" junk; and what the term "equator" can mean to a child of 7 - 
beyond a line drawn on the map - it is difficult to imagine. Fundament- 
ally, geography is meaningless unless the parts of the earth studied can 
be grasped in their relationships; and with young children we are 
compelled either to fall back on the mere learning of unrelated facts, or 
to try to force them to grasp relationships for which their minds are 
hot yet ripe . . . . A girl, age 9, whose homework the present writer 
superintended, read in her geography lesson that the west coast of this 
country is wetter than the east, with the explanation that the prevailing 
wind comes from the west, that it gathers moisture from the sea, and that 
it then meets the mountains which it "can't get through ". And so, the 
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book continued, the clouds must rise, upon which they meet the colder air 
which in turn causes rain. 
The writer went over all this very carefully with the child, and on 
being asked to repeat it she replied that the wind brought moisture from 
the sea. What happens then? she was asked. "The clouds meet the 
mountains and can't get through them." And what happens then? "They 
explode :" she answered blandly. Then, when reminded of their rising, she 
added: "The cold air freezes the clouds, and it rains." At each step 
the child had to be prompted, there being no grasp of the process as a 
whole or of the causal relations. All that she could remember were the 
isolated facts. 
Finally, there is the question of the primary subjects, reading, 
writing, and arithmetic. The first two do not - nor does arithmetic in 
its earler stages - involve any form of relational thinking; but they 
all involve necessarily one thing, namely, the ability to control mental 
' images. To read, and therefore also to write, involves the recognition 
of a series of letters as together forming a sound or series of sounds. 
Until a word is so familiar that it can be recognised automatically, the 
child must consciously combine the several sounds of the letters together. 
That is, the sound -image of the earlier letters must be "held" until the 
last one is reached, and then the individual letter -sounds are combined 
into the word - sound. Thus, control over imagery is an essential factor. 
To teach children to read, therefore, prior to the age of 6 -7 must 
involve a strain upon those - and that is the great majority - who cannot 
yet control their imagery. The Moray House experiment showed that, with 
the greatest possible assistance, 70% of the 5 -year -olds failed to show 
- 252 - 
adequate control; and it can safely be assumed that where so large a 
proportion fail, success is not easily achieved by the remainder. 
An interesting case of this kind came under the writer's notice. 
Avery bright little girl, age 5;7, was learning to read at school, and 
her mother reported to the writer that the child seemed to have acquired 
a dislike for school since she had left the Kindergarten class in which 
she had been very happy. Further, normally cheerful and easy to manage, 
the child had become very irritable, intractible and generally difficult. 
The writer knew the child well and can testify to her normal happy 
temperament. 
At the mother's request, he superintended the child's reading "home- 
work" on two occasions, and he discovered that while the child knew the 
sounds of the individual letters, and pronounced them correctly, she 
could not put them together to form a word. She had to deal mostly with 
words of three letters, or, at least three sounds; but, having pronounced 
each sound separately in order, and managing, with assistance, to put the 
first two sounds together, she invariably by that time had "lost" the 
final sound, and usually invented another to take its place. It was 
plain that the child had not sufficient control over her imagery, and 
that the whole process of attempting to read was consequently a great 
strain to her. At the writer's suggestion, therefore, the parents had 
the child's reading and arithmetic stopped, and her temperament soon 
returned to normal. 
Some months later, these subjects were resumed - this time without 
any visibly ill effect; and now, at the age of 7, this child can read 
very well, and enjoys it, having rapidly gone through 
some ten or more 
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school "readers ", and being in a class of children mostly a year her 
senior. One of the more recent of the books she has read is Hans 
Andersen's "The Snow Queen" (Chambers' Narrative Readers) and which 
is issued for children age 9 and 10. 
That control of imagery is equally necessary for arithmetic, needs 
no emphasis. The simplest sum involves the holding of an image and the 
substituting of another image as each digit is added or subtracted, as 
the case may be. 
It may be said, in short, that all scholastic work which involves 
more than mere parrot imitation, requires some elementary thought of a 
conscious kind, and this is not possible unless mental imagery can be 
isolated and controlled. This ability does not develop adequately until 
age 6 -7, and therefore children should remain in the nursery class until 
that age. Six appears to be the usual age in the majority of other 
countries, and we in this country would appear to be almost alone in the 
practice of commencing formal scholastic work at age 5. 
In an article "Physiological Age and School Entrance" by A.K. Belk, 
(44) the author points to a number of important physiological changes in 
the child of 6 -7; and he mentions the following: Disturbances of growth 
in height and weight; Dentition; Change in rate of growth of both skull 
and brain; Growth of larynx and development of voice range; Control of 
eye - movements; Neuro- muscular control. (p.307). He concludes from these 
facts (p.313): 
If 
. . . the question arises as to whether the time of appearance 
of the first molars could not be cited as a point before which 
school duties should not be imposed." 
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More recently, under the title of "Education of children under seven 
years of age ", (45) (a memorandum submitted to the consultative committee 
by the members of the education section of the British Psychological 
Society, under the chairmanship of errs. Susan Isaacs) the report states: 
"It seems to us of the first importance that the years from 
two to seven should be considered as a single educational unit. 
. . . . There is no evidence to justify the idea that any 
drastic change, either in rate of development or in kind, takes 
place to coincide with the changes in school life which external 
organisation now compels at about the ages of five and seven." 
(p.257) 
It is interesting to note that the unitary nature of these early 
years is here recognised, but the corollary is not added that, for the 
same reason, scholastic teaching has no place during that time. There is 
a suggestion that reading, writing, and arithmetic should be less formally 
introduced - by means of play and games, and practical interests; but 
there is no definite suggestion that they are themselves unsuitable. Yet 
what does it mean, otherwise, to say that these years should-be considered 
as a single educational unit? The change in mental activity which is 
involved as soon as these scholastic subjects are begun - however their 
introduction may be camouflaged - is a vital one psychologically; and if 
there is no change in development, either in rate or in kind, between the 
ages of 2 and 7, on what pretext are reading, writing, and arithmetic 
introduced at all? The authors do not appear to have thought their 
statement through, and to have considered its implications. 
It is not intended in this final section to attempt anything so 
complex as a suggested school curriculum. All that has been attempted is 
to show - as indicated in the introductory paragraphs of this thesis - 
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how the results of our method of approach to the child, developed in the 
preceding sections, can be reflected back upon current educational prac- 
tice. Much of this practice appears to be psychologically unwarrantable. 
There is a marked tendency to a premature intellectualisation of the 
child, forcing him to perform mental operations for which, structurally, 
his mind is ripe only some two to three years later, sane subjects being 
presented altogether too early, and others in a too abstract way. 
The rough indications of a revised curriculum given above are not 
merely theoretical. They happen to coincide very closely with that in 
use in the Waldorf Schoci for a period of nearly 19 years, the concrete 
results of which have already been referred to. Judging by these results 
in contrast to the product of the ordinary type of school, it would appear 
that the effect of this present process of premature intellectualisation 
is - as those who follow the Waldorf School principles maintain - to kill 
the initiative and the creative elements in the young human being, to 
deaden the mind instead of to quicken it, and to make adult thinking 
inelastic and rigid. 
Business men who employ these young people are aware of this, and 
frequently complain of it. Some three years ago the Chairman of the 
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce said in a public address: 
"Indeed, it almost seems that if we are to maintain our 
position as a great industrial and commercial nation, we 
must see to it that a radical change is made in the training 
of our young people before they heave school - - - What we 
business people want to -day is the new blood of vision and 
initiative . . . " 
The deadening effect of the system was also referred to more 
recently by a President of the Educational Institute of Scotland, in her 
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presidential address. She criticised the present educational system - 
. . . not because it is falling behind with regard to the 
ordinary school subjects, not because it fails as a preparation 
for earning a living, and not so much because it fails to 
develop brawn and muscle as fully as might be, but because it 
seems to me to be somehow failing to enable great masses of the 
people to keep their souls alive under modern conditions." 
But there would appear to be consequences of a social kind also. 
If, as has been suggested - and the argument is a compelling one - 
premature intellectualisation can produce an emptily critical, and so 
destructive, attitude toward the environment, as well as a hunger for 
unhealthy excitement, it is a short step from this to some form of 
juvenile delinquency. 
Various factors have been cited as causes of this present -day prob- 
lem - unemployment, lack of parental control, the cinema, and so on; but 
while all these may no doubt be contributory, the pertinent question must 
be asked: Why should any of these factors lead necessarily to behaviour 
of an anti -social kind? That they do so is merely evidence of the fact 
that such tendencies are there in the child already. 
The present writer feels convinced, from the psychological consider- 
ations put forward in this thesis, and from the insight into questions of 
moral training which he gained through the Waldorf School, that these 
external circumstances serve merely to fan into flame tendencies which are 
already smouldering underneath, and that the basic cause of these tend- 
encies, and the responsibility for the social disease which arises from 
them, lie at the door of our system of education. 
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